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Abstract 
 
 
 
The task of this research is to examine how South Korean evangelicals construct 
their mission strategy to North Korea. In order to respond to the humanitarian 
concerns in North Korea, South Korean evangelicals have established or used 
already existing humanitarian organisations (also known as faith-based 
organisations in the secular field) and carried out holistic mission in North Korea. 
This research seeks to demonstrate how they have responded to the perceived 
needs of the mission field while respecting the socio-political conditions imposed 
both by the South and North Korean governments. However, it is also argued that 
they are ready to challenge South Korean governments when necessary through 
advocacy and that they desire to transform North Korean society and challenge 
the state of division. Their aim is to work for the reconstruction and reunification 
of an imagined Christian nation. By comparing the Korean peninsula to biblical 
Israel, their goal is to restore God’s glory in Pyongyang which was once called the 
Jerusalem of the East. However, some evangelicals reflect on mission strategies to 
North Korea and seek to understand the North Korean worldview better, this 
research suggests that they are considering implementing cross-cultural 
missiological principles to pursue their mission successfully. This research argues 
that evangelicals have been shaped by and have engaged with their context: 
evangelicals have never been apolitical, as they have always been driven by a 
strong sense of Christian nationalism. Equally, this research argues that in spite of 
the rhetoric, they have also been concerned to a certain extent with issues of 
poverty and injustices [256 words]. 
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A note on romanisation and referencing 
 
 
For the Romanisation of Korean words when using Korean sources, I have 
used the McCune-Reischauer system as recommended by the U.S. Library of 
Congress and the Journal of Korean Studies. As a French speaker, I also think that 
the system translates more faithfully Korean sounds. However, currently, in South 
Korea, the Revised Romanisation of Korean system is in use. This means that 
Koreans will translate their names under the new system. I have therefore tried as 
much as possible to romanise Korean names with the new system when 
referencing or quoting from a Korean source. In addition, I follow the Western 
model of referring to the author’s first name first followed by his or her last name 
which is contrary to Korean convention. Sometimes, however, Korean scholars do 
not always follow those rules and have adopted a slightly different Romanisation 
system for their names. I have tried to respect their choice as much as possible but 
I have also included a romanised version of their names under the McCune-
Reischauer system for the sake of consistency.  
When referring to a historical figure however or when referring to a 
Korean person (not a source), I use the Korean convention: family name, followed 
by their first name. Again there might be some exceptions to this. For example the 
first South Korean President is generally known as Syngman Rhee. 
When quoting from sources who themselves romanised Korean terms, I 
have left their romanised Korean words untouched because I would be altering the 
quote by changing it. Finally, I have italicised Korean words except for those who 
have become commonplace in English such as the name of cities, minjung or 
Juche. 
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Glossary of terms 
 
 
§ American Far East Broadcasting: FEBC 
§ Christian Council of Korea: CCK 
§ Christian Solidarity Worldwide: CSW 
§ Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice: CCEJ  
§ Civil Society Organisation: CSO 
§ Commission's European Community Humanitarian Office: ECHO 
§ Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence: CPKI 
§ Economic and Social Council of the United Nations:  ECOSOC 
§ Faith-based organisation: FBO 
§ Grand National Party: GNP 
§ International Red Cross Committee: ICRC 
§ International Crisis Group: ICG 
§ Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies : KAVA 
§ Korean Communist Party: KCP 
§ National Council of Churches in Korea: NCCK 
§ Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea: KNCCK 
§ Non-governmental organisation: NGO 
§ Non-profit organisation: NPO 
§ Open Doors International: ODI 
§ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: OECD 
§ People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy: PSPD  
§ Public Distribution System: PDS 
§ United Nations Development Programme: UNDP 
§ World Council of Churches: WCC 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This introductory chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section 
will introduce the context, themes and research questions related to this research. 
The second part will be dedicated to fieldwork, ethical concerns and development 
of research questions. 
Evangelicals and social involvement 
  
The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have seen a 
“religious resurgence” (Haynes 2007: 27), so much so that, “in the modern world, 
religion is central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people” 
(Huntington quoted in Haynes 2007: 27). As argued later, scholars and policy 
makers have come to recognise the positive contributions made by faith-based 
organisations (FBOs) in the fields of development, conflict resolution and human 
rights.  
However, for a very long time, scholars in the field of international relations 
believed in the decline of the influence of religion in the public sphere as a result 
of a series of secularising events that took place in medieval Europe and the 
modernising theories that ensued (Jack Snyder 2011: 24). During the Cold War 
and the elaboration of theories of development, the majority of Western scholars 
ignored the role played by religion because it was seen as an obstacle to 
development (Lunn 2009; Fox & Sandler 2004; Marshall 2001; Clarke & 
Jennings 2008; Holenstein 2005).  Western academics and governments believed 
that only nation states could bring about development by injecting substantial 
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amounts of development aid to help developing countries ‘progress’. In the West, 
many believed that the world would become increasingly secular as it modernised 
and progressed technologically (Haynes 2007). Until the 1960s, secularisation 
remained an undisputed paradigm in spite of the rise of Protestantism in North 
America and the role played by the Catholic Church in the reconstruction of 
Europe after the war (Martin 2005: 18). 
The idea that religion would decline as society advanced technologically and 
economically is known as the ‘secularisation theory’. It formally originated with 
philosophers of the Enlightenment in Europe such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Hume, 
was consolidated at Westphalia (1648) through the subordination of religion to the 
state (Shah & Philpott 2011: 37), and was further promoted by Marx and Darwin 
in the 19th century as well as Weber, Durkheim and Freud in the beginning of the 
20th century (Shah & Philpott 2011: 27). 
 Another factor that contributed to the apparent withdrawal of religion from 
society in the West was the division within Christianity itself. As this research 
will later explain, in the beginning of the 20th century especially, Christians 
became very divided over the question of whether to focus on social action (and 
thus involvement in the public sphere) or prioritise personal salvation (keeping 
religion in the private sphere) (Woolnough 2010: 9). The ecumenical movement 
formally established after the Second World War, the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), is usually described as liberal by evangelicals because of its focus on 
social action. Evangelicals, on the other hand, have always placed personal 
salvation at the centre of their theology and as such are often regarded as 
conservative. 
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The Cold War further deepened this division. Many evangelicals in the West 
sought to transform the political world order through missions to communist 
countries that called for religious conversion and by supporting to American anti-
communist foreign policies, but did not make social justice their priority. 
Mainline Protestants, especially the World Council of Churches, were perceived 
by evangelicals as suspect because they engaged in social activism and also 
counted as members the official churches in communist countries which also 
meant that they often ignored or outright contradicted reports of persecution of 
Christians outside the official bodies in those countries.  
Christianity in South Korea underwent similar forms of demarcation. In fact, 
under the authoritarian regimes, the South Korean Christian progressive 
movement elaborated its own form of liberation theology, minjung theology. 
Thus, for the most part, scholarship on the involvement of Christians in politics in 
the aftermath of the Korean War focuses on the political role played by adherents 
of minjung theology. For believers of minjung theology, salvation was not a 
personal matter but a social process. Rather than being rescued from their sins, 
people had to be rescued from their state of suffering, suffering under the 
authoritarian regimes in the South. 
Evangelicals, however, remained mostly uncritical of the South Korean 
authoritarian regimes until the 1980s, stating that they wanted to stay ‘apolitical’ 
and promote a pure gospel. Furthermore, because of their history with Western 
Christianity and its missionaries, they are often believed to have neglected their 
social responsibility. A prominent minjung scholar, Kwang-sun Suh, argued that 
“Americans put a fundamentalist stamp on Korean religion that has lasted until 
the present day: ‘the revival meetings...set the tone of Korean Protestantism: 
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emotional, conservative, Pentecostal, individualistic, and other-worldly” (Kwang-
sun Suh quoted in Brouwer, Gifford & Rose 1996: 112). More recently, Joseph 
Jung argued that the reason for the Korean Protestant (liberal and conservative) 
church’s lack of influence on society was because of its simplistic and narrow 
understanding of the term conversion: “ [the] famous slogan ‘believe in Jesus - go 
to heaven,’ [a] simplistic formula to achieve salvation or to get a ticket to heaven 
has been one of the key catch-phrases for evangelistic mission in Korea; 
unfortunately, it has resulted in an individualistic and other-worldly Christian 
faith” (Joseph Jung 2009: 238). 
Figures seem to corroborate these arguments. As of 2006, 72.9 % of Korean 
missionaries were involved in evangelistic and spiritual activities with only a 
limited percentage involved in social welfare, community development and 
medical missions (Steve Sang-cheol Moon 2012: 60). With a total number of 
19,373 missionaries in 177 countries, South Korea has become the second largest 
missionary sending nation after the United States (Steve Sang-cheol Moon 2012: 
84). According to Young-dong Kim, church growth remains the strongest motive 
for mission and “most Korean Evangelicals have focused on reaching the 
‘unreached peoples’ and frontier missions. This means the top priority policy of 
the Korean Evangelicals would be placed on evangelism. For some Korean 
Evangelicals, social responsibility is not regarded as missions, but one of many 
functions of the church” (Young-dong Kim 2012: 336). In other words, Young-
dong Kim argues that evangelicals do not prioritise social action when they 
develop their mission strategy. Furthermore, Rev. Seung-min Shin, executive 
Secretary for Ecumenical Relations of the Presbyterian Church of the Republic of 
Korea (PROK) argues that it was only after the kidnapping of 23 South Korean 
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missionaries in Afghanistan in 2007 that the Korean Church started to reflect on 
“its methods of overseas mission, which ignore the socio-political and cultural 
context of the missionary-receiving countries, and have resulted in church 
planting and conversion” (Seung-min Shin 2008: 75). 
However, Christianity in Korea, whether liberal or conservative, has never 
been apolitical or socially inactive. Protestant Christianity was introduced to 
Korea at the end of the 19th century. It rapidly flourished, as it was associated, 
inter alia, with Korea’s striving for independence and modernity. In the South, in 
the aftermath of the Korean War, evangelical churches actively supported the 
successive governments’ politics of anti-communism and economic growth. 
Furthermore, in spite of their strong concern with evangelism, evangelicals have 
always been involved—to a certain degree—in social action. In fact, the rapid 
growth of the church in South Korea and the Christian involvement in the public 
sphere is such that the theory of modernisation alongside a secularisation of 
society cannot be applied to the case of South Korea (see Davie 2002; Il-hyun 
Cho & J. Katzenstein 2011).  
Famine in North Korea and evangelical responses 
 
Since its inception, North Korea had been relying on a Soviet style economic 
system and a public distribution system (PDS), which was established in the 
1950s to allocate food to the population. North Korea used to rely greatly on aid, 
especially oil, provided by the former Soviet Union and China. In 1987, Russia 
stopped donating aid. The former Soviet Union in 1990, and China, in 1993, 
demanded that the North paid goods with hard currency rather than through barter 
trade. In 1994, China decided to reduce its grain shipment. This decrease in 
foreign aid combined with government mismanagement provoked the death of 
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hundreds of thousands of people. By the time the international community 
decided to provide assistance, it was already too late. In order to cope with the 
virtual collapse of the PDS, the North Korean population has been increasingly 
relying on markets that have been burgeoning in the country. However, the 
regime’s monetary reforms and regular clampdowns on markets mean that to this 
date access to food remains a severe problem for the whole North Korean 
population.  
The country needs economic reforms and it is the North Korean government’s 
refusal to undertake such reforms that has caused the North Korean population 
much suffering. Therefore, the population’s failure to have access to food is a 
consequence of government policy and not caused by a lack of food supply. In his 
study of famines, Amartya Sen has labelled this particular problem ‘failure of 
entitlement’ (Sen 2007: xvii-xviii).  
In 1994, the death of the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung at the height of the 
famine and a nuclear crisis marked the ‘opening’ of North Korea to the world. 
Hundreds of refugees started to flee the country to seek food and work in China. 
As refugees made their way down to South Korea, they raised awareness about 
the horrendous human rights situation in the North. At the same time, North 
Korea appealed to foreign governments for food aid and foreign NGOs and 
international organisations were allowed to enter the country to bring 
humanitarian assistance. 
The human rights and humanitarian crisis in North Korea meant that non-state 
actors in South Korea were allowed to play a more concrete role in the shaping of 
South Korea’s relations with North Korea. Religious groups and particularly 
evangelicals have been at the forefront of humanitarian assistance to North Korea. 
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They have also led the campaigns that condemn gross human rights violations, the 
existence of labour camps and have established the networks that help North 
Koreans escape North Korea. In other words, “Christians have become the alpha 
and the omega of the North Korean issue” (Il-hyun Cho & Katzenstein 2011:186).  
The humanitarian intervention of South Korean evangelical organisations in 
North Korea are often interpreted in the context of Korean re-unification and the 
Protestant efforts to reconcile with the North which started with the visit of 
Korean American Pastor Kim Seong-nak, born in North Korea, to Pyongyang in 
1979 (Mahn-yol Yi 2006: 243). The organisations themselves say that they are 
working toward the reconciliation and reunification of the two countries. 
Sebastian Kim says that the current Protestant responses to the issues of division 
can be categorised in three ways: “unification as part of an anti-communist 
campaign and mission agenda (conservative Christians), promoting dialogue 
between the two nations (liberal Christians), and involvement in a supportive and 
sharing humanitarian campaign (both conservative and liberal Christians) 
(Sebastian C.H. Kim 2011: 124). More concretely, South Korean evangelicals 
have responded differently to different concerns and their strategies can be 
broadly divided into three: first, evangelicals have chosen to address the food 
crisis by working directly with the North Korean authorities and by providing 
food and development assistance to North Korea. As explained later, in doing so, 
some evangelicals have also set aside their evangelising agenda and sought the 
help of liberal Christians.  
Second, Korean evangelicals and North Korean refugees converted to 
Christianity believe that the humanitarian crisis is foremost a violation of North 
Koreans’ most fundamental human right by the North Korean authorities, and 
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have established human rights organisations to raise awareness about human 
rights violations and seek regime change. These groups refuse to engage with the 
North Korean government, which they believe cannot be trusted, and therefore for 
the most part, oppose the provision of humanitarian and development assistance 
to North Korea. Third, other groups have chosen to assist North Koreans to escape 
their country. Their work is often compared to that of American activists in the 
19th century who had established an ‘underground railroad’ to help slaves escape 
to free states. Melanie Kirkpatrick has documented the labour of these Christian 
activists thoroughly in a recent book: Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story 
of Asia’s Underground Railroad (2012).  
Research questions 
 
The different approaches to the North Korean crisis illustrate the diversity of 
thinking in terms of mission within a similar conservative tradition. Young-dong 
Kim argues that “the supreme policy of the sending missionaries and mission 
practices should be based on the needs of the mission field, rather than the needs 
of the Korean missionaries/churches” (Young-dong Kim 2012: 340). By 
examining the ways by which evangelicals have responded to the 
humanitarian/food crisis in North Korea (in other words how they have responded 
to the perceived needs of the mission field), my research seeks to understand how 
South Korean evangelicals design and implement their mission strategies globally 
and more specifically in North Korea. The main question I am going to give a 
response to is: how do South Korean evangelical organisations construct their 
mission strategies to North Korea? While I address this main question, I am going 
to give answers to a series of sub questions:  
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§ How do they respond to the perceived humanitarian concerns in North 
Korea?  
§ How do they view North Korea? Does active involvement in the North 
mean that they have given up on their anti-communist stance? 
§ What is their context? What are the factors and conditions that limit and 
determine their related activities in the South and in the North? 
I will be using the holistic model of contextualisation as a criterion to assess 
mission to North Korea. Mission is always contextual as it implies the insertion of 
the gospel into another context: “the Christian faith never existed except as 
‘translated’ into a culture1” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 458).  Therefore, I intend to 
demonstrate how evangelicals in South Korea have been shaped by and engaged 
with their context. More specifically, as the purpose of my study is to show how 
evangelicals are engaging with issues of poverty, division of the country and 
human rights, I will be referring to the holistic model of contextualisation (as 
explained later). 
Before I proceed, I would like to give a definition of some theological terms 
and explain what I mean when I refer to the term evangelical. Even though my 
research is presented in the field of Korean studies, it contains a certain number of 
theological terms which are, I believe, necessary to introduce in order to 
understand the rest of this research. For the most part, I am referring to definitions 
provided by two recognised evangelical scholars, the late John Stott and Alister 
McGrath.  
 
                                                
1 North Koreans might have shared the same traditions, culture, history and language and so on 
with South Koreans for over a thousand years, after sixty years of division living under a very 
different political system and isolated from the rest of the world, I think it is fair to say that the 
country and its people have developed very differently. I develop this further in the chapter 
dedicated to Juche. 
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2. Glossary 
 
Evangelism: The prominent British evangelical scholar, John Stott, has broadly 
defined evangelism as follows: “evangelism (evangelizomai) means to bring or to 
announce the evangelion, the good news” (Stott 2008 (1975): 58). “The good 
news is Jesus. And the good news about Jesus which we announce is that he died 
for our sins and was raised from death. In consequence, he reigns as Lord and 
Saviour at God’s right hand and has authority both to command repentance and 
faith, and to bestow forgiveness of sins and the gift of the Spirit on all those who 
repent, believe and are baptised” (Stott 2008 (1975): 83).  
Conversion: Christians who evangelise or share the good news expect that other 
people would respond positively to the message and ‘convert’. Stott says that in 
secular contexts, conversion means ‘to turn’: to turn around or to return. In a 
Christian context, conversion can be described as “having ‘turned to God from 
idols’ (1 Thessalonians 1:9; Acts 14:15) and also after ‘straying like sheep’, as 
having ‘now returned to the Shepherd and Guardian of your souls’ (1 Peter 2:25)” 
(Stott 2008 (1975): 169).  Evangelisation must be different from the act of 
proselytism or the “deliberate attempt to engineer conversions” (Davies quoted by 
Stott 2008 (1975): 164). In 1964, the Central Committee of the World Council of 
Churches defined the term proselytism as such: “Proselystism... is the corruption 
of witness. Witness is corrupted when cajolery, bribery, undue pressure or 
intimidation is used—subtly or openly—to bring about seeming conversion; when 
we put the success of our church before the honour of Christ ... when personal or 
corporate self-seeking replaces love for every individual soul for whom we are 
concerned” (WCC quoted in Stott 2008 (1975): 165).  
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Soteriology: “The term ‘soteriology’ (from the Greek soteria, ‘salvation’) is 
increasingly used to refer to what were traditionally designated ‘theories of the 
atonement’ or ‘the work of Christ’. Soteriology embraces two broad areas of 
theology: the question of how salvation is possible and, in particular, how it 
relates to the history of Jesus Christ; and the question of how ‘salvation’ itself is 
to be understood” (McGrath 2011: 319). 
Eschatology: Eschatology means the Christian understanding of the ‘last things’. 
“The term ‘eschatology’, which came into general use in the twentieth century, 
derives from the Greek term ta eschata, ‘the last things’ and relates to such 
matters as the Christian expectations of resurrection and judgment. Related to the 
concept of eschatology is the Greek term ‘parousia’ which means ‘coming’ or 
‘arrival’, used to refer to the second coming of Christ” (McGrath 2011: 444) 
Praxis: “a Greek term that means ‘action’ “adopted by Karl Marx (1818-83) to 
emphasise the importance of action in relation to thinking” (McGrath 2011: 470). 
Postmillennialism: Simon Ponsoby (2008) gives the following definition of 
postmillennialism: “the millennial rule of Christ will be ushered in by the church, 
which establishes a platform for the return of Jesus. This will be the result of a 
passionate implementation of righteousness and peace on earth through tenacious 
engagement in political, social, economic, and secular spheres and aggressive 
global evangelism” (Ponsoby 2008: 85). He further argues that postmillennialism 
sees the millennium as either literal or symbolic; the reign is that of the church 
over the world and its worldview is generally more optimistic (Ponsoby 2008: 88-
90). 
Premillennialism: premillennialism believes that only the return of Christ can 
defeat the evils of this world. It generally interprets the millennium as a thousand 
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years following the return of Jesus when Jesus will be reigning with “resurrected 
martyrs from Jerusalem” and holds a pessimistic view of the world (Ponsoby 
2008: 88-90).  
What do I mean by evangelical? 
 
In his introduction to Christian theology, Alister McGrath, traces the term 
evangelical back to the sixteenth century. The term was then used by the Catholic 
writers who wished to return to “more biblical beliefs and practices than those 
associated with the late medieval church. It was used especially in the 1520s, 
when the terms évangélique (French) and evangelisch (German) came to feature 
prominently in polemical writings of the early Reformation” (McGrath 2011: 80). 
As explained in detail later in this dissertation, in the English-speaking world, the 
term is also associated to the Methodist Revival and the Evangelical Awakening 
of the 18th century as well as with missions and social reforms in the 19th century. 
In the 20th century, it became associated with Cold War politics and anti-
communism. Today evangelicalism has become a very broad term “embracing a 
complex network of individuals, seminaries, parachurch organisations, and 
journals, each with a distinctive ‘take’ on what constitutes the essence of 
evangelical identity” (McGrath 2000: 26). 
According to Sebastian and Kirsteen Kim, the term ‘evangelical church’ can 
be applied to Protestant churches where the sermon, not the Holy Communion, 
constitutes the “climax of worship” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 20). It 
may refer to Christians with a special concern for the spread of the gospel or the 
good news. It may further refer to Protestants avoiding the negative connotation 
of the term ‘protest’. Finally, the term ‘evangelical’ is also used to refer to a more 
restrictive form of Christianity that can be found in Northern America, Europe 
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and the countries of the Global South that have been influenced by Western 
evangelicalism. By restrictive the authors are referring to “churches and 
organisations that are related historically and/or theologically to the Pietist2 or 
Methodist revivals in the eighteenth century and subsequent ‘Evangelical 
revivals” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 20). This kind of evangelicalism 
usually relies on four assumptions: 
§ The authority and sufficiency of Scripture; 
§ The uniqueness of redemption through the death of Christ upon the cross; 
§ The need for personal conversion; 
§ The necessity, propriety, and urgency of evangelism (McGrath 2011: 80). 
 
John G. Stackhouse Jr. (2000) adds a final category, trans-denominationalism. 
Stackhouse argues that the four assumptions described above are not exclusive of 
evangelicalism. For example, Catholics will defend the same ideas. However, 
evangelicals place these four assumptions above every other conviction: “There is 
nothing in the generic evangelical impulse that militates directly against 
denominational distinctives and divisions, but there is an important ecumenical 
dynamic to the elevating of these four convictions above the faultlines of 
denominational division” (Stackhouse 2000: 42).  
Research led by Timothy S. Lee on Protestantism in South Korea suggests that 
evangelicalism and Protestantism are “more or less synonymous”. In contrast, 
proponents of the minjung theology referred to in other sections of this research 
                                                
2 Pietism is a reactionary movement within mainstream Protestantism that first developed in the 
17th century with the publication of Philip Jakob Spener’s Pious Wishesw which “set out proposals 
for the revitalization of the church of his day” and challenged the increasing orthodoxization of the 
church and the “rational defense of Christian truth”. Pietism was further developed in England and 
Germany with representatives such as Nikolaus Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf in Germany and the 
founder of the Methodist movement within the Church of England, John Wesley (McGrath 2011: 
53-54). 
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do not qualify as evangelical (Timothy S. Lee 2007: 2). Lee defines 
evangelicalism in South Korea as such:  
Evangelicalism is broadly defined here to include movements more 
specifically known as Fundamentalism and Pentecostalism—as a species 
of Protestantism characterized by a literalist bent in biblical interpretation, 
a soteriology that values the individual over society, fervent advocacy of 
evangelism, and a piety that emphasizes conversion experience and 
personal relationship between God and believer, relegating rituals such as 
baptism and Communion to a secondary place. In Evangelicalism, 
salvation is typically achieved through conversion, wherein one accepts 
Jesus Christ as personal savior and resolves to live in accordance with the 
Gospel (Timothy S. Lee 2007: 3).  
  
Evangelicalism has also somehow become a useful term to define conservative 
Protestant Christianity as opposed to a more ‘liberal’ type of Christianity. These 
distinctions however became more important in the aftermath of the World War II 
with the establishment of the World Council of Churches. However before the 
war such distinctions did not really matter. American missionaries to Korea 
between 1880 and 1910 were for the most part evangelical but as Ung-kyu Pak 
argues “in America, evangelical had become the popular term for almost any 
theologically conservative Protestant who affirmed the necessity of regeneration, 
and the movement clearly included so many subgroups that no none group could 
claim to speak for the whole” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 81). Therefore in my research, 
I will be using the term Christian in reference to all early Protestants in Korea. I 
will be using the terms (conservative) Christian and evangelical to refer to 
Protestant evangelicalism after World War II. Timothy S. Lee says that in Korea, 
there are three non-evangelical Protestant denominations—the Episcopal Church, 
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the Lutheran Church and the liberal branch of the Presbyterian Church (Taehan 
kijang changno kyohoe). All other Protestant denominations can be regarded as 
evangelical.  
A 2005 national census indicated that nearly half of the population (48,580,293 
as of 2010) say they are practicing a religion. Out of this estimate, 43% 
(10,726,463) practiced Buddhism; 34.5% (8,616,438) practiced Protestantism; 
20.6% (5,146,147) practiced Catholicism (Korean Statistical Information Service 
2013). The largest Protestant denominations are the Methodist Church and the 
Presbyterian Church. The Presbyterian Church is divided between the Kosin group 
(considered ultra-conservative); Hapdong group (conservative); the Tonghap 
group (moderate) and the Kijang group (liberal). There are further sub-divisions 
within the Presbyterian Church.  
There are two ecumenical bodies: 1) the National Council of Churches in 
Korea (NCCK or in Korean Han’guk kidokkyo kyohoe hyŏpŭihoe) which is 
usually considered liberal although Jooseop Keum argues that the international 
body, the World Council of Churches, was anti-communist in its early days and 
supported the UN decision to enter into war with North Korea (Jooseop Keum 
2008); 2) the Christian Council of Korea (CCK or in Korean Hangi ch’ong) which 
is conservative. South Korea is also the home of mega-churches, the largest of 
which is Pentecostal but they are also Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist. Many 
churches are charismatic and as such attribute great importance to the person of 
the Holy Spirit.  
3. Evangelicals and contextualisation 
 
I am now going to explain what I mean by ‘model’ and by ‘contextualisation’. 
There are several definitions that can be used to describe a model. In the present 
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context, a model is a “relatively simple, artificially constructed case which is 
found to be useful and illuminating for dealing with realities that are more 
complex and differentiated” (Bevans 2012 (1992): 29). Models are only 
constructions and even though they can provide some insight they cannot explain 
the whole picture which means that to understand models in this way, we must 
adhere to a critical realist perspective (Bevans 2012 (1992): 30).  
Contextualisation was originally a term that had been coined in ecumenical 
circles. As already referred to above and explained in more details below, the first 
half of the twentieth century was characterised by a strong divide between 
evangelicals and ecumenical circles. In 1961, the International Missionary 
Council (IMC), a prominent mission organisation founded in 1912, merged with 
the World Council of Churches and became the Division on World Missions and 
Evangelism (DWME) and in 1973, the Commission on World Mission and 
Evangelism (CWME). During that period of time the DWME focused on ideas 
such as presence instead of proclamation (as a means of evangelism), 
interreligious dialogue, a moratorium on mission and identifying what God is 
doing in the world rather than what the church is doing (this idea is usually 
referred to as missio Dei). The organisation also shifted its mission agenda from 
evangelism to the defence of social justice (Moreau 2012: 33). In that context, the 
Taiwanese theologian, Shoki Coe, coined the term contextualisation:  
To convey all that is implied in the familiar term indigenisation, yet seek to 
press beyond for a more dynamic concept which is open to change and 
which is also future-oriented. Contextuality is that critical assessment of 
what makes the context really significant in the light of the Missio Dei. It is 
the missiological discernment of the signs of the times, seeing where God is 
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at work and calling us to participate in it (Coe (1976) quoted in Moreau 2012: 
34). 
At first, evangelicals rejected the whole idea promulgated by the DWME but 
gradually they incorporated and debated these ideas including that of 
contextualisation. From an evangelical perspective, the point is to capture the 
universality of the gospel in a world that is rich and diverse in religious identities, 
cultures, languages, societies and so on. In this research, I will use the term 
contextualisation to understand how evangelicals in South Korea have engaged 
with and have been shaped by an ever-changing context. 
Contextual theology slightly differs from traditional theology which relies on 
two sources, scripture and tradition, which are believed to be above culture and 
history. Contextual theology however recognises that there is a third source: 
“present human experience” or context (Bevans 2012 (1992): 2-3). Every model of 
contextualisation is the product and combination of different theological elements 
and theological perspectives. Different theologians have elaborated different 
models and have understood the concept of model in different ways. Perhaps, the 
most well known models of contextualisation are those categorised by Stephen B. 
Bevans (2012): 
The countercultural model, recognises the importance of context but 
radically distrusts its sanctity and revelational power. The translation model 
is one that, while certainly taking account of experience, culture, social 
location, and social change, puts much more emphasis on fidelity to what is 
considers the essential content of scripture and tradition ... The 
anthropological model, will emphasize cultural identity and its relevance for 
theology more than scripture and tradition ... The practitioner of the praxis 
model will zero in on the importance or need of social change as she or he 
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articulates her or his faith; the one who prefers the synthetic model will 
attempt the extremely difficult task of keeping all of the elements in perfect 
balance (Bevans 2012 (1992): 31-32). 
These models are not exclusive of one another and each can integrate elements 
of the others. In relation to Korean Christianity, the praxis model of 
contextualisation has been used to describe minjung theology as defined by 
Adams: “[m]injung theology is a conscious attempt to carry out the theological 
task from the Korean cultural and historical perspective” (Adams 2012:155).  
Minjung theology 
 
Minjung (min means people and chung/jung means masses) theology emerged 
in South Korea in the 1960s as part of a wider social movement. It impacted on 
the labour movement the 1970s and the democratisation movement in the 1980s. 
For about three decades, South Korea was under the leadership of a military junta 
that did not allow any room for dissidence. As the objective of the leaders, 
respectively Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, was to achieve 
economic growth at all costs, labour laws became extremely severe and the labour 
class was effectively exploited. Theologians were shocked as they became aware 
of the harsh treatment of workers in factories and decided to write their stories 
down and reflected on them theologically (Adams 2012: 157). Christians and 
students involved in the movement were the National Council of Churches in 
Korea which included some evangelical churches, the liberal branch of the 
Presbyterian Church and a big segment of the Catholic Church. Adams says that 
minjung theologians rested their theology on Korean sources: the concept of han, 
the Tonghak movement3, shamanism, and mask dance (Adams 2012: 178-155). 
                                                
3 Tonghak (Eastern Learning) “was a revolutionary religion reaching deep into the value-system 
of Korean society. It justified radical rebellion against the existing order by affirming human 
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Other non-Korean sources were: scripture, Western dialectical thought, and the 
historical process itself, all of which are also concerned with history (Adams 
2012: 179).    
Nam-dong Suh argued that minjung theology was unique to the reality of 
Korea and Koreans, as it finds its root in the four suppressed hans (condition of 
suffering) of the Koreans: 
1. Koreans have suffered numerous invasions by surrounding powerful 
nations so that the very existence of the Korean nation has come to be under- 
stood as han. 2. Koreans have continually suffered the tyranny of the rulers 
so that they think of their existence as baeksong 4 .' 3. Also, under 
Confucianism's strict imposition of laws and customs discriminating against 
women, the existence of women was han itself. 4. At a certain point in 
Korean history, about half of the population were registered as hereditary 
slaves and were treated as property rather than as people of the nation. These 
thought of their lives as han. These four may be called the fourfold han of 
Korean people (Nam-dong Suh 1983: 5). 
 
Furthermore, whereas early missionaries would argue that Protestant 
Christianity became so successful in Korea because of the people’s rejection of 
old traditions and beliefs, Kwang-sun Suh, a minjung theologian of the second 
generation, disagrees and actually claims that Protestantism spread so rapidly 
precisely because of the ‘shamanization’ of Korean Protestant Christianity (Suh 
quoted in Adams 2012: 178). He says: “Korean Christianity has its deepest roots 
in the mudang [shaman] religion, and thereby, Christianity put down roots in the 
minds of the minjung. Thus Korean Protestantism has been able to grow in 
                                                                                                                                 
equality; it launched a search for Korean identity and self-awareness; its goal was to bring a new 
order to this world wherein all could live as equals in dignity and prosperity” (Suhn-kyoung Hong 
1968: 49). 
4 Baeksong means common people, citizens 
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numbers, and become one of the most powerful and dynamic religions in Korea” 
(Suh quoted in Adams 2012: 178).  
For a long time, evangelicals resisted the praxis model (liberation theology) 
because of its emphasis on social change and dismissal of spiritual transformation. 
Equally, Korean evangelicals and conservative Christians rejected minjung 
theology which they considered to be a heresy (Adams 2012: 197). Between the 
28th of August and 1st of September 1973, a group of evangelicals from around the 
world gathered to address concerns related to their missionary work. In their final 
declaration, the participants declared the following: “We recognise that we have 
to turn back from the sociological dimension of ‘Salvation Today’, and return to 
the original dimension of ‘Salvation from Sin”’ (The Seoul Declaration on 
Christian Mission 1973)—which basically means that there cannot be political or 
social salvation without salvation from sin first. 
Contextualisation, syncretism and indigenisation 
 
In spite of the rhetoric, from an early stage, evangelicals have been concerned 
with the idea of contextualisation. They encouraged the indigenisation of the 
church abroad. The aim of mission as formulated by 19th century missiologists 
Rufus Anderson and Henry Venn was to plan churches that would eventually be 
self-governed, self-supported and self-propagating5 . This formula is usually 
known as the ‘Three Self’ principles of mission. Indigenisation, however, limits 
the idea of context to culture and seeks to integrate the gospel into the culture but, 
unlike contextualisation, does not necessarily seek to challenge or even transform 
it. Moreau (2012: 125) and Simon Shui-man Kwan (2005: 240) have referred in 
                                                
5 Moreau (2012: 126) argues here that this formula in fact encouraged a Western model of church 
community not to mention the social construction of the concept of ‘self’.  
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their respective works to a very useful table originally drafted by Taber (1991) 
that differentiates between contextualisation and indigenisation: 
Criterion Indigenisation Contextualisation 
Understanding of contexts Emphasis is placed on 
‘culture’, which is narrowly 
understood as socially 
rooted ideas people hold 
about a certain set of 
questions. It almost always 
excludes considerations of 
concrete ecological, social, 
political, or economic 
conditions. 
Local context is to be 
understood multi-
dimensionally. Besides, it 
rejects the limiting of 
interest to what happens 
internally within a single 
social group, but demands 
that relations between 
groups, including nations, 
also be considered. 
Views of culture Tends to be static and 
backward looking. 
 
Culture as closed and self-
contained. 
Tends to be present-and-
future oriented. It often 
seeks to work towards 
sociocultural changes. 
Insists on considerating [sic] 
relations between culture 
and social groups right up to 
the global scale. 
Focus of concern Focuses on what is going 
on ‘out there’ on the 
foreign mission field. 
Focuses also on what is 
going on in the sending 
countries. 
View of gospel The substance of the gospel 
is universal and timeless. 
Only the presentation of it 
has to be changed in order 
to have it intelligible to 
other cultures. 
The gospel is not even 
known until a proper 
analysis and critique of the 
context have been done, 
because for gospel to be 
good news it must address 
the specifics of each 
context. 
Role of the missionary Assumes a fairly critical 
and even definitive role for 
the missionary in shaping 
the entire process. 
Places the burden of 
initiative and authority 
squarely on Christians of the 
local context. 
 
Scholars of Korean Christianity have paid particular attention to the way 
Christianity has interacted with Korean culture and native religions. James 
Grayson (2009), for instance, has developed the theory of ‘emplantation’ to 
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explain Korean integration of Christianity into their culture. Grayson’s model 
identifies three stages of development: “Phase 1: Contact and Explication, Phase 
2: ‘Penetration’, and Phase 3: ‘Expansion” which success depends on other 
occurrences such as syncretism that is “1) the resolution of contradictions between 
the new doctrine and the core values of the receiving society; and 2) the resolution 
of conflict between the new doctrine and the existing religions of the host society” 
(Grayson 2009: 163). However, this research seeks to illustrate how evangelicals 
seek to address questions of injustice, poverty and division of the peninsula and 
thus, moves beyond an understanding of context that is limited to culture.  
Related to the concept of indigenisation, evangelicals have been wary of 
another issue: syncretism, or “the inappropriate blending of non-Christian 
religious ideas or practices with Christian faith” (Moreau 2012: 138). Because 
they both link to the relationship between culture and the gospel, contextualisation 
and syncretism are intrinsically connected. These issues have been reasons for 
concern in Korea since the inception of Christianity in the country. I will address 
the question native of Korean religions’ influence on Korean Christianity in the 
fourth chapter of my research, however in the meantime it is worth mentioning 
that Korean Christians have attempted several times to reconcile Christianity with 
elements of their native culture: Pyun Young-tai (1892-1969) addressed the 
question of ancestor worship; Yun Sung-bum (1916-1980) Christianity and 
Confucianism; Pyun Sun-hwan (1927-1996) Christianity and Buddhism; Ryu 
Tong-shik (1922-) Christianity and P’ung nyudo (Korean term meaning beautiful 
life) (Adams 2012: 55-66). However, in a Korean context, the struggle to 
accommodate the gospel into Korean culture meant that most Christians were 
eager to eliminate unwanted elements of their own culture which they deemed 
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inappropriate, while they eagerly sought to integrate an already syncretised and 
westernised gospel. What is often considered a threat to the integrity of the gospel, 
however, has often defined the power relationship between the Western Christian 
and Christians from the global South. As Gary Cowin intelligently pointed out: 
“What’s the rule-of-thumb definition for the difference between contextualisation 
and syncretism? Simple: It’s contextualisation when I do it, but syncretism when 
you do it!” (Cowing quoted in Moreau 2012: 128). More recently, many 
evangelicals have come to realise that some form of syncretism is almost 
inevitable regardless of where you are and where you come from. Therefore, this 
research rests on the assumption that there will always be an element of tension 
between the gospel and the context. Bosch (2011) defines contextualisation as an 
“ongoing dialogue taking place between text and context, a theology which, in the 
nature of the case, remains provisional and hypothetical” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 
437). 
Critical realism 
 
The philosophy I use to underpin contextualisation is critical realism. Critical 
realism is a philosophy that was mostly developed in the second half of the 
twentieth century and that is often associated to the work of Roy Bhaskar, a 
British philosopher. Critical realism is based on three philosophical theses: 1) 
ontological realism; 2) epistemological relativism; 3) judgmental rationalism. 
Patomaki offers clear and succinct definitions of these three concepts: 
“Ontological realism means that the world is real and—except for a very small 
part—independent of the researcher’s (my or our) knowledge of it ... The world is 
not only real but it must also be differentiated, structured, layered and possess 
causal powers, otherwise our knowledge of it—or our being—would not be 
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possible” (Patomaki 2002: 8). “Epistemological relativism connotes that all 
beliefs and knowledge claims are socially produced, contextual and fallible” 
(Patomaki 2002: 8). Finally, “judgmental realism means that, in spite of 
interpretative pluralism, it is possible to build well-grounded models and make 
plausible judgments about their truth ... it explains the nature of the objects we 
study” (Patomaki 2002: 9). In other words, critical realism implies that reality 
exists independently of us and that in the process of apprehending this reality, we 
are influenced by previous theories, experiences, prejudices and so on.   
Traditionally, evangelicals’ epistemological approach has been naïve realism: 
“the belief that knowledge is objective and that we can know reality as it is in all 
of its fullness. Those who approach contextualisation with this orientation believe 
that the Bible teaches truth and they can know biblical truth completely and 
without distortion” (Moreau 2012:79). Another approach, which has never been 
supported by evangelicals, is instrumentalism: “the Bible may contain truth, but it 
is subjective truth constrained by those who wrote, collated, and collected it” 
(Moreau 2012: 78). Whereas evangelicals would never contest the truth of the 
Bible, many have increasingly become aware of a sinful nature which affects our 
hermeneutical interpretation of it and, thus, have slowly moved to adopt critical 
realism and “recognise our inability to grasp truth without constraints” (Moreau 
2012:79). However, just like many evangelicals have resisted the idea of 
contextualisation, many “are reluctant to admit that context shapes the way 
scripture is conceptualized, experienced and valued” (Ott et al. 2010: 278). 
Therefore, many refuse to reflect critically on the way their experiences influence 
the way they interpret and apply scriptures. They believe that it is possible to 
understand and transmit a pure gospel (Nicholls 2003 (1979): 8). 
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Concretely this means that this esearch does not make Christian scriptures 
alone an “epistemological priority” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191). I do not resort to 
the gospel or a particular interpretation of the Bible as my unique framework of 
reference. As stated later, I have mainly used data collected in the context of my 
fieldwork and applied a triangulation of information to understand the ways in 
which Korean evangelicals have received and seek to spread the gospel to North 
Korea. Furthermore, theology alone cannot explain everything. As argued by 
Chung-shin Park in his research on the relationship between Protestantism and 
politics on the Korean peninsula, “[t]heology alone does not determine how a 
church will react to a sociopolitical issue at a given time. The same theology may 
play a liberal role in one period and a conservative role in another. The 
theological orientation of a church should be seen in its historical context: how it 
came about, and how the programs of the church were affected as a result” 
(Chung-shin Park 2003:51).  
In his critical exploration on the meaning of Christian missions, David Bosch 
provides a very insightful analysis of paradigms in missiology. David Bosch 
argues that “the Christian faith is a historical faith. God communicates his 
revelation to people through human beings and through events, not by means of 
abstract propositions” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 185). Bosch uses Hans Küng’s 
historical-theological subdivisions to describe the history of Christianity. These 
subdivisions in history suggest that missionary paradigms can never be 
completely objective:  
In each of these eras Christians, from within their own contexts, wrestled 
with the question of what the Christian faith and, by implication, the 
Christian mission meant for them. Needless to say, all of them believed and 
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argued that their understanding of the faith and of the church’s mission was 
faithful to God’s intent. This did not, however, mean that they all thought 
alike and came to the same conclusions. There have, of course always been 
Christians (and theologians!) who believed that their understanding of the 
faith was “objectively” accurate and, in effect, the only authentic rendering 
of Christianity. Such an attitude, however, rests on a dangerous illusion. Our 
views are always only interpretations of what we consider to be divine 
revelation, not divine revelation itself (and these interpretations are 
profoundly shaped by our self-understandings) (Bosch 2011 (1991): 186).  
Bosch argues that it is “therefore not appropriate not to talk about ‘Christian 
theology’ but about ‘Christian theologies’. Any individual Christian’s 
understanding of God’s revelation is conditioned by a great variety of factors. 
These include the person’s ecclesiastical tradition, personal context (sex, age, 
marital status, education), social position (social ?class?, profession, wealth, 
environment), personality, and culture (worldview, language, etc.)” (Bosch 2011 
(1991): 186). Bosch further identifies other factors which affect the way a person 
or a society receives the gospel: “the general frame of reference with which they 
happen to have grown up, their overall experience and understanding of reality 
and their place within the universe, the historical epoch in which they happen to 
live and which to a very large extent has molded their faith, experiences, and 
thought processes” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 187). 
This does not mean that everything is relative. Bosch rightly argues that it is not 
because the Christian faith is culturally and socially dependent that there is no 
such thing as an absolute truth (in critical realism, this is referred to as judgmental 
rationalism): “Our theologies are partial, and they are culturally and socially 
biased. They may never claim to be absolutes. Yet, this does not make them 
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relativistic, as though one suggests in theology—since we really cannot ever know 
‘absolutely’—anything goes. It is true that we see only in part, but we do see ? It 
is misleading to believe that commitment and a self-critical attitude are mutually 
exclusive” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 190-191). The danger, argues Bosch, would be to 
grant equal validity to an infinite number of contextual theologies (relativism), 
hence the importance of self-criticism and ongoing dialogue with other Christians: 
“I recognise that different theological interpretations, including my own, reflect 
different contexts, perspectives and biases. This is not to say, however, that I 
regard all theological positions as equally valid or that it does not matter what 
people believe; rather, I shall do my utmost to share my understanding of the faith 
with others while granting them the right to do the same? (Bosch 2011 (1991): 
191). Although fallible and constructed, the Christian’s understanding of the truth 
should always be based on the gospel and “because of the gospel, never, however, 
against the gospel” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 191). However, he is aware of the issues 
related to biblical hermeneutics and therefore suggests that “the Christian church 
should function as an ‘international hermeneutical community’ ? in which 
Christians (and theologians) from different contexts challenge one another’s 
cultural, social, and ideological biases. This presupposes, however, that we see 
fellow-Christians not as rival opponents but as partners ?, even if we may be 
passionately convinced that their views are in need of major corrections” (Bosch 
2011 (1991): 191).  
Similarly British Christian scholar, Corrie, argues that “we can avoid the 
profoundly pessimistic conclusions of the postmodern project of deconstruction, 
and yet we concede that we need a critical dimension in all truth claims, and the 
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willingness to submit them to the searchlight of other perspectives” (Corrie 2011: 
8). The search for other perspectives and constructive criticism raises an 
additional question: can an outsider to the Korean culture adequately discuss 
contextualisation? According to the theologian Hiebert, we must engage critically 
with the context, however “it is the insiders of a culture who ought to be engaging 
in this process of theological engagement, not the outsiders who only perpetuate 
their theological imperialism, wittingly or unwittingly” (Hiebert quoted in Corrie 
2011: 8). Bevans (2012) however argues that an outsider can participate to some 
extent in another context if the person approaches the culture and the context 
openly and with a desire to learn (Bevans 2012 (1992): 19). The attitude of the 
researcher will be discussed further in the section dedicated to fieldwork and 
ethics of research below. 
Holism in Christian mission 
 
Moreau (2012) argues that today “by and large, evangelicals affirm a holistic 
focus for contextual work” (Moreau 2012: 136), although historically this has not 
been the case. Furthermore, there are evangelicals who continue to resist the idea. 
For example, Ott et al. (2010) argue that some evangelicals “fear that 
‘contextualizing’ the gospel will open the door to watering down or 
compromising the gospel with culture” (Ott et. al 2010: 266). 
 Evangelicals who have accepted the idea of contextualisation were prompt to 
associate contextualisation with incarnation (God becoming man in the person of 
Jesus Christ) (Moreau 2012: 133). Sung-wook Hong says that the advocates of the 
holistic model of contextualisation, “understand the incarnation as a prime 
example of contextualisation” (Sung-wook Hong 2009: 33). God identifies with 
man through the person of Jesus: “In his [Jesus] words and actions, he 
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communicated the values of the Kingdom of God. His communication was in the 
culture of which he had become a part yet his words and actions have been just as 
relevant and powerful for people of other races and times as the church started 
sharing them with others” (Samuel quoted in Sung-wook Hong 2009:34). Hong 
argues therefore that the holistic model constitutes the most appropriate one in 
mission studies even though more needs to be done to develop it and address its 
weaknesses (Sung-wook Hong 2009: 36). The section below discusses recent 
developments in evangelical mission. These developments are important to 
understand as they have affected to a certain degree the development of 
evangelicalism in Korea and Korean mission strategies. 
The term mission comes from Latin ‘missio’ and means ‘a sending’, “with 
reference to what an individual or group wants to do or is convinced to do” 
(Mombo 2010: 37). The concept of Christian mission has been the ongoing 
subject of discussion among Christians throughout history. Bosch (2011) uses the 
historico-theological subdivision as suggested by Hans Küng (1984) to 
demonstrate contextual movements in Christian history: 
§ The apocalyptic paradigm of primitive Christianity. 
§ The Hellenistic paradigm of the patristic period. 
§ The medieval Roman Catholic paradigm. 
§ The Protestant (Reformation) paradigm. 
§ The modern Enlightenment paradigm. 
§ The emerging ecumenical paradigm (Bosch 2011 (1991): 185). 
 
The Enlightenment exerted a profound impact on Protestant Christianity 
especially evangelicals. Enlightenment is known as the age of reason, the belief in 
science and progress and the subsequent marginalisation of religion. Bosch argues 
that Christians responded to Enlightenment in different ways among which the 
privatisation of religion, the integration of reason into Christian theology and the 
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equation of theology to science (Bosch 2011 (1991):  275-276). Three factors, 
however, reversed these tendencies: the Great Awakening in the American 
colonies, the birth of Methodism and the evangelical revival in Anglicanism. 
Some Christians reacted against the rationalisation of religion by choosing to 
embrace its spiritual component only. A major Christian theologian in the 
American colonies, Jonathan Edwards, however, chose to approach Christianity 
by combining both components; namely scripture and the experience of God 
(spiritual experience): “Edwards and the Awakening, however, combined the two 
principles; they knew that Scripture without experience was empty, and 
experience without Scripture was blind” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 283- 284). 
Edward’s eschatology exerted a profound influence on the beliefs of twentieth 
century American missionaries in the sense that it emphasised the importance of 
the proclamation of the gospel, repentance and faith. The birth of Methodism in 
England also influenced other denominations and beliefs as “Methodists were 
concentrating on the salvation of souls. They viewed societal change as a result of 
rather than an accompaniment of soul-saving” (Bosch 2011 (1991): 284-285). 
A direct product of the Awakening, says Bosch, was the establishment of 
missionary organisations. Churches and denominations no longer became solely 
responsible for the evangelisation of the world, but lay individuals, in Britain and 
in North America, founded societies dedicated to foreign missions. Furthermore, 
the evangelical Christians directly affected by the Awakening, were moved to 
address causes of injustice around the world such as the conditions in slums, 
prisons, coal mines and so on (Bosch 2011 (1991): 286-287).  
In the course of the nineteen-century however, Christians in both America and 
Britain continued to be influenced by the Enlightenment and their theology 
	   41 
became more and more soteriological. In North America, for example, it could be 
assumed that all Protestant denominations were postmillennialist. However the 
Civil War in the United States impacted profoundly on the beliefs of American 
evangelicals: 
The evangelical unity forged by the Awakenings—an evangelicalism in 
which a “commitment to social reform was a corollary of the inherited 
enthusiasm for revival” (Marsden 1980:12)-- was about to disintegrate; 
“the broad river of classical evangelicalism divided into a delta, with 
shallower streams emphasizing ecumenism and social renewal on the 
left and confessional orthodoxy and evangelism on the right” (Lovelace 
1981: 298). By the beginning of the twentieth century the first had 
evolved into the social gospel, the second into Fundamentalism (Bosch 
2011 (1991):  289).  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of this strong emphasis on evangelism and the desire to 
save souls, evangelical missionaries of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
did not differentiate between “service to the body” and “service to the soul” 
(Bosch 2011 (1991): 294).  
The divide between social concern and evangelism is predominantly a 
twentieth century phenomenon.  This change of attitude toward mission which led 
evangelicals to withdraw from social involvement has been described as the 
‘Great Reversal’. The polarisation mostly developed in North America and the 
West but effectively affected evangelical churches in the global South (Tizon 
2010: 62-63). Mission historians have often divided the history of Western 
missions in the twentieth century as follows. The era prior to 1910, first, when 
missionaries, in spite of a clear preference for evangelism, were involved with 
social and humanitarian action. Second, Edinburgh 1910, a mission conference 
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where there is evidence of an increasing split between those prioritising personal 
salvation and those focusing on social action. The latter led, third, to the 
establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948. Fourth, the 1960s and 
beyond when evangelicals resumed discussions over the nature of missions and 
the relationship between the saving of souls and social action. Evangelicals started 
to recognise that prior to 1910, missionaries had been addressing both spiritual 
and physical needs but recalling at the same time that the salvation of souls had 
always prevailed over humanitarian and social action. Thus, Billy Graham 
reaffirmed in 1966: “I am convinced if the Church went back to its main task of 
proclaiming the Gospel and getting people converted to Christ, it would have a far 
greater impact on the social, moral and psychological needs of men than any other 
thing it could possibly do. Some of the greatest social movements of history have 
come about as the result of men being converted to Christ” (Graham quoted in 
Bosch 2011 (1991): 414). Evangelicals continued to discuss and eventually agreed 
that evangelism and social action could not be separated. In doing so, evangelicals 
were not only restoring a legacy of social involvement but also catching up with 
Christian liberal and secular movements. 
These discussions culminated with the Lausanne Covenant of 1974 according 
to which “the full gospel should include both personal salvation and social 
responsibility for the fallen world” (Woolnough 2010: 9-10). This shift, fifth, to a 
more comprehensive approach to mission has been labelled ‘holistic mission’ and 
was further reinforced in 1986 when a group of ‘Concerned Evangelicals’ 
questioned the politics of the apartheid in South Africa and felt the need to 
address both questions of personal sin and injustices in society (Bosch 2011 
(1991): 417).  
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In reality, evangelicals have not yet reached a common understanding on the 
idea of holistic mission. John Stott, a British evangelical scholar, summarised the 
argument quite succinctly. He argued that if social action was a means to win 
converts then “in its most blatant form this makes social work (whether food, 
medicine or education) the sugar on the pill, the bait on the hook, while in its best 
form it gives the gospel a credibility it would otherwise lack. In either case the 
smell of hypocrisy hangs round our philanthropy” (Stott 2008 (1975): 41). The 
second way of relating social action to evangelism has been to describe it as being 
the manifestation of evangelism, meaning that education and medical care, “are 
motivated by the proper love and compassion” (Stott 2008 (1975): 42). However 
as Stott argued, it is still hypocritical: “if good works are visible preaching, then 
they are expecting a return; but if good works are visible loving, then they are 
‘expecting nothing in return” (Stott 2008 (1975): 43). For Stott, social service is a 
partner of evangelism: “neither is a means to the other, or even a manifestation of 
the other” (Stott 2008 (1975): 43). Christians therefore are called to respond to a 
need. For example, if a person is so hungry that she or he will not hear a word, 
then it is more important to feed that person first. If a person is simply suffering 
from a spiritual problem or sin then it is important to address that particular need 
first. Stott says situations are different and callings are different (Stott 2008 
(1975): 44).  
Christians and the Cold War 
 
The situation described above is even more nuanced. First, American 
evangelicals were a very influential political force during the Cold War. Second, 
as argued below, some of them were heavily involved in social action. 
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Some of these evangelicals viewed missions as a means to eradicate 
communism and thus change the world order. According to Jenkins, 
“Evangelicals are concerned more with creating a righteous political order than 
with far-reaching economic restructuring” (Jenkins 2006: 141). An example of 
this can be seen in the fact that some evangelical missionaries became bible 
smugglers into communist nations.  International Christian organisations such as 
Open Doors, Release International, Barnabas Fund and Voices of the Martyrs 
were established in memory of pastors and missionaries who had risked and 
sometimes given their lives in their attempt to evangelise the communist nations. 
Primarily missionary organisations, they have expanded the scope of their 
mandate to include human rights advocacy with a special emphasis on religious 
freedom, dedicated solely to the cause of the persecuted church. All these 
organisations are actively working to promote religious freedom in North Korea 
and to spread the gospel.  
 In fact, mainstream Western Christianity was shaped by and helped shape 
Cold War politics. American Presidents used religion, especially evangelical 
Christianity as a propaganda tool, to combat the atheist materialism proposed by 
the Soviet bloc. Herzog (2010), who has analysed the politics of Christian revivals 
in the United States in the early stages of the Cold War, says: “if Communism 
was a dangerous pseudo-religion, then a powerful weapon in the anti-Communist 
arsenal was genuine religious faith. Perhaps more importantly, there was also a 
growing belief that power had both material and spiritual components” (Herzog 
2010: 340). According to Diane Kirby, religion was an important component of 
President Harry. S. Truman’s politics during the Cold War for which he received 
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the support of church leaders in Europe especially from Pope Pius XII, a fervent 
anti-communist (Kirby 2003: 78). She further argues:  
American officials and the American people held powerful beliefs about the 
superiority of their institutions, culture and way of life. These beliefs, 
including religious beliefs, prompted actions that figure prominently in the 
story of the Cold War and the nature it assumed. The US traditionally 
perceived itself as the manifestation of Truth, Justice and Freedom placed on 
earth by a God whose purpose was to make of it an instrument for extending 
His spiritual and material blessings to the rest of humanity (Kirby 2003: 3). 
 Therefore those holding these beliefs often thought that by promoting the 
American style of Christian evangelical faith and seeking more converts the world 
could become a better place. Between 1945 and 1960, religion became a key 
component of the development and implementation of American policy: “There 
were specific legislative achievements, such as the addition of ‘under God’ to the 
Pledge of Allegiance. But there were less visible, and as a consequence largely 
forgotten, policy adoptions regarding religion in the areas of foreign propaganda 
and psychological warfare, military training, state-sponsored or state-supported 
national faith drives, and public education” (Herzog 2010: 338). As a result the 
politics of the presidents tended to receive large support from the evangelical 
community: “[n]ational opinion surveys in the mid-1980s revealed that a quarter 
of Americans viewed the US-Soviet conflict in theological terms, and over half 
endorsed Reagan’s view of the Soviet Empire as an ‘Evil Empire” (Gouverneur 
2007: 85). As a result, conservative Christians lobbied for the creation of the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 thus making religious freedom a 
major component of American foreign policy. Under the Act, the President is 
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required to undertake a series of punitive actions against countries that violate 
religious freedom (Hackett 2005: 669). 
Authors and academics who have studied the relationship between Christianity 
and the communist bloc argue that Christians have contributed to the making of a 
bipolar world order. However, they usually neglect an important factor: the reason 
why Christians despised communism and regarded it as evil is also because the 
‘atheism’ of communist countries usually translated into a harsh and systematic 
persecution of religions that operated outside of the state control. It was not only 
forbidden to spread the gospel and go to church, but Christians (evangelicals and 
Catholics) in those countries were routinely arrested, tortured and executed for 
their faith. Evangelicals, therefore, believed that by changing the nature of these 
regimes, they would help their fellow believers who were being persecuted. 
Evangelicals and Catholics were the first groups to denounce human rights 
atrocities committed by communist governments. Sadly, it also means that until 
the 1980s, evangelicals around the world including South Korea supported 
authoritarian regimes because of their anti-communist policies. In addition to their 
involvement in politics, evangelicals continued to remain involved in social action 
(even though their actions were being frowned upon by other more conservative 
evangelicals). In fact, the “post-World War Two period marked a significant 
increase in evangelical ministries” (Tizon 2010: 66).  
 
Holistic missions and the establishment of faith-based organisations 
 
With the development of holistic missions, evangelicals expanded their 
mandates to address contemporary issues of human rights, ecology, poverty and 
so on. Often, in order to do so, lay Christians, denominations and churches 
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established charities or faith-based organisations (FBOs). Most of the 
organisations that are operating in North Korea and referred to in the following 
chapter of this research are effectively FBOs. Some of these organisations are also 
known as mission or missionary organisations in Christian circles. For example, 
Youth with a Mission and Campus Crusade are well known mission organisations. 
They are also very active in providing aid and working in North Korea. 
Scholars argue that it is difficult to give a proper definition for faith-based and 
religious organisations (Harden 2006; Torry 2005). Harden also rightly highlights 
the fact that a lack of understanding of spirituality and faith can become a 
hindrance in the process of evaluation of faith-based programmes (Harden 2006: 
484). It is also important to underline the fact that the term FBO encompasses a 
vast range of concepts and attributes. In fact, faith-based organisations are so 
diverse in terms of identity and practices that the scholarship and case studies 
used to attempt to understand and appraise their work will never adequately 
reflect the situation on the ground, as every case is different. Gerard Clarke and 
Michael Jennings provide a table of categorisations which is often referred to in 
the scholarship on faith-based organisations (Clarke & Jennings 2008: 25): 
§ Faith-based organisations or apex bodies which rule of 
doctrinal matters, govern the faithful and represent them 
through engagement with the state and other factors; 
§ Faith-based charitable or development organisations 
which mobilize the faithful in support of the poor and other 
social groups, and which fund or manage programmes 
which tackle poverty and social exclusion; 
§ Faith-based socio-political organisations which interpret 
and deploy faith as a political construct, organizing and 
mobilizing social groups on the basis of faith identities but 
in pursuit of broader political objectives or, alternatively, 
promote faith as a socio-cultural construct, as a means of 
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uniting disparate social groups on the basis of faith-based 
cultural identities; 
§ Faith-based missionary organisations which spread key 
messages beyond the faithful, by actively promoting the 
faith and seeking converts to it, or by supporting and 
engaging with other faith communities on the basis of key 
faith principles; 
§ Faith-based radical, illegal or terrorist organisations 
which promote radical or militant forms of faith identity, 
engage in illegal practices on the basis of faith beliefs or 
engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the 
grounds of faith. 
 
According to Bradley, for an organisation to be recognised as faith-based, 
“faith needs to have embedded itself in the organisation’s operational structures 
rather than just existing as a source of personal motivation for individual 
employees” (Bradley 2009: 105). Like Clarke and Jennings, Berger distinguishes 
faith-based organisations from churches (or temples and mosques) and defines 
religious/faith-based organisations as civil society organisations that are actively 
involved with the public sphere: 
Religious NGOs [are] formal organisations whose identity and mission are 
self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or 
spiritual traditions and which operates on a nonprofit, independent, voluntary 
basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public 
good at the national or international level … They differ from congregational 
and denominational structures, which tend to focus on the development of 
their memberships, RNGOs seek to fulfil explicitly public missions (Berger 
2003:16). 
Torry (2005) highlights the fact that FBOs are open systems (Torry 2005: 31), 
which means that “religious organisations vary in the extent of their exposure to 
or insulation from specific sources of external pressure” (Benson & Dorsett 1971: 
141). Many Christian organisations have chosen to link humanitarian assistance to 
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their mission of evangelisation (Flanigan 2010; Clarke 2007; Berger 2003; 
Benthall 2005) but Berger argues that many organisations have also become more 
“concerned with the practical expression of their religious beliefs and consider 
themselves duty-bound to be a source of positive change in society (Berger 2003: 
32). Some faith-based organisations and staff do not explicitly share the gospel as 
such but express their faith through their work. Flanigan says that some see the 
“provision of social services as a type of religious ministry”. Furthermore, 
religious organisations can be working in an environment or a community that 
shares the same ideology and religious traditions. In that case, Crowe says that the 
organisation can claim a certain “degree of legitimacy” (Crowe 2007:5). 
However, FBOs must be ready to “embrace debate, acceptance and ideological 
differences” (Crowe 2007:4). Generally in Western Europe, the agenda of FBOs 
does not differ much from that of secular organisations and the British 
Department for International Development (DFID) has in fact increasingly been 
cooperating with FBOs and has even recognised the contributions that they have 
made in the efforts to alleviate poverty. Between 2005 and 2010, DFID funded an 
international research programme, the Religions and Development Research 
Programme Consortium, which highlighted the role played by religions in 
development (Religions and Development Research Programme 2014). 
 In the United States, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has historically discriminated against religious organisations in terms of 
funding. President Georges W Bush, however, established the Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives Act, which was approved by Congress in 2001. In 2004, 
USAID agreed to no longer discriminate against religious organisations which 
meant that organisations which combined provision of services to religious 
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activities such as religious education, worship, evangelisation and so on could 
apply for state funding (Clarke 2007).  
In conclusion and to use the words of Bradley: “diversity in identity translates 
into diversity in practice” (Bradley 2009:102). To understand FBOs, Bradley 
advises to take into account “first, the degree to which a collective ‘faith’ is 
central to the organisation’s identity. Second the extent to which ‘faith’ shapes 
and drives the practices of an organisation” (Bradley 2009:104). Bradley uses a 
continuum to describe everything in between including organisations that make 
use of their religious knowledge and teachings to elaborate new development 
practices.  To translate this into theological terms: “Since one’s theology of 
mission is always closely dependent on one’s theology of salvation; it would 
therefore be correct to say that the scope of salvation—however we define 
salvation—determines the scope of the missionary enterprise” (Bosch 2011 
(1991): 403). The section below describes the scope of activity in Christian terms. 
Not all organisations wish to spread the gospel, and have chosen instead to 
secularise their mandate. For example, the UK—based human rights Christian 
organisation Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) is rooted in Christian beliefs 
and only hires ‘committed Christians’ but does not evangelise. Similarly, other 
organisations choose to prioritise evangelism and focus on church planting, 
theological education and so on. For the organisations that have chosen not to 
evangelise, it could be proposed that they have chosen to teach Christianity by 
example. This type of mission can also be called diakonia. 
The modern interpretation of the term diakonia is often “humble service”, 
whereas it was originally used in the Greek/original version of the New 
Testament, to mean, “the carrying out of a commissioned task” (Gooder 2006: 
	   51 
33). The modern use of the term diakonia is as follows: “a church-based care for 
the poor, the sick, and the socially deprived—it is an expression of church charity 
and Christian love. It might be spontaneous, but in many churches, the diakonia is 
well organised. It is highly practical in its orientation” (Johannessen 2009: 168).  
Diakonia is also a term that has been used by the World Council of Churches in 
its efforts to bring about reconciliation and solidarity. Diakonia, in other words, is 
not a strategy that seeks to lead to conversion but rather a social action oriented 
strategy of forgiveness and reconciliation.  
Sometimes however organisations decide to follow the principles of diakonia 
because the country where they operate does not allow them to express their 
religious beliefs freely and/or evangelise. This is particularly the case for 
organisations working in the Middle East and socialist countries such as Cuba, 
China, Vietnam and, of course, North Korea. Often, the missionaries employed by 
these organisations will enter the country with a work visa and will have a full-
time job such as teacher, businessman or medical practitioner. This particular type 
of mission is referred as tentmaking or bi-vocational ministry. 
Tentmaking ministry is a phrase that has been coined to describe the ministry 
of the apostle Paul in the New Testament. According to the book of Acts, chapter 
18 verses one to three, “Paul left Athens and went to Corinth. There he met a Jew 
named Aquila, a native of Pontus, who had recently come from Italy with his 
wife Priscilla, because Claudius had ordered all the Jews to leave Rome. Paul 
went to see them, and because he was a tentmaker as they were, he had stayed 
and worked with them” (Acts 18: 1-3). Missionaries who live abroad often rely 
on financial provisions from their home church, friends and families. However, 
many missionaries have also followed the example of Paul and have chosen to 
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work full-time to sustain themselves while carrying on with their mission work. It 
is a strategy to penetrate countries which would otherwise deny them entry as 
religious worker: 
For any number of reasons a series of different structures has been 
developed to enable Evangelicals to enter countries or regions of the world 
that would normally, but not exclusively, be closed to traditional missionary 
endeavours. These types of ministries are called Tentmaking, Platform 
Ministries and NGOs ... If the remaining unevangelized people in our world 
are to hear the gospel, then Christians will have to enter nations that restrict 
the access of foreign missionaries. Many of the people who live in these 
nations are religiously confident with long traditions in Islam, Buddhism and 
Hinduism. There are generally poor nations... They are nations that also 
often violate international standards in the area of religious freedom and 
consider the propagating of Christian faith a disruptive Western influence. 
Some refer to these nations as ‘creative access nations’ or CANs (Fanning 
2009: 11-12).  
Often, target governments are well aware that they are granting visas and 
residency to organisations that carry such agendas and, therefore, Fanning argues 
that the question of whether tentmaking is ethical or not is irrelevant. In fact, 
many countries look the other way “when sometimes something violates policy 
but benefits the nation” (Fanning 2009: 22).  
However, the work of undercover missionaries has sometimes resulted in 
diplomatic tensions between the United States and target countries, especially in 
the Middle East: 
Proselytism-driven politics can take many different forms, depending on the 
configuration of relations among proselytizers, their targeted group, other 
religious organisations, and political authorities in both home and target 
countries. A comparable range of diverse responses is elicited by those faith-
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based organisations engaged in the delivery of humanitarian relief or 
development aid as well as those mobilizing on the behalf of marginalized or 
victimized peoples. Ironically, none of these activities may have been 
initially inspired by any explicitly political agenda. The key point is to 
realize that efforts directed solely at goals defined within a faith tradition 
may have external effects on political processes and actors that result in 
policy partnerships, partisan struggles, or international confrontations 
(McGinniss 2006: 8).  
 
In April 2003, Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse and other organisations 
claimed that they hoped to contribute to the reconstruction process in Iraq and 
prepare the way for democracy by converting locals to Christianity. Their 
programme was promptly terminated with the Bush administration having to 
disclaim the intentions of the NGO but it reinforced Muslim suspicion that the 
United States was promoting a pro-Christian agenda in the region (McGinnis 
2006: 2).  
The sections above has sought to define and analyse issues related to 
contextualisation, holistic mission and faith-based organisations. The section 
below will be discussing fieldwork undertaken for this research.  
 
4. Scope of my research and development of research questions  
 
Prior to undertaking fieldwork, I had decided that my research was going to 
focus on the legitimacy of South Korean Christian organisations in light of a 
change of government in South Korea. Under the Sunshine Policy of President 
Kim Dae-jung implemented in 1997, South Korean NGOs were granted better 
access to the North and expanded their activities to include technical aid and 
development programmes. The coming into power of a conservative government 
in 2008, however, provided them with a new political scene to negotiate with. 
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Initially, my research also aimed at understanding how FBOs related not only to 
the current political environment but also to their a priori ideological opponents: 
human rights organisations which generally oppose food aid to North Korea. 
Therefore, in my core chapter, I developed the following points: legitimacy is 
both an outward and an inward process, it is both “derived and generated” (Slim 
2002: 7). In order to do so, I was going to be looking at the legitimacy of these 
organisations because it allowed me to look at “a particular status with which an 
organisation is imbued and perceived at any given time that enables it to operate 
with the general consent of peoples, governments, companies and non-state 
groups around the world” (Slim 2002: 7).  Slim explains that an NGO’s 
legitimacy is derived legally and morally which means that in looking at the case 
of South Korean FBOs, I was going to look at the source of their mandate, which 
is most likely faith based, and also analyse how the South and North Korean states 
draft laws that allow them to operate and how these laws are being influenced by 
politics.  
Slim argued that legitimacy is generated “tangibly and intangibly in practice” 
(Slim 2002: 9), therefore an organisation must not only seek support from people 
but will also gain legitimacy because of its knowledge, expertise and 
performance. It also gains less intangible support through its reputation, integrity 
and trust (Slim 2002: 9-10). NGOs around the world are being made the subjects 
of debate. NGOs are increasingly perceived to have lost their neutral stance and to 
be acting and implementing policies on behalf of particular individuals, groups, 
governments or governmental agencies. In addition to that, NGOs working in 
authoritarian states face severe criticism and are often accused of collaborating 
with evil regimes. NGOs operating in North Korea confront these two different 
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perspectives: they are sometimes described as a bridge between the oppressed and 
isolated North Korean population and the outside world and, as such, are being 
used by governments that promote policies of engagement with North Korea. It is 
also said, however, that their work and the provision of aid sustains the regime 
and therefore the organisations do not have legitimacy in the eyes of many human 
rights activists and opponents to the politics of engagement with North Korea.  
Once I arrived in South Korea, I realised that part of the scope of my original 
research proposal was not relevant because in fact Christian organisations were 
not actively seeking to defend or justify their activity but rather took it for granted 
that their involvement in North Korea was the right thing to do because they 
believed that it was what God had called them to do. I decided therefore to review 
my research questions in the light of this. I decided to focus more deeply on the 
Christian identity and motivations of the organisations to better understand them. 
I also realised that the ideological gap between different civic society groups and 
in particular between Christians was greater than I had previously assumed. I 
therefore decided to focus my research on these aspects. I wanted to understand 
how could the same people who believe in the same and unique ‘truth’ be 
expressing their faith in such a polarised way? I developed new research 
questions: who are these organisations and what exactly are they hoping to 
achieve? I also realised how much the history, culture and current politics of the 
Korean peninsula impacted on the scope of their activity, and so I wanted to 
include the conceptual framework in which these activities take place. I developed 
my interview questions accordingly.  
Finally, the use of written materials such as emails, books on mission to North 
Korea, articles and brochures from organisations helped me to contextualise and 
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generalise certain facts. For example, the humanitarian activity of a church or an 
organisation in North Korea should be understood in the wider context of South 
Korean evangelicals’ missions strategy, the growth of the church, their approach 
toward mission, their attitude toward communism/ North Korea and their 
historical bound with North Korea.  
Overview of fieldwork period 
 
I spent eleven months in Seoul, South Korea, between September 2009 and 
August 2010. I first travelled to South Korea in 1998 and I had lived in Seoul a 
number of times between the years 1998 and 2008. In August 2006, I stayed in 
Tumen, a town located on the North Korea border in China, where many 
missionary groups are stationed. I travelled to North Korea in September 2009 
and September 2011.  
While in Seoul, as a direct observor I  attended a wide range of conferences 
and press conferences organised about North Korea as well as prayer meetings 
and services. I held informal conversations with persons involved in the Christian 
and non Christian human rights movement (South Korean activists, North Korean 
defectors and foreigners) and humanitarian workers (Christian Protestant, non-
Christian, Budhhist and Catholics) as well as diplomats, journalists and 
academics. I attended a meeting organised by the North Korean human rights 
studies department of the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU) that 
took place between the researchers of KINU and organisations providing 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea. I also attended a three day conference on 
mission in North Korea that took place in Seattle between 10 September and 12 
September 2010 (Empower Conference organised by the Christian organisation 
Reah International). This conference gathered a number of Christian missionaries 
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(foreign and South Korean) active both inside North Korea and on the North 
Korea Chinese border as well as academics, representatives of think-tanks (policy 
makers in Washington DC) and politicians. I was invited to attend under the 
condition that I would not divulge the names of the attendees (speakers or 
participants). The conference focused on several aspects of mission work in North 
Korea including:  
• Humanitarian  
• Medical  
• Business  
• Education  
• PUST (Pyongyang University of Science & Technology)  
• Information Technology (Reah 2010). 
 
Ethical concerns 
 
While securing and conducting interviews, I faced a certain number of ethical 
concerns and obstacles. First, it was difficult to network and interview a number 
of people because I am a foreign researcher. In Korean culture, trusted 
relationships and connections are very important. In that context, accessing the 
field was facilitated by “introductions and referrals” (Berg 2007 (1989): 175). 
Access therefore was not the product of a negotiated process and gradual 
establishment of trust between me and the interviewees or by what I know but 
rather by whom I knew: ?in a sense this is analogous to snow-balling: using one 
research participant to indicate others who can be equally or more informative? 
Instead of using contacts to widen the sample as in snowball sampling, the 
suggestion there is to use one?s contacts and relationships to gain the vital, 
initial entry into the field, where one can engage with possible research 
participants?(Vallance quoted in Berg 2007 (1989): 175). I therefore spent a lot 
of time establishing connections and networking. This task was nevertheless made 
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complicated by the fact that Korean society, civil society and the academic world 
are extremely polarised over the question of North Korea. The point was to 
connect with individuals and organisations who would connect me with the right 
individuals without being associated to a political agenda. I also found that my 
referring to foreign researchers, and because of my former involvement with a  
UK—based Christian organisation, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), which 
is well-known in Korea, facilitated the establishment of some connections.  
Additionally, I felt that in a number of cases, because of my efforts to speak the 
language and my position as a PhD student, many people welcomed me and 
provided me with the requested information. Korean people tend to be very 
touched and excited when a foreigner shows interest in their country, especially 
North Korea, and are deeply respectful of academics because of the value 
attributed to education in Korean culture. 
At the same time, it was extremely difficult to secure interviews with NGO and 
FBO representatives first of all because the subject of North Korea and of 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea are very sensitive in South Korea. NGOs 
are usually reluctant to share information about their work. Christian groups are 
even more secretive about their work because of the sensitiviy associated to 
mission work in North Korea. I had to pay particular attention to the ethical 
concerns related to this aspect of my research. Most (but not all) of the individuals 
interviewed for the purpose of this research did not want to be recorded or be 
named. However, my research seeks to to be as detailed as possible and is an 
attempt to respect the wishes of the interviewees while recognising the need to be 
critical and concrete in my analysis. I conducted semi-structured interviews, as I 
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wanted to give the interviewees the space and freedom to express themselves 
within the remit of my area of research.  
I conducted interviews with academics, diplomats, and government officials in 
English. Interviewing the FBO representatives was a bit trickier as they were not 
all necessarily fluent in English, so I conducted the interviews in Korean and 
showed them my questions written in Korean and proofread beforehand by a 
Korean speaker. I did not use an interpreter. Occasionally, the representatives 
would choose to speak in English in order to clarify certain points. Two FBO 
representatives were confident enough to write down the answers to my questions 
but I have decided nevertheless to leave their comments anonymous. As argued 
by Sophie Laws et al. “[e]ven if respondents consent to participation, it is still 
your duty to protect them as far as possible from any potentially harmful effects 
of your research, whether these relate to individuals or whole social groups” 
(Laws et al. 2003: 235).  
In light of the restrictions and constraints described above, I will simply refer 
to the conference and interviewees following the Chatham house rule according to 
which: "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, 
participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor 
the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, may be revealed" 
(Chatham House 2013 ). It is important to note that not all the information 
provided by the interviewees was sensitive or confidential but for the sake of 
consistency, I will be referring to the interviewees in a consistent manner 
regardless of the nature of the information distinguishing South Korean 
interviewees from foreign interviewees. For example, I will refer to South Korean 
evangelical interviewees as SK1, SK2, SK3 and so on. I will refer to interviews 
	   60 
with foreigners as F1, F2 and so on. A more detailed list of my semi-structured 
interviews (job titles, names of organisations and dates of interview) can be found 
in the bibliography. I did not quote from all of them. 
I openly introduced myself as a PhD researcher collecting data, but, because I 
also introduced myself as a Christian, I thought that many of the interviewees 
would trust that I would respect their confidentiality. In telling them I was sharing 
their faith, I wanted to build a level of trust between them and me. However the 
fact that the interviewees were pleased to share about their vision, work and 
mission to another Christian, especially a foreigner, had several drawbacks as well. 
For example, I do not think that they ever questioned the fact that I might at a 
later stage use the data collected to provide a critical assessment of their work. I 
felt there was a kind of tacit agreement that because I was interviewing them and 
was interested in their work that I would agree with them and share the same 
views. This was also the product of the fact that all times, I expressed empathy 
with them as their expressed their frustrations with the government (that blocked 
their activity) and shared their vision of a reunited Korea. Bruce L. Berg argues 
that “appreciation does not require the interviewers to agree with or even to accept 
the perceptions of their subjects but merely to offer empathy” (Berg 2007 (1989): 
179). I do not think that interviewees made the distinction between my 
expressions of empathy and approval of their work and vision. Furthermore, I 
cannot prove that I actually built trust by disclosing my religious beliefs. However 
by not saying it, I would have withheld part of the truth about my identity and 
since I expected interviewees to be as candid and open as possible with me, I felt 
that it was only constructive that I should do the same. 
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Unlike questionnaires, interviews can be understood as being “social 
interactions” (Mason 1996: 40): “From this point of view you cannot separate the 
interview from the social interaction in which it was produced, and you should not 
try. It is better to try to understand the complexities of the interaction, rather than 
to pretend that key dimensions can be controlled” (Mason 1996: 40). Christian 
organisations are not actively seeking the support of the population or of other 
groups, because they believe that what they do is the right thing to do. More 
generally South Korean humanitarian organisations that provide aid to North 
Korea have been criticised for paying less attention to humanitarian principles, 
food monitoring and access, because they want to build a relationship of trust with 
the North Koreans and thus promote peace (see statement from Korean Sharing 
Movement below). In light of the aforementioned factors, my reasons for 
conducting interviews were manifold: first, I had to interview representatives of 
the organisations to endeavour to find out what they really think. Second, the use 
of interviews goes some way to compensate for the fact that I had no direct access 
to the field meaning that I could not directly witness the provision of aid to North 
Korea and observe the interactions between South Korean Christian aid workers 
and the North Koreans. As Jennifer Mason rightly argues “the data you want may 
not feasibly be available in any other form ... [the] direct observation of 
phenomena in which you are interested is simply impossible” (Mason 1996: 42). 
However, this does not mean that I was “able to get inside their heads” (Mason 
1996: 40) and in fact one might wonder although it is always important to analyse 
as far as possible whether the data collected through interviews is “accurate and 
reliable” (Mason 1996: 42). In that sense, the fact that I sought to put my 
interviewees at ease at all times and guaranteed their anonymity means that for the 
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most part they were happy to share information with me and be as candid as they 
could. Equally, the fact that I used semi-structured interviews means that I could 
adjust my questions to the circumstances and the mood of the interviewees. In 
some ways, it is inevitable that interviews produce imperfect data, nonetheless 
they provided me with a deeper understanding of the situation and allowed me to 
identify patterns (for instance similar answers) such as the constant reference to 
the history of Christianity in North Korea. Finally, interviews and direct 
observation and the use of written material are in line with my choice of 
philosophical approach as argued by Jennifer Mason (1996): 
§ Your ontological position suggests that people’s knowledge, views, 
understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions are 
meaningful properties of the social reality which your research questions 
are designed to explore. 
§ Your epistemological position suggests that a legitimate way to generate 
data on these ontological properties is to interact with people, to talk to 
them, to listen to them, and to gain access to their accounts and 
articulations (Mason 1996: 39-40). 
In conclusion, the use of interviews proved to be a useful method to gain a 
better understanding of a situation that continues to be sensitive for many in 
South Korea and therefore not easily researchable.  
5. Conclusion and chapters 
 
In this dissertation, I will discuss South Korean mission to North Korea on the 
basis of the holistic model of contextualisation. As the context does not solely 
include culture or native religions of the Korean peninsula, I will include in my 
discussion the wider political context (domestic and international) in relation to 
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North Korea and seek to understand how history, as well as other factors, have 
shaped contemporary Korean conservative Christianity. Finally, because in my 
research I highlight the place of religion in the public sphere, in the following 
chapter, I am going to examine the rise of religions in the public sphere and 
explain how in North Korea, politics of secularisation translated into harsh 
repression of religion freedom. I will also introduce scholars’ attitudes toward 
religion, especially in relation to North Korea. The third chapter will analyse 
evangelicals’ political theology, and issues of Christian nationalism and anti-
communism. The purpose of the fourth chapter will be to illustrate the South 
Korean evangelical level of commitment toward humanitarian concerns in North 
Korea.  The fifth chapter will argue that evangelicals are re-evaluating North 
Korean mission and are now developing strategies to implement cross-cultural 
missiological principles with North Koreans. The sixth chapter will identify the 
socio-political contexts and the relationship between civil society and the North 
and South Korean states. 
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Chapter 2: Christianity in the public sphere 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will analyse the place of religion in international relations and 
the field of development. It will be argued that religions have played a significant 
role in the public sphere and that Christianity has grown to become a world 
religion. The second section of this chapter will be dedicated to North Korea and 
the politics of religious repression. While Christianity has developed dramatically 
in the Global South, it has been severely repressed in North Korea. The section 
will be followed by a summary of the history of interactions between South 
Korean liberal churches and the North Korean official Christian bodies. Finally, 
the last section of this chapter will summarise what has been written already on 
the work of Christian organisations operating in North Korea. Nearly all scholars 
have recognised the presence of religious groups but few have actually analysed 
its significance with regard to the influence of Christians in Korean politics. 
2. Resurgence of religions in the public sphere: faith in development 
 
The moral precepts of justice, love, compassion and charity lie at the heart of 
most religions and have preceded the enactment of international laws. According 
to Carolyn Evans, the three major monotheistic religions, namely Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, share “the idea of [a] common humanity” (Evans 2005: 4). 
In the book of Leviticus, a book that is common to the three traditions, God 
instructs his people to love their neighbors as themselves and not to hate their 
brothers in their heart (Evans 2005: 4). Therefore, temples and places of worship 
have historically served as places of refuge. The Catholics established orders to 
“provide charity for the poor, medical care to the sick, education for children and 
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hospitality to strangers” (Ferris 2005: 313). In the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Protestant missionaries were dispatched from Europe and North America not only 
to evangelise but also to bring humanitarian assistance. In the beginning of the 
20th century, religious groups established charities to carry on advocacy and 
lobbying activity. After the Second World War, both Christian and secular non-
governmental organisations were created to respond to the humanitarian crisis 
arising across Europe. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was established in 
1948 and responded to the humanitarian need of displaced people. NGOs and 
churches strongly advocated for the establishment of the United Nations and the 
subsequent declaration of human rights (Ferris 2005: 314-315).   
Religious actors tend to promote a certain type of political system because they 
favour a certain type of ‘political theology’ which is best described as being: “the 
set of ideas that a religious actor holds about what is legitimate political authority” 
(Toft et al. 2011: 27). William Wilberforce’s campaign against slave trade, 
Gandhi’s peaceful struggle for India’s independence, Martin Luther King’s 
leadership in the civil rights movement, Desmond Tutu’s fight against apartheid; 
are such examples of religious actors who acted out on a certain political 
theology.  
In the 1980s, religious leaders (especially Christian) became prominent critics 
of the development policies implemented by international organisations such as 
the World Bank.  Their criticism was institutionalised with the creation of the 
Jubilee campaign 2000. The campaign was a joint effort between religious, 
secular leaders and personalities such as U2 singer Bono, called for the 
cancellation of the debt of poor countries (Marshall 2001: 348). Another 
significant event was the establishment of the World Faiths Development 
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Dialogue (WFDD), a joint effort by former World Bank president James 
Wolfensohn and former Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. George Carey. The WFDD 
aims at promoting dialogue between religious and secular institutions to address 
questions of development and poverty6.  
Therefore, my research has been conducted at the time when scholars and 
practitioners have come to recognise the role played by faith not only in 
development and politics but also in the strengthening of social capital. In recent 
years there has been a growing interest in the role but also potential problems 
posed by the factor of ‘faith’ in religious organisations. There has also been a 
renewed interest in concepts of spirituality in society but this interest is not due to 
an “increased appreciation of religion qua religion” (Chaves, Giesel & Tsitsos 
2002: 108) but rather an interest in what and how religion and faith can contribute 
to society: “many see religion and religious organisations as springs of 
voluntarism, community resources, and civic skills that can be deployed in a wide 
variety of secular arenas” (Chaves, Giesel & Tsitos 2002: 108). Churches, 
temples, mosques, religious organisations and so on contribute to the healthy 
functioning of a civil society. In an analysis on the correlation between religion 
and development, Khan and Bashar (2008) argue that religion can “act as a 
catalyst for accumulation of social capital” (Khan & Bashar 2008: 3) and “can be 
seen as a promoter of growth as they direct people towards honesty, discipline, 
hard work, education, thriftiness (leading to savings essential for investment and 
thereby growth) and absenteeism from harmful activities” (Khan & Bashar 2008: 
7). It has often been argued for instance that the growth of capitalism in the West 
                                                
6 The organisation is now run by Georgetown University in Washington DC.  
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was linked to the practice of an ascetic life as promulgated by Protestant/Calvinist 
principles (Weber (1930) 1971). 
In the 1990s, the World Bank conducted a study in developing countries asking 
the question: what is poverty? The study, entitled Voices of the Poor, revealed that 
for the ‘poor’, it is not so much the absence of material goods that they found 
unbearable but rather the perpetual sense of shame, powerlessness and humiliation 
that affected them the most (Corbett & Fikkert 2009: 52-53). Tyndale argues that 
since development is about improving the lives of people, it is a metaphysical 
question. She argues that people gain their sense of dignity and self-worth from 
their spirituality and culture. Once people feel secure in the knowledge of ‘who 
they are’, their confidence is strengthened and they feel capable of undertaking 
new projects and assume positions of leadership (Tyndale 2006:161). The 
research led by Miller and Yamamori on Pentecostalism argues that the moral and 
spiritual needs of an individual should be taken into account, and that religion 
does fulfil a role that secular theories of development cannot challenge (Miller & 
Yamamori 2007: 63).  
Therefore, as development practitioners and policy makers began to broaden 
the objectives of development to not only encompass economic development but 
also an enlargement of people’s choices and freedoms. They began to realise that 
the idea of “human development” was also concerned with spirituality (UNDP 
1990). Equally, in the case of conflict, social unrest and/or political instability in a 
given state, improving the economy of the state is often perceived as being the 
only adequate remedy. However, those conflicts are often the results of not only 
economic disparities but also of ethnic and/or spiritual divisions. The needs to 
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involve religion in the mediation and reconciliation processes are therefore 
essential (Luttwak 1994:14-15).  
In her analysis of the positive contributions of faith-based organisations to the 
field of development and peace building, Flanigan (2010) argues that faith-based 
organisations are receiving increasing recognition for the following reasons:  
§ Added credibility in the community 
§ More individualized and compassionate service provision 
§ More highly committed and motivated workers 
§ Greater safety for service recipients 
§ Less conflict and greater trust among NGO staff (Flanigan 2010: 30). 
 
 FBOs have been increasingly involved in seeking justice and have played “a 
greater role in making governments politically accountable to their constituents” 
(Clarke 2007:81). 
Church growth and the growing number of Christian organisations 
 
According to the Union of International Associations, there are approximately 
33,500 international NGOs in the world. 3,183 have consultative status at the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 320 out of these 3,183 can be 
characterised as religious. The fact that these organisations have been granted 
consultative status at ECOSOC means that they have been recognised as proper 
development and humanitarian aid NGOs. The table below shows that Christian 
organisations prevail in number (Petersen  2010). 
 
 
 
	   69 
Religious Affiliation Number of Organisations Percentage of all religious 
NGOS 
Christian 187 58.4% 
Muslim 52 16.3% 
Jewish 22 6.9% 
Buddhist 14 4.4% 
Hindu 3 0.9% 
Spiritual 25 7.8% 
Multireligious 11 3.4% 
Other religions 6 1.9% 
Total 320 100% 
(Petersen  2010) 
The study conducted by Petersen also reveals that religious NGOs are usually 
involved in fields similar to that of secular NGOs such as education, social justice, 
humanitarian aid and environmental protection. However, many chose to include 
promotion of their religion. Finally, others focus on spiritual matters. The table 
below introduces the relevant figures: 
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Goals and fields of work Percentage of all 
religious NGOs 
Culture and recreation, education, health, social services, 
environment, development and infrastructure, law, defense and 
politics 
47.3% 
Religious promotion 13.9% 
Both categories 38.8% 
Total 100% 
(Petersen 2010) 
Petersen’s findings reveal the great involvement of Christianity on the public 
sphere. It is not surprising that Christianity should be very present since it is a 
worldwide religion that for centuries has crossed cultural and political boundaries. 
It is a global phenomenon. As explained by Sebastian Kim and Kirsteen Kim, 
“[t]he spread of Christianity is often tied to the expansion of Europe and the rise 
of North America” (Sebastian Kim & Kirsteen Kim 2008: 11). However, “[a]s in 
the first millennium, the worldwide presence of Christianity today is not primarily 
the attempts by powerful churches to replicate themselves worldwide but the 
result of indigenous response and grassroots movements” (Sebastian Kim & 
Kirsteen Kim 2008: 11). The continuing expansion of Christianity as a non-
Western phenomenon (though this does not mean that Christianity is no longer 
present in the West) is best illustrated in the table below from the World Christian 
Database and referred to by Philip Jenkins on his research of global Christianity:  
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“The Changing Distribution of Christian Believers” (Jenkins 2011: 3). 
Number of Christians (millions) 
 1900 1970 2010 2050 
Africa 10 143 493 1,031 
Asia 22 96 352 601 
North America 
Latin America 
79 
62 
211 
270 
286 
544 
333 
655 
Europe 381 492 588 530 
Oceania 5 18 28 38 
TOTAL 558 1,230 2,291 3,188 
 
Jenkins argues that the three continents (namely Latin America, Africa and 
Asia), where Christianity has and continues to develop dramatically, “share a 
passionate enthusiasm for mission and evangelism that is often South-South, 
organised from one of the emerging churches, and directed toward some other 
region of Africa, Asia, or Latin America—we think of Brazilian missionaries in 
Africa, Ugandans in India, Koreans in the Middle-East. Although poorly studied, 
South-South evangelism represents one of the most impressive phenomena in 
contemporary Christianity: the topic cries out for a major book-length survey” 
(Jenkins 2011: 16).  
My research therefore, not only contributes to the field of Korean studies, it 
also provides an in depth case study on the role-played by non Western Christian 
organisations on the international stage. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has 
joined other OECD countries in the provision of development aid around the 
world. In fact, many of the Christian organisations that are working in North 
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Korea are also working in other developing countries.  Korean Christian 
missionaries and development organisations often convey consciously and 
unconsciously an ideological message.  As such it is important to examine the role 
of Korean Christian development agencies as political actors and representatives 
of South Korean Christian evangelical values. 
3. North Korea and Christianity 
 
Pyongyang: Jerusalem of the East 
 
Catholicism was introduced to the Korean peninsula in the 18th century and 
Protestantism was introduced at the end of the 19th century. As examined in the 
next chapter, Koreans and missionaries worked together to spread the gospel on 
the whole peninsula. Protestantism spread rapidly and successfully but 
particularly flourished in the northern region. Pyongyang quickly became a major 
missionary platform, the so-called Jerusalem of the East. According to Palmer, 
after twenty years of mission work, “the northern provinces of P’ yŏngan, 
Hamgyŏng and Hwanghae, though containing only one-fourth of the Protestant 
missionaries in Korea, reported about half of the baptisms, adherents and church 
contributions of the whole country” (Palmer 1986: 82). Therefore, before the 
emergence of communism, the north of the peninsula had already become the 
bastion of conservative Christianity especially Presbyterianism. However, after 
the division of the country in 1945, Kim Il-sung sought to supress all forms of 
religious expressions in the North. Christians sought refuge in the South where 
Christianity developed dramatically henceforth. In today South Korea, Christians 
have the right to meet and practice their religion and their rights are protected by 
the state. Furthermore, as illustrated by a table provided by In-chul Kang  [Inch’ŏl 
Kang] (2013), Protestant Christians are very influential in the government as they 
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steadily constitute the largest religious group in the national assembly and thus 
regardless of the Presidents’ religious leanings: 
Term Protestant Catholic Buddhist Other or no 
religion 
Total 
15th (1996-
2000 
110 (36.8) 63 (21.1) 52 (17.4) 74 (24.7) 299 (100.0) 
16th (2000-
2004) 
112 (41.0) 66 (24.2) 43 (15.8) 52 (19.0) 273 (100.0) 
17th (2004-
2008 
103 (34.4) 70 (23.4) 34 (11.4) 92 (30.8) 299 (100.0) 
18th (2008-
2012 
120 (40.5) 72 (24.3) 55 (18.6) 49 (16.6) 296 (100.0) 
19th (2012-
2016 
111 (37.0) 73 (24.3) 41 (13.7) 75 (25.0) 300 (100.0) 
(unit: person) (In-chul Kang 2013: 115) 
In North Korea however, Christianity has struggled to survive. As Shah and 
Philpott explain, secularisation might be hostile to religion when a “state seeks to 
integrate a religious body into its own authority through suppression, coercion, 
and often harsh persecution, as in Communist Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania or 
in revolutionary Mexico” (Shah & Philpott 2011: 26). The politics of 
secularisation implemented by communist governments impacted countries in 
different ways and certain religious denominations enjoyed more freedom under 
communism than others. As mentioned earlier, evangelical Christians, in 
particular, and Catholics were persecuted because of their association to the 
United States and to the West.  
Religious persecution is often associated with Marxism. Gabel (2005) argues 
that Marx believed that religion led the oppressed to accept their conditions of 
suffering by nurturing them with the hope of a better after-life. Since Marx 
wanted to improve the material condition of people, he thought that they should 
get rid of religion and focus on the transformation of their earthly predicament. 
Marx condemned the emphasis on ‘otherworldliness’. He also criticised 
Christians for their charity arguing that there would be no need for charity if man 
	   74 
could change the economic and social conditions and achieve social justice, and 
that charity merely holds the system in place. Marx also rebuked the Protestant 
greediness associated with the right to private property, which “worked against 
the dreamed-of communality of the future” (Gabel 2005: 87). Finally, Marx said 
that Christians were hypocritical when they forgot three centuries of slavery, 
martyrdom and oppression and started their own campaigns of persecution against 
heretics and infidels under Constantine (Gabel 2005: 85-87).  
Communism was first introduced to the Korean peninsula in the early 1920s. 
Bruce Cumings argues that it seduced young generations and the ‘humble’ of 
Korean society (Cumings 2005 (1997): 157-158). They were nationalist and 
fought for the independence of the country but split between different factions: 
one group chose to exile and engage into armed struggle. The other group stayed 
in Korea, and underwent tremendous pressure from the Japanese, but by the end 
of the 1920s, was leading the resistance movement (Cumings 2005 (1997): 158-
159). As explained by Dae-sook Suh in Cumings (2005): 
[Communists and leftists] succeeded in wresting control of the Korean 
revolution from the Nationalists; they planted a deep core of Communist 
influence among Korean people, particularly the students, youth groups, 
laborers and peasants. Their fortitude and, at times, obstinate determination 
to succeed had a profound influence on Korean intellectuals and writers. To 
the older Koreans, who had groveled so long before seemingly endless 
foreign suppression, communism seemed a new hope and a magic 
touch...For Koreans in general, the sacrifices of the Communists, if not the 
idea of communism, made strong appeal, far stronger than any occasional 
bomb-throwing exercise of the Nationalists. The haggard appearance of the 
Communists suffering from torture, their stern and disciplined attitude 
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toward the common enemy of all Koreans, had a far-reaching effect on 
people (Dae-sook Suh (1967) quoted in Cumings 2005 (1997): 159). 
The Korean Communist Party (KCP) was founded in 1925 in the south and 
was led by a man named Pak Hŏn-yŏng (Cumings 2005 (1997): 159). Kim Il-sung 
(born Kim Sŏng-ju), on the other hand, lived in exile until the liberation of Korea 
and thus when he came back to take control of the north of the country with the 
support of the Russians, he was unknown to the majority of Koreans including 
Korean communists. One of his major tasks, therefore, was to eliminate political 
rivals and build an image of himself as a fearless and victorious patriot (Dae-sook 
Suh 1988: 69-71). First, he proceeded to attack and eliminate indigenous 
communists and those who had given in under persecution from the Japanese 
(Dae-sook Suh 1988: 89-90).  Dae-sook Suh argues that it was not too difficult as 
Kim Il-sung received the support of Russian forces who occupied the north until 
1948. Eliminating Christians who opposed Kim Il-sung’s policies was also part of 
Kim Il-sung’s plans to consolidate his power. Dae-young Ryu [Taeyŏng Yu], a 
Korean academic offers a very useful insight into the development of North 
Korea’s policy toward religion in his book written in Korean on modern Korean 
Christianity, Han’guk kŭn hyŏndaesawa kidokkyo (2009).  
According to Ryu (2009), North Korea’s policy toward religion alongside the 
extermination of religious activity followed different stages: between 1945 and 
1953, the years of formation of the North Korean state and the Korean War; 
between 1953 and 1972, years of the establishment of the ideology, Juche, and the 
suppression of all forms of dissidence; between 1972 and 1994 (year of the death 
of Kim Il-sung), the era of Kim Il-sungism. The constitution was also amended in 
1972 to reflect the strengthening of authority of the supreme leader. The 
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established on 9 
September 1948. The constitution that was then promulgated was called the 
Chosŏn minjujuŭi inmin kong hwaguk hŏnpŏp. In December 1972, it became the 
Chosŏn minjujuŭi inmin kong hwaguk sahoejuŭi hŏnpŏp and in 1992, it was 
further amended and renamed Urisik sahoejuŭi hŏnpŏp. The changes in 
terminology reflect the changes in ideology. For example the term socialism 
(Sahoejuŭi) is missing in the first constitution but was added in 1972 to indicate 
North Korea’s desire to implement its very own form of socialism (Dae-young 
Ryu 2009: 217-252).  
1945-1953: establishment of North Korea and the anti-capitalist and 
anti-feudal revolution 
 
Under Japanese occupation, Koreans developed or adopted different political 
and religious ideologies. Some Koreans turned to Christianity and by extension 
turned to the West, especially the United States, to modernise and seek the 
independence of the country. Others joined Ch’ŏndokkyo, religion of the heavenly 
way, followers, a native Korean religion which promoted equality and social 
justice. Ch’ŏndokkyo followers were actively engaged in the struggle for 
independence (also known as one of the righteous armies7) and were organised 
politically. Others collaborated with Japan or sought the protection of China or 
Russia. In summary, Koreans had become very divided over the question of Japan 
and there was no unified force to fight against the occupant. However, as the 
Second World War come to an end it became increasingly obvious that Japan was 
going to lose the war and it was believed that the Soviet Union would occupy the 
whole peninsula. Korean nationalists came together to form the Committee for the 
                                                
7 For a definition of righteous armies (in Korean Ŭibyŏng) please refer to Korea a Historical and 
Cultural Dictionary by Keith Pratt and Richard Rutt (1999: 493). For more details, refer to the 
Formation and development of modern Korean nationalism by Yong-ha Shin (1987).  
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Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI or in Korean the Chosŏn kong kuk 
chunbi wiwŏnhoe). Branches of the CPKI rapidly spread across the country and 
took control of all the local administrations. The committee developed into a 
political structure, the Chosŏn inmin kong hwaguk (the Korean People’s 
Republic). Soon afterwards, it was decided that the United States would come to 
occupy the south of the peninsula and moderate and conservative forces left the 
CPKI. In the north however, most committees were led by Protestant leaders 
including prominent Protestant leader and nationalist Cho Man-sik in the area 
around Pyongyang. Cho led the party with the help of Protestant churches and 
was later removed by the Russians for opposing the American-Soviet agreement 
for Korean trusteeship. Following Yalta, the United States and the Soviet Union 
had decided to establish a joint provisional government on the peninsula. The UN 
requested that elections be held in the north and in the south but the Russians did 
not allow for elections to take place (Hawk 2005: 68-71). 
After removing Cho Man-sik, the Russians appointed Kim Il-sung as the leader 
of the country. Kim Il-sung had been a guerrilla leader in Manchuria and was 
chosen possibly because of his language skills: he was fluent in Russian and 
Chinese but ironically would have to improve his Korean to lead the country 
(Lankov 2013: 3-4). The Soviet army occupied the North between 1945 and 1948 
and the Chinese occupied North Korea for eight years, from 1950 until 1958. The 
Soviets were actively engaged into North Korean politics but the Chinese army 
however, first led the war against the United Nations then stayed in the North to 
ensure political stability but did not interfere with domestic politics (Dae-sook 
Suh 1988: 155). 
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In 1946, Soviets proceeded to a land reform that confiscated all lands including 
that from aristocrats and religious groups (churches, Buddhist temples and so on). 
Many Christians opposed the land reform and fled to the south of the country. 
Others chose to go underground. Kang Yang-uk, the then vice-President, 
criticised the pastors and Christians who had fled south and argued that they were 
fleeing not because their faith was under threat but because they wanted to keep 
their land (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 217-220).  As both the North and the South 
were concerned with reunification, Kim Il-sung was trying to establish a national 
union between nationalists, religious groups, intellectuals and progressive groups; 
he did not use yet the terms socialism or communism but anti-capitalism and anti-
feudalism (panje and panbonggŏn). His aim was to establish a true progressive 
democracy and did not want it to be seen only as a socialist revolution (Dae-
young Ryu 2009: 221-222).  Andrei Lankov says that communism in East Asia 
must be understood differently: “In the 1920s and 1930s, in the era when Kim Il 
Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh were young idealists, communism in East 
Asia was widely seen as a shortcut to the national revival and modernity, a way 
not only to solve social problems but also to leapfrog past stages of backwardness 
and colonial dependency” (Lankov 2013: 5). Between October 1946 and February 
1947, local elections were organised to elect central committees. In October 1946, 
Presbyterians sent an open letter and said that they would boycott the elections if 
held on a Sunday and that they did not want the church buildings to be used for 
other purposes than worship. Most Christians in those days were located in the 
northwestern region of the country; they were capitalist, landowners and pro-
American.  On March 23rd 1946, in an address, Kim Il-sung had laid out some of 
the guarantees of the future provisional government. The second element of the 
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list said that groups and individuals who would oppose the government should be 
banned (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 222-223).  
In 1948, after the national elections and the formal establishment of the DPRK, 
Kim Il-sung decided to curtail further the influence of religious groups. Thus, 
article two of the constitution only guaranteed the freedom to believe and the 
freedom to perform religious rituals in accordance with those beliefs. Mission 
work (including the right to evangelise) and religious education were, however, 
no longer allowed (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 226-227).  At that time, 2.7 % of the 
members of the Supreme People’s Assembly were religious believers. Dae-sook 
Suh argues that many political, social and religious organisations were 
represented (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 99). As such, he says, there was still an effort to 
represent the views of most groups. 
Kim Il-sung himself is reported as saying that people could not be forced to 
give up on their religious beliefs but that instead, people should be allowed to 
realise for themselves that their beliefs were not rational. Kim Il-sung believed 
that eventually people would embrace atheism and stop attending places of 
worship (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 227). For Kim Il-sung, the Korean War (1950-
1953) was a final step in the process of liberation from imperialism and 
feudalism. In that context, Christianity was associated with the United States and 
Christians became severely persecuted. Many were executed or sent to prison 
camps. Still, Kim Il-sung said that he did not oppose people of faith but said: if 
you must believe in God, believe in a Korean God (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 228-
229). Actually some of Kim Il-sung’s claims worked in his favour as Christians 
sought protection from bombing in church buildings, American raids did not 
discriminate and destroyed churches, killing hundreds of people. Some chose to 
	   80 
turn their back on Christianity and followed Kim Il-sung (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 
231).  On July 30 1953, Dae-sook Suh (1988) explains that three days after the 
end of the Korean War, the Supreme Court of the DPRK held a trial indicting 12 
conspirators under Article 25 of the North Korean criminal law. The 12 men were 
accused of: “espionage activities for the United States, indiscriminate destruction 
and slaughter of democratic forces and Communist revolutionaries in the South, 
and the attempted overthrow of the government of the republic by military force” 
(Dae-sook Suh 1988: 131).  The trial cited American imperialists, American 
officials but also the American missionary Horace Underwood Jr. from Yonsei 
University (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 132). 
1953-1972: establishment of Juche and North Korean Cultural 
Revolution  
 
These years marked the completion of a North Korean form of socialism, the 
extermination of all forms of dissidence and the establishment of the state’s 
ideology and policy. In a speech delivered to the central bureau in 1956, Kim Il-
sung said: we should not ignore or distrust young people who believe in religion. 
They can also be transformed into good socialists if we teach them well. Faith is 
freedom so we cannot forbid it but we can educate and change their mindset 
(Dae-young Ryu 2009: 234). However, between 1957 and 1959, North Korea 
proceeded to eliminate and punish those regarded as hostile to the government, 
including Christians. In 1957, the authorities developed the notorious class 
system, in Korean, sŏngbun, according to which “each citizen is assigned a 
hereditary based class and socio-political rank over which the individual 
exercises no control but which determines all aspects of his or her life” (Collins 
2012: 1). Sŏngbun was institutionalised by Kim Il-sung between 1957 and 1960 
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and continues to affect all areas of life including food distribution, education, 
employment, healthcare and residence. The core (haeksim) class is deemed loyal 
to the regime and is often based in Pyongyang where the so-called elite lives a 
relatively comfortable life. The wavering (tondyo) class is submitted to constant 
sessions of re-education but is granted opportunities to serve the party and the 
military. Members of the wavering classes live in the provinces surrounding 
Pyongyang. Members of the hostile (chŏktae) class are family members and/or 
descendants of traders, religious leaders, Japanese collaborators or allies of the 
United Nations and South Korea during the Korean War who were regarded as 
enemies of the regime and thus sent to live in remote places.  
The chŏktae are more likely to suffer from punishment, arbitrary detention and 
starvation. They represent the segment of the population which was the most 
affected by the famine, and the majority of refugees who have escaped North 
Korea in search for food come from these regions especially from the northern 
provinces of Hamgyeong (The Chosun Ilbo 2011). Sŏngbun is hereditary and 
there is nothing one can do to upgrade his or her status. On the other hand, it is 
easier to fall from grace and it is not unusual for high-ranking officials to 
disappear or even be executed. 
In 1958, the North Korean Council of Ministers institutionalised a “people’s 
group” (Inminban) structure as a means of holding neighbours accountable to one 
another (Hawk 2005: 73). Lankov explains that these people’s groups include 
between 20 and 40 families and functioned as effective tools of surveillance until 
the 1990s. Each group is led by an official, usually a middle-aged woman. 
Lankov, who had interviewed a former leader of an inminban, said that she stated: 
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“an inminban head should know how many chopsticks and how many spoons are 
in every household” (Lankov 2013: 38-39). 
According to Kim Il-sung, 1958 was also the year of completion of the 
socialist revolution. Dae-sook Suh (1988) says that on February 8 1958, North 
Korea celebrated the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s 
Army. Suh argues that on the occasion, “Kim spoke with authority on any subject, 
and no one dared question anything he said” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 154). Kim Il-
sung criticised those working for the judiciary who released political prisoners in 
the name of human rights, citing the example of a Christian named Yi Man-hwa. 
Suh says that Kim Il-sung also “attacked such religion said that Buddhists sit and 
meditate but do nothing. Such lassitude may be good for Buddhism, but it bad for 
the state” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 154). 
Books that record Kim Il-sung speeches delivered in that period published in 
1960s no longer mention religion or religious believers (Chonggyoin). Ryu says 
that the absence of reference to religion and religion believers is often interpreted 
as evidence of extermination of religion in the 1950s (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 235-
236). However, in a speech delivered in 1959, Kim Il-sung conceded that not 
everyone was ready to support communism to the end but that, nevertheless, 
people should hold hands and move forward. Ryu interprets this as sign that in 
spite of his efforts, Kim Il-sung had been unable to exterminate all religious 
believers and that faith in religion had subsisted in North Korea (Dae-young Ryu 
2009:  236).  
In the 1960s, the North Korean state ideology, Juche (Chuch’e), emerged. 
According to Lankov, Juche had been mentioned by Kim Il-sung in 1955 but had 
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remained insignificant until the mid—1960s (Lankov 2013: 67). Chu/Ju means 
master or lord and che means subject, main body or core. It is often translated as 
‘self-reliance’ but Lankov says that it is a mistake and that a better translation 
would be ‘self-importance’ or ‘self-significance’ (Lankov 2013: 67). In April 
1965, as Kim Il-sung visited Indonesia to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
Bandung conference in Indonesia, he stated that the key factor in terms of 
ideology, politics, economy and defence was the Juche idea (Dae-young Ryu 
2009: 236-237).  When Kim Il-Sung first mentioned Juche on December 28 1955, 
it was as a way of criticising ‘toadyism’: Korea’s ‘adulation’ for foreign powers. 
He had also reflected on the need for Koreans to develop their own application of 
Marxism or Leninism to fit Korea’s circumstances. Dae-sook Suh (1988) more 
precisely argues that Kim Il-sung’s first reference to Juche was a means to 
counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union on North Korean politics while 
praising the Chinese who were still occupying their territory: “Kim said that in 
order to strengthen party spirit among the members, the Koreans must follow the 
example of the Chinese rectification campaign, the zhengfeng movement8 ... later 
when the Chinese occupation forces withdrew from North Korea in 1958, his first 
speech about Juche was revised to delete his remark about following the example 
of the Chinese rectification campaign” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 144). The re-
emergence of Juche in 1965 as a North Korean ideology, however, reflected the 
North Korean efforts to demark themselves from both the ideologies of the Soviet 
Union and of China (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 237). Since the 1980s, Juche has also 
been commonly referred to as Kim Il-sungism because of the idolisation of the 
leader Kim Il-sung as explained in chapter five. 
                                                
8 First ideological campaign organised by the Chinese Communist Party between 1942 and 1944. 
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On the 25th of May 1967, Kim Il-sung clarified his ideas in a presentation 
entitled: “From capitalism to the period of transition of socialism and about 
proletarian dictatorship matters” by which he located his ideology between that of 
China and of the Soviet Union but essentially called on for the execution of a 
small cultural revolution (Munhwa punyaesŏ ŭi pansujŏngjŭi t’ujaeng). Basically, 
the North Korean Cultural Revolution called for the extermination of previous 
religious and intellectual cultures (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 238).  
In March 1968, at a presentation delivered at the Ministry of Education, Kim 
Il-sung called for the re-evaluation of Christianity and Buddhism. Concerned with 
the growing number of religious believers in South Korea, Kim Il-sung warned of 
the poisonous nature of religion (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 238). Kim Il-sung called 
religion an obstacle to the development of a North Korean culture. He argued, for 
example, that Buddhist temples symbolised Korea’s historical and cultural 
heritage but that their religious value should be taken away (Dae-young Ryu 
2009: 239). Religion was also criticised in the arts. For example a 1967 movie 
(Ch’oehaksin ŭi ilga) portrayed the son of a pro-American pastor, Pastor Choe, 
who becomes a true patriot and kills American soldiers. Kim Jong-il, who was 
involved in the making of the film claimed that the main problem was not the 
faith of the character but his toadyism towards America (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 
239). 
Ryu says that Kim Il-sung praised the film which reflected the values and the 
political line of the party: we can work with religious believers for the sake of our 
reunification but we cannot work with pro-Americans (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 
239). Ryu argues that there was a shift of perspective toward religion before and 
after the implementation of Juche: in the beginning, Kim Il-sung criticised 
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religion for being the opium of the people, exploiting lower classes and being 
unscientific. After the establishment of Juche, religion, especially Christianity, 
was referred to as an imperialistic tool (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 240). 
1972- present day: Kim Il-sungism  
 
The new constitution of 1972 weakened the power of the Supreme People’s 
Assembly and abolished the cabinet to grant full authority to the head of state 
(Ch’usŏk) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 241). The capital was also changed from Seoul 
to Pyongyang. The capital could still have been Seoul because North Korea never 
recognised South Korea as a legitimate state, and considered it was the 
government of the whole of the peninsula. Maps of the DPRK effectively include 
the whole peninsula without the line of demarcation between the two countries. 
However in doing so, Suh argues North Korea moved from being a satellite 
communist territory to being a fully independent state. Furthermore, according to 
Suh, “the most radical changes were in the substitution of Kim’s political thought 
for Communist ideology, the establishment of his revolutionary tradition as the 
tradition of Korea, and the all-powerful administrative organ of the Central 
People’s Committee” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 270). 
The new constitution also included a clause to guarantee the freedom to oppose 
religion and religious believers. Accordingly, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
North Korean government continued to actively promote anti-religious activities 
using the arts and performances (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 242-243). Ryu says that 
the reason why North Korea had to campaign against religious activity is because 
they could never fully resolve the matter. Kim Il-sung was not only concerned by 
the potentiality of having believers in the North, he was equally concerned by the 
number of Christian believers in the South and regarded them as an obstacle to 
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reunification. Kim Il-sung argued that the North Korean government never 
persecuted anyone because of their faith but because of their anti-government 
activity (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 244-245).  
In 1992, the constitution was revised again and granted the freedom of faith but 
regulated whoever attracted foreign power using religion. In fact the North 
Korean constitution never granted freedom of religion but the freedom to believe 
and perform religious rituals. Kim Il-sung had vouched to do anything in order to 
protect the proletarian class, and would control everything to achieve this 
including religion (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 246). Kim Il-sung believed that he was 
a benevolent leader working for the good of the nation. The Pyongyang 
newspaper published stories of patriotic Christians such as Kang Yang-uk. Kim 
Il-sung argued that he placed ‘people’ over religion and ideology (Minjok 
ch’isangjŭi) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 251).  
Contemporary state policy and the underground church 
 
There is no recorded religious activity in North Korea between the late 1950s 
and the late 1980s. According to official figures provided by the North Koreans in 
2002, there are currently 12,000 Protestants, 10,000 Buddhists and 800 Catholics 
in the country. There is also a Cheondogkyo (Ch’ŏndokkyo) Young Friends Party 
and a governmental approved group of Cheondongkyoists encompassing 
approximately a number of 15,000 practitioners. In the capital, Pyongyang, there 
are four state-controlled churches: two Protestants (Pongsu and Ch’ilgol), the 
Ch’angch’un Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox 
Church. It is not known how many people attend these churches but many 
foreigners have been able to visit them and attend services, which they describe as 
being political. However, David Hawk argues that in the absence of foreigners, 
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sermons are actually genuine (Hawk 2005: 89). Interaction with foreigners is 
limited nevertheless. Some visitors say they witnessed some genuine worship 
amongst the members of the congregations. There are approximately 60 Buddhist 
temples but they are regarded as historical monuments. The government has also 
reported a number of 500 family worship centres—the equivalent of house 
churches in the West—but researchers have not been able to verify their 
existence. 
According to reports by human rights organisations and missionaries, people 
who undertake proselytising activities or North Koreans who come into contact 
with Christianity are arrested and subjected to harsh punishment. North Korea is 
therefore on the United States’ list of Countries of Particular Concern9 and was 
the country before last (178th out of 179) on the world index of press freedom 
compiled by the French human rights organisation, Reporters Without Borders in 
2013 (Reporters without Borders NGO 2013). The British Christian human rights 
charity Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) and the missionary organisation 
Open Doors International (ODI) regularly document and report violations of 
religious freedom including the persecution, arrest, torture and execution of 
Christians. CSW reports that during the 1950s and 1960s, the North Koreans 
carried out a systematic ‘cleansing’ of Christians, which technically amounted to 
committing genocide (Christian Solidarity Worldwide NGO 2007). In 2010 alone, 
ODI reported that “[h]undreds of Christians were arrested in North Korea ... with 
some killed and others sent to concentration camps” (Open Doors International 
                                                
9 Country of Particular Concern is a designation by the United States Secretary of State (under 
authority delegated by the President) of a nation guilty of particularly severe violations of religious 
freedom under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 (H.R. 2431) and its 
amendment of 1999 (Public Law 106-55). 
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NGO quoted in Agence France Press 2011). Nevertheless, according to the 
organisation, there are an estimated 400,000 Christians, who have survived this 
holocaust and meet and worship in hiding, they are the members of the so-called 
underground church.  
Missionary organisations claim to have reliable data on the current state of the 
North Korean underground church. According to Open Doors Korea, the North 
Korean church went underground in the 1950s and partly functioned until 1958. 
Apparently, Christians chose to go underground as the government was carrying 
out a census to implement its social class system referred to above. Christians 
were heavily targeted, sent to remote areas in the north of the country, sent to 
labour camps or simply executed. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, many 
Korean Chinese fled the country and sought refuge in North Korea. At that time, 
North Korean underground churches had established a national network to sustain 
themselves. In the late 1980s, China opened its economy, which meant that 
religious activity increased and even became tolerated by the Chinese 
government. This movement brought revival into the Korean Chinese church 
which encouraged North Korean underground churches who started to reveal their 
identity secretly to some Korean Chinese leaders. In 1993, with the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, South Korean 
missionaries started to travel to China and Korean Chinese started to visit South 
Korea increasingly. As a result, North Korea tried to enhance their security to 
prevent missionary activities through Korean Chinese churches based in China. 
For example, they would send North Korean spies to Korean Chinese churches to 
identify links between Korean Chinese Christians and South Korea. When Korean 
Chinese Christians visited North Korea, they were warned by the local security of 
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the Foreign Affairs Bureau to decrease their activity or they would send spies to 
their churches in China and Korea and arrest them. Accordingly, North Korean 
churches decreased contacts with Korean Chinese churches. However, with the 
food crisis, they started opening to the world again, asking for help (Open Doors 
Korea NGO 1999). 
The South Korean branch of the organisation Cornerstone (in Korean 
Mot’ongidol sŏngyohoe) has released documents providing some information 
about the underground church. According to these documents, there would be 
between 2000 to 4000 Christian believers in every major North Korean town. 
Believers meet in secret and must be creative with regard to places of worship and 
the form of worship itself. However, most meetings include the recitation of the 
Apostles Creed and of the Lord’s Prayer, some singing and a sermon. There are 
no ordained ministers but there are leaders. Members of the underground church 
are usually Christians or the descendants of Christians who went underground in 
the 1950s. As such, the church is reported to be aging and seeking new members 
(Cornerstone NGO 2012). The organisation says it tries to help the underground 
church by providing bibles, food, medicine, radios and other necessities. 
Cornerstone claims that by the end of 2011, it had helped plant 1,273 new 
churches in North Korea (Cornerstone NGO 2012). 
Efforts of the liberal churches to promote reconciliation with North 
Korea 
 
While efforts to connect with the North Korean underground churches are 
relatively recent, liberal churches have been interacting with the North Korean 
official religious bodies since the 1970s. David Hawk (2005) says those 
organisations were established precisely with the intention of interacting with 
	   90 
progressive voices in the Christian world (Hawk 2005: 86). During the Cold War, 
Christians in the West analysed the religious situation in China and Eastern 
Europe through the lens of anti-communism. In the 1970s however, some people 
initiated a dialogue between Marxism and Christianity, engaging with issues of 
social justice as a common ground. Whereas most people used to think that 
communism and Christianity could not co-exist, progressive Christians discovered 
that religion had subsisted, at least on the surface, in socialist countries.  
Similarly, in South Korea many Christians believed that religion had disappeared 
in North Korea and relied on research reports produced by the South Korean 
government to provide information about the religious situation there. In the 
1980s, as exchanges with North Korea started to increase, liberal Christians were 
given the opportunity to interact with North Korean official religious bodies (Dae-
young Ryu 2009: 191-193).  
Christians from the Korean Diaspora first met with the North Korean Christian 
Federation in November 1981 at the Albert Schweitzer House in Vienna. At the 
time, the North Koreans had suggested to achieve reunification by “recognizing 
the existence of a confederation of the two governmental systems, forming one 
Korean team to participate in international events, and trimming down the size of 
the military” (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006:  238). Both sides 
continued to meet until the early 1990s and they claim their initiative has 
contributed significantly to an atmosphere of reconciliation (Gil-soo Han & 
Andrew Eungi Kim 2006:  239). 
In South Korea, the Christian peace movement began in the aftermath of the 
Kwangju massacre on the 18th of May 1980 when Koreans began to question the 
legitimacy of American troops on the peninsula and the role played by the United 
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States in the repression of democracy uprisings (Sam-yeol Lee [Samyŏl I] 2000: 
124). At an individual level, some Christians had already been promoting peace 
and reunification but in 1980, the Church as a whole started to hold seminars and 
debates to identify ways to cooperate and interact with North Korea (Sam-yeol 
Lee 2000: 124). Gil-soo Han and Andrew Eungi Kim (2006) further identify two 
possible reasons why the Korean liberal Church became involved in reunification 
efforts in the 1980s. Firstly, the peace and anti-nuclear movements in the West 
influenced the Korean Church. In the 1970s, Korean churches began to address 
social and human rights injustices but did not link them to the issue of 
reunification, which they regarded as a political matter. Secondly, Han and Kim 
propose tha the declining influence of the Church and the increasing 
secularisation of Korean society prompted the churches to assume responsibility 
for new causes (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 247).   
In 1982, the KNCC established a research centre for peace. In 1984, a 
conference held in Tozanzo, Japan, on the theme of ‘Consultation on Peace and 
Justice in North East Asia’ marked a turning point as it elevated the Korean 
conflict to international attention by recognising that it also represented a 
potential threat to peace in the region and in the world (Gil-soo Han & Andrew 
Eungi Kim 2006: 239-240). The discussions held in Japan led to the adoption of a 
declaration in 1985 that set the tone for subsequent meetings and declarations: 
1. Overcoming the division of the peninsula will directly lead to achieving 
peace. The issue of reunification cannot be monopolized by the government 
but should be broadly shared with the Korean people. 
2.  It is unacceptable that either the South or North Korean governments 
avoid possible reunification as a way of holding on to power. 
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3. Korean Christianity aspires to democracy and justice on the peninsula. 
This aspiration is the cornerstone to overcoming the division of the peninsula 
and achieving reunification. Moreover, the central purpose of reunification is 
to achieve a democratic and just society, thus the reunification movement 
has to be democratic and just. 
4. On the basis of the Christian belief that advocates peace in the Kingdom 
of God, Korean Christians declare that they have the responsibility, right and 
liberty to participate in the process of achieving reunification (Gil-soo Han 
& Andrew Eungi 2006: 241). 
 
In 1986, the WCC organised in Switzerland the first meeting between South 
Korean and North Korean churches. The North and South Korean churches met 
again in 1988 and 1990. The 1988 declaration was constituted of six chapters: 
“Korean Christian Missiological Tradition to Advocate Justice and Peace; The 
Current State of the Divided Peninsula; Confession of the Hatred of Fellow North 
Koreans since the Division of the Peninsula; Korean Christianity’s Suggestions to 
the North and South Korean governments; and Korean Christianity’s Tasks to 
Achieve Peaceful Reunification” (Gil-soo Han & Andrew Eungi Kim 2006: 242).  
The year 1995 was designated the “Year of Jubilee for Peace and 
Reunification”. In 1995, the NCCK reaffirmed its desire to promote an 
independent and peaceful peninsula.  
 
5. Existing literature on NGOs in North Korea 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, 1994 marked the ‘opening’ of North Korea 
to the world. Some humanitarian groups including evangelicals such as Han 
Kyung-shik were already sending aid to North Korea since the late 1980s but 
were not allowed to operate on the North Korean territory. Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) were first allowed to enter North Korea in 1995, when 
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confronted with severe food shortages, the North Korean government launched an 
appeal for help to the international community, who soon discovered the gravity 
of the famine, called the “Arduous March” (Pukhan kigŭn for South Koreans and 
Konanŭi haenggun for North Koreans).	   
However, altruism is not the only reason why non-governmental organisations 
(NGOS) or FBOs decided to get involved in North Korea. There are a range of 
factors--such as ideology or the pursuit of self-interests—that also determined 
their decision to operate in the North. South Korean organisations, in particular, 
said they privileged the building of relationships over humanitarian principles, 
and used aid as a means to promote peace on the peninsula. Existing literature on 
the subject tends to lump all South Korean humanitarian agencies together, which 
implies that all the organisations share the same agenda and draw their legitimacy 
from the same moral authority.  
In their research and assessment of NGO activity in North Korea, scholars have 
tended to limit their analysis to the role played by NGOs in the provision of food 
aid; issues of access and food monitoring; their potential role in establishing a 
relationship of trust with the North Koreans and in the context of examining the 
ethical dilemma related to the provision of food aid to North Korea.  
An important work on the issue of the ethical dilemma related to the provision 
of food aid is Michael Schloms’s North Korea and the Timeless Dilemma of Aid 
(2004). His work highlights NGOs’ lack of consistency in applying the principles 
of humanitarianism in North Korea: “due to differing ethical frameworks, 
mandates and traditions, aid agencies adopted different approaches to dealing with 
working restrictions in the DPRK” (Schloms 2004: 279). The author, however, 
does not examine in detail the mandates and traditions of these organisations. This 
	   94 
research seeks to fill a gap by examining the mandate and ethical framework of 
South Korean evangelical organisations. 
With regard to issues of access and food monitoring, Paved with Good 
Intentions: the NGO experience in North Korea, edited by L. Gordon Flake and 
Scott Snyder (2003), provides the most comprehensive summary of the 
humanitarian NGO experience in North Korea. The editors sought a wide range of 
perspectives and thus included the analysis of the activity of American, South 
Korean and European humanitarian organisations. Scott Snyder argues that the 
early stages of NGO activity in 1995 set the tone for the subsequent years of 
polarisation between the members of the international community. Some 
organisations decided to leave the country because they believed that their activity 
was helping a dictatorial regime to survive and because of the lack of access and 
unequal distribution of food in the country. Other organisations decided to stay to 
meet the needs of the most vulnerable in North Korea in spite of the unwillingness 
of the North Korean regime to undertake the necessary reforms to secure the 
survival of its population (Snyder 2003: 112). The authors admit that both 
international agencies and organisations might have had a political agenda, but 
ultimately the purpose of their book is to assess the scope of NGO activity in 
North Korea.  
There are a series of articles that have been written on the positive outcome of 
NGO activity in North Korea focusing especially on the NGOs’s potential 
influence on North Korean society and the building of relationships between 
North Koreans and the international community.  As examined in the last chapter, 
they argue that foreign aid workers have multiplied efforts to create a space for 
capacity building, peace building and possibly the emergence of a civil society 
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and social change (Smith 2005; Beck & Reader 2005; Weingartner 2001; Reed 
2004 & 2005; Timothy Savage & Nautilus Team 2002; Snyder 2003; Shin-wha 
Lee 2003; Yang-ho Hong 2001; Bleiker 2004; Oknim Chung 2003; Thomas T. 
Park, Seliger & Hyung-suk Kim 2007).  
According to Richardson (2008), South Korean civil society organisations, 
more especially, have an important role to play in the process of reunification 
even more so because, at times where relations are strained, “humanitarian aid 
sent by NGOs is often more readily accepted by the North than aid sent through 
official government channels” (Richardson 2008: 175).  It is important to note that 
the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF--which activities this research 
does not take into account—are the main distributors of food aid to North Korea 
whereas NGOs provide assistance on a much more limited scale. 
Finally, scholars have analysed food aid through a state centric/realist 
approach. Since 1995, the governments of South Korea and the international 
community have been using humanitarian activity in North Korea as a means to 
justify different policies. Aid has been used as political leverage to encourage the 
denuclearisation of the peninsula or to institutionalise politics of engagement in 
the absence of diplomatic relations. As such, humanitarian organisations have 
consciously or unconsciously played an important role in consolidating foreign 
policies towards North Korea. To put it in the words of a Christian aid worker 
himself: “Most of us are aware that self-interest masquerades as altruism. 
Governments support and use us in various ways for different purposes, and we 
have our own reasons for allowing ourselves to be used” (Victor W.C. Hsu 2005: 
15). 
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However, little attention has been paid to the political role played by the 
organisations themselves. As Clarke notes, “NGOs are not only important actors 
in their own right, but have become important vehicles for other actors, such as 
foreign donors, industrial or agricultural interests, religious groups, or 
underground movements, in articulating conflicting ideological positions” (Clarke 
1998: 43). Therefore, scholars have usually neglected the fact that these 
organisations might convey different political and ideological ideas. Most South 
Korean humanitarian organisations claim that they are acting independently of 
political concerns and are promoting peace on the peninsula. For instance, the 
vision laid out by one of the most prominent organisations, the Korean Sharing 
Movement (Uri minjok sŏro tŏpgi), is as follows: 
1. As a humanitarian aid NGO it will contribute to the realization of humanitarianism 
and brotherhood and the formation of a Korean ethnic community.  
2. As a peace NGO it will push forward to prevent armed conflict and establish a 
lasting peace in the Korean peninsula.  
3. As a North-South solidarity NGO it will aim to relieve social economic 
inequalities, improve societal relations among regions, promote democracy and 
human rights, and cultivate the ability to resolve conflict peacefully in the Korean 
peninsula (Korean Sharing Movement 2010)  
According to John Feffer, “[t]he missionaries are greedily eyeing North Korea. 
The 20 million citizens there represent fertile conversion. Indeed churches have 
been at the forefront of humanitarian efforts to alleviate the food crisis, and some 
of these denominations hope to expand their religious work as a quid pro quo” 
(Feffer 2003: 152). For the most part however, scholars have downplayed this 
important factor, as it does not seem to be recognised as an important variable to 
take into consideration even amongst Christian scholars.  
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Most of the time, the term NGO is used indiscriminately even if FBOs prevail 
in number. For example, a recent analysis provided by Victor Hsu, National 
Director for the DPRK programme of World Vision International (and a 
Christian), highlights the positive and effective partnerships established by NGOs 
with North Korean officials, but Hsu omits to differentiate NGOs from FBOs: 
“NGOs such as Adventist Disaster Response Agency, American Friends Service 
Committee, Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, German Agro-
Action, Global Resources Services, Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Save the 
Children UK, and World Vision have had fruitful partnerships with the DPRK in 
projects that address organic farming, upgrading of clinics and hospitals, 
livestock, food aid, vegetable and fruit fertigation and renewable energy” (Victor 
Hsu 2012). In fact, out of these ten organisations, seven are Christian: the 
Adventist Disaster Response Agency, American Friends Service Committee, 
Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, Global Resources Services, 
Samaritan’s Purse and World Vision are all faith-based organisations.  
Some scholars admit that Christian organisations are present in greater number, 
however, they do not go beyond the facts. Such an example can be found in 
Edward P. Reed’s article on South Korean organisations in Engagement with 
North Korea: a viable alternative, edited by Sung-chull Kim and David C. Kang 
in 2009: 
Notably, more than half of South Korean NGOs providing assistance to 
North Korea are affiliated with or directly supported by religious groups. Of 
the forty-two KNCC members, sixteen are affiliated with Christian churches 
or groups (Protestant and Catholic) and five with Buddhist organisations. As 
in other countries, faith-based NGOs are at the forefront of domestic and 
international humanitarian activities in South Korea. The religious groups 
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provide the institutional means for individuals to give expression to their 
faith-based humanitarian sentiments. They also provide the national 
networks through which support can be mobilized and information 
disseminated (Reed 2009: 205). 
Finally, Scott Snyder, himself a Christian, highlighted in 2007 the paradoxical 
relationship between Christian NGOs and the North Korean government. He 
argues that these organisations have been successful in interacting with North 
Koreans because they have “place[ed] personal relationships above political 
concerns” (Snyder 2007: 428). Snyder also argues that the North Koreans are 
more comfortable working with Christian organisations as long as they “leave 
religion at the door” (Snyder 2007: 429).  Snyder provides evidence of a lasting 
relationship between North Koreans and Christian groups but does not explain 
why Christians became involved in North Korea in the first place. 
It is true that South Korean Christians have successfully managed to secure the 
financial means to proceed with their missionary activity in North Korea. The fact 
that evangelicalism has become the religion of the middle-class and the educated 
in South Korea also contributes to the sustaining of their activities. However, it 
would be misleading to reduce the power of Christian evangelicals to their wealth 
alone. We must avoid what critical realists have labelled the epistemic fallacy: 
reducing the knowledge of what we know to the knowledge of being. Thus 
ontology and epistemology must be disambiguated. What matters is not how 
much money Christians have at their disposal but how they decide to use it. 
Money is merely a means to achieve what they consider to be a greater end, which 
might not be material but spiritual. Furthermore, as explained later in this 
research, for the most part South Korean Christian churches continue to cultivate 
	   99 
a strong sense of anti-communism and when relations between the two countries 
are strained, it is difficult to raise funds for the North in South Korea.  
Another study carried out in a different region of the world shows that it is 
important to understand the ideological component behind the provision of aid to 
fully understand the politics of aid to a given country. The Norwegian government 
channels all of its aid to Sudan through Christian Norwegian organisations. Aud 
V. Tønnessen says that religion was a dominant force behind Western aid 
provided to Southern Sudan after the peace treaty had been signed: 
This all formed part of a higher aim: that of rebuilding Southern Sudan as a 
home for the Christian Sudanese population, not through development and 
efforts to secure the peace. So in this case it is the framing of the activities 
that explains the intentions behind them, not the activities in themselves. If 
one therefore only sees mission when evangelisation takes place, or only 
sees a professional development programme without taking into account the 
interpretative frame within which the activities take place, one fails to see 
and analyse the impact of religion in the international aid system (Tønnessen 
2011: 335). 
Therefore, it is not because evangelical organisations are not directly 
evangelising that their impact or motivations should be ignored. 
 
6. NGOs operating in North Korea: the situation as of 2009-2010 
 
As of 2010, a reduced number of NGOs were still active in North Korea. 
Organisations active on behalf of the European Union and resident in the country 
were: Premiere Urgence; Save the Children; Concern Worldwide; Welt Hunger 
Hilfe (German Agro Action), Triangle and Handicap International. Other active 
but non-resident organisations are: the Mennonite Central Committee (Canada); 
First Steps (Canada); the Eugene Bell Foundation (US/South Korea); Christian 
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Friends of Korea (US); Mercy Corps (US); World Vision (US); Samaritan’s Purse 
(US); Adventist Disaster Response Agency (US); Global Resources Services 
(US); American Friends Service Committee (US); the Canadian Food Grains 
Bank and the Hanns Seidel and Friedrich Naumann Foundations (Germany).  
As of 2009, there were 70 South Korean organisations involved with North 
Korea, 56 of which were members of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation 
with North Korea (KNCC).  The North Korea aid programme encompasses all 
humanitarian efforts and development programmes undertaken by South Korean 
civil society. It covers diverse areas including emergency assistance, medical 
care, agriculture and so on. The Protestant faith-based organisations registered 
with the Korean NGO council for cooperation with North Korea in 2009 were: 
Salvation Army (Han’guk segun) 
 
 
Good neighbors (Kut neibŏsŭ) 
 
Good people (Kut p’ip’ŭl) 
 
Korea Food for the Hungry International (Kukchekia 
taech’ek kigu) 
 
International Corn Foundation 
(Kukche oksusu chaedan)  
 
Korean Living Together Movement (Nambuk hamkke 
salgi undong) 
 
Campus Crusade Korea  
(Han’guk taehaksaeng 
sŏngyohoe)  
 
The general assembly of the Presbyterian church of 
Korea (Taehan yesu kyojangnohoe t’onghap sahoe 
pongsabu)  
 
YMCA Korea (Han’guk YMCA 
chŏn’gukyŏnmaeng) 
 
Lighthouse foundation (Tongdae pokchihoe) 
 
World vision Korea (Woldŭ 
pichŏn) 
 
The Korean Association of People Sharing Love 
(Minjok sarang nanŭm) 
 
New Millennium Life Movement 
(Saech’ŏnnyŏn saemyŏng 
undong) 
 
South-North Sharing Campaign (Nambuk nanum 
kongdong undong) 
 
The cross mission/Sam care  
(Saempokchi chaedan) 
 
 
Dairy Goat Project (Han’guk 
taehaksaeng sŏngyohoe) 
 
Eugene Bell Foundation (American/Korean) 
 
 
 
Korean Foundation for World Aid (Han minjok 
pokchi chaedan)- formerly called Korea Welfare 
Foundation 
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My research focuses on the activities of South Korea based groups that 
provide assistance to North Korea and have chosen to work with the North 
Korean authorities. These groups, organisations or churches might not always be 
purely composed of ethnic South Koreans as Koreans have sometimes been 
working in partnership with Westerners. I will also briefly refer to the work of 
Christian human rights groups and explain why they refuse to provide aid.  These 
groups, also based in South Korea, might also be the joint efforts of North Korean 
refugees and American activists and, in that sense, are not always ‘purely South 
Korean’. Finally, my research does not address the activities taking place on the 
China North Korea border and it focuses on the work of groups who have based 
their activity in South Korea. A list of all the organisations currently working 
under the umbrella of the Council for Cooperation with North Korea can be found 
in the second appendix at this end of this dissertation. The first appendix is a 
sample of my interview questions in Korean. 
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Chapter 3: Christian nationalism 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human rights and humanitarian groups who are working to improve the living 
conditions of North Koreans are also working to bring revival in North Korea. 
They believe that their activity will bring them closer to achieving re-unification 
and the re-evangelisation of the northern part of the country. In doing so however, 
most evangelicals are aiming to bring about regime change in North Korea as they 
believe that the Juche ideology and Christianity cannot coexist. This chapter will 
proceed in the following manner: first, it will attempt to understand what a 
theology of revival means for Korean evangelicals today in light of the historical 
relationship of Christianity with North Korea. Second, it will briefly summarise 
the key events of the history of Christianity on the Korean peninsula, as 
contemporary evangelicalism cannot be understood without reflecting on the 
history of Christianity in Korea.  Third, it will argue that an anti-communist 
ideology/anti-Juche continues to shape the way evangelicals relate to North 
Korea. It will be argued however that evangelicals with an interest in North Korea 
namely humanitarian aiders and human rights activists are divided over the North 
Korea issue, which is also reflective of a broader national divide. It will explain 
that the question of which policies to adopt towards North Korea constitutes a 
major issue of contention between political parties in South Korea. As of 2013, 
there exist two major political families: the conservatives, which are grouped 
under the Saenuri10 (new world) Party—party in power—and the progressives 
(who could also be referred to as liberals or democrats) which are grouped under 
                                                
10 Formerly called Grand National Party (GNP) 
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the Democratic Party (DEP or in Korean minjudang). The political division 
between conservatives and democrats pervades every aspect of society: chaebols, 
academia, the media, churches and NGOs. It is commonly referred to as the 
South-South division.  
Finally, it will be argued that their anti-Juche ideology is not only the product 
of history but also related to the fact that many Korean Christians have related the 
fate of their country to that of biblical Israel and have ‘satanised’ the forces (first 
Japan and then North Korea) that are preventing them from building a Christian 
nation.  
2. Christian Nationalism  
 
Calhoun (1993) defines nationalism as a modern concept that takes roots in the 
“preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-
determination [‘especially the idea of sovereignty’] linked to the concept of 
nation-state in the notorious formulations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of 
Nations in 1919” (Calhoun 1993: 213). Furthermore, Christianity is often 
associated with concepts of nationalism or modernisation of a society. Robert 
argues that generally Christianity spread relatively easily around the world 
because it formed part of the strategic response again colonialism: 
Christian belief, as a holistic way of addressing both questions of ultimate 
meaning and the need for material well-being, appealed the most in small-
scale societies that were confronted with larger political forces they could 
not control ... Intellectuals adopted Christianity as a strategic response to 
modernisation, a way of gaining the knowledge needed to negotiate the 
larger forces of political decay, or to resist colonialism” (Robert 2009: 49-
50). 
	   104 
Nationalism in Korea is often used to describe the involvement of Christians in 
the struggle for independence from Japan (Ung-kyu Pak 2005; Wells 1990; 
Timothy S. Lee 2010). However, Christian nationalism in Korea has been 
expressed differently at different times. Korean Christians have been trying to 
evangelise the whole peninsula for over a century. According to Spencer J. Palmer 
(1986), “from the beginning the Koreans were made to believe that the spread of 
Christianity and the growth of the Christian church belonged to them and not to 
the missionaries” (Palmer 1986: 28). Furthermore, Christianity in Korea has never 
existed outside of the political realm and has arguably always been nationalistic. 
In his book on Korean eschatology, Ung-kyu Pak (2005) makes a significant 
observation. He argues that dominant religions in Korea changed with the 
successive governments or dynasties: “Shamanism was the dominant religion in 
prehistorical times; Buddhism dominated in the Silla and Koryo eras (from the 
seventh to the fourteenth century); and Christianity emerged during the late 
Chosun era and during the twentieth” (Ung-kyu-Pak 2005: 19). It can be argued 
therefore that historically, specific religions were allowed to thrive under a given 
political order and at the same time these religions championed a particular 
system. 
With regard to Protestant Christianity especially, David Kwang-sun Suh 
[Kwangsun Sŏ] (2005), minjung theologian, has provided a very interesting 
insight into Korean political theology and the kingdom of God. Suh argues that 
for early Protestant Christians, the kingdom of God meant the end of 
Confucianism. People should convert to Christianity to move away from 
Confucianism and bring the country into a stage of greater modernity. Under 
Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the kingdom of God meant liberation and 
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independence from Japan. By turning to Christianity, the nation would be given 
greater power to resist occupation. During the years that preceded the Korean War 
and the years of the Cold War, the kingdom of God would have been the end of 
communism and the end of the North Korean dictatorship. Since the 1980s, for 
many Koreans the kingdom of God is the reunification of the Korean people 
(David Kwang-sun Suh 2005). There is a strong correlation therefore, between the 
idea of the kingdom of God and what Korea should look like as a nation. Suh’s 
remark outlines different stages of Christian nationalism and political theologies. 
This chapter suggests that evangelicals are not only seeking to reunify the 
peninsula but also to rebuild North Korea as a Christian nation. 
Furthermore, according to Sebastian C.H. Kim, anyone who wants to 
understand the Korean Church, must understand its revivals (Sebastian C.H. Kim 
2007: 43). A revival is a religious meeting held in the evenings, usually organised 
by churches from the same denomination and taking place in different locations at 
the same time. Dae- young Ryu (2008) argues that “one notable characteristic of 
Korean Protestantism is its theological conservatism. Further, embedded in this 
conservatism is a revivalistic-evangelistic temperament. Korean Christians' 
religious gatherings are typically emotional and stirring. Nearly all Korean 
congregations across denominational lines observe the century-old tradition of 
annual and semi-annual revival meetings that place a heavy emphasis on the 
Bible, conversion, and evangelism” (Dae-young Ryu 2008: 371).  
Korean evangelicals strategise to bring revivals in different areas of the world. 
In this context, the term revival can also mean restoring or bringing back to life. 
For example, the mission organisation, Withee Mission International (Widi 
kukchesŏn kyohoe), seeks among other things to restore Christianity as a major 
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religion in Europe by working through migrant workers from the global South 
who settle in Europe. The organisation says that through the training of migrants, 
it has already planted churches in Belgium and in the United Kingdom (Withee 
Mission International NGO 2004). G. Thompson Brown has written a book on 
How Koreans are reconverting the West (2008) through its Diaspora and another 
book on the role of the Korean Diaspora in Christian mission, Korean Diaspora 
and Christian mission, was published by Korean authors in 2011 (S. Hun Kim & 
Wonsuk Ma eds. 2011). However, as argued by Chung-shin Park, “the revival 
theology born in the historical context of colonisation played an influential role in 
nationalistic politics as a theology of hope, at least in the early colonial period” 
(Chung-shin Park 2003: 65). Therefore, it can still be argued that today’s revival 
theology is still intrinsically linked to evangelicals’ political theology. As Koreans 
advocate for revival in Pyongyang, they are also politically aiming to ‘re’construct 
a reunified, democratised and Christianised peninsula.  
Just like early Protestants believed that Christianity could free the Korean 
peninsula from Japanese occupation, they believe that the Christian faith can 
defeat communism and that personal conversions will lead to national renewal in 
North Korea. However, underpinning this form of Christian nationalism lays 
another form of Christian nationalism, which also emerged during the early years 
of the introduction of Protestantism on the peninsula. This form of Christian 
nationalism is best defined as such: “the set of ideas in which belief in the 
development and superiority of one's national group is combined with, or 
underwritten by, Christian theology and practice” (Stephen Backhouse 2011: xii). 
It is also associated to the idea that a nation used to be Christian or a God fearing 
country and it must therefore retrieve its Christian identity. In her definition of 
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Christian nationalism in the United States, Michelle Goldberg (2007) argues that 
the “motivating dream of the movement is the restoration of an imagined 
Christian nation” (Michelle Goldberg 2007: 7). Similarly, many Korean 
evangelicals believe that the northern territory must be re-conquered so that they 
can rebuild an imagined Christian nation. As such, for many Korean evangelicals 
the aim is to ‘restore God’s glory in Pyongyang’ or to implement what they have 
called the restoration theology (hoebok sinhak) (SK7). They believe that it is 
God’s will for the two countries to be reunited and for the whole peninsula to 
become a home to revivals again. Many identify Korea with biblical Israel and as 
such, continue to refer to Pyongyang as the Jerusalem of the East. Ung-kyu Pak 
(2005) says that under Japanese occupation, premilennialists believed that “Japan 
was used by Satan to prevent Korea from being a Christian nation” (Ung-kyu Pak 
2005: 205).   
As argued further in this chapter, evangelicals who are concerned with North 
Korea also believe that Kim Il-sungism is evil for a number of reasons: first 
because it is the state religion and North Koreans are forced to commit idolatry by 
worshipping their leaders like gods; second because it stands in the way of 
reunification and the current state of division which they believe is a sin; third 
because it prevents Korea from becoming a unified Christian nation.  
3. The advent of Protestant Christianity in Korea 
 
Korea did not come into contact with Protestantism until the nineteenth century 
and it developed with Korea’s quest for modernity and independence (Wells 
1990; Wi-jo Kang 1997). At the end of the 19th century, Korea was still the 
subject of political rivalries between the regional great powers. Thus, the Korean 
territory was affected by two wars: the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the 
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Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) at the end of which Korea was placed under 
Japanese protectorate. 
Church historian Kyoung-bae Min claims that the first Korean Protestants were 
baptised in April 1864, however their names have remained unknown to this day 
(Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 126). The very first Protestant missionary to set foot on 
the peninsula was Reverend Karl Gutzlaff, who travelled to Korea with a trade 
delegation from Britain in 1832. Gutzlaff distributed some Christian literature but 
did not stay long enough to make a lasting impression on the Korean people. 
Thirty-three years after Gutzlaff’s visit, Robert J. Thomas, a Welsh missionary, 
travelled to Korea with two Catholic Koreans. After a brief visit to China, he 
embarked on the American vessel, the General Sherman, heading towards Korea 
to open trade relations. Upon arrival, the Koreans notified the Americans that they 
did not wish to establish trade relations and asked them to depart. The Americans 
ignored the Koreans’ request and proceeded on the Taedong River towards 
Pyongyang. The Koreans responded by attacking and burning the ship down. The 
assault left no survivors and Robert Thomas perished with the rest of the crew.  
In the aftermath of the attack on General Sherman, missionaries began 
preaching the Gospel on the China-Korea border. Reports from the National Bible 
Society of Scotland reveal that in 1879, John Moss and John MacIntyre from the 
United Church of Scotland based in Moukden (Shenyang) began the translation of 
the New Testament with the help of native Koreans (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 129). 
These Koreans were traders who travelled back to their villages in Korea with 
copies of the New Testament translated into Korean. The Koreans’ names were 
Suh Sangryoon and Lee Woongtchan. As a result, by the time the first 
	   109 
missionaries entered Korea, there were already many converts to the Christian 
faith (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 129-130). 
Koreans also came into contact with Protestantism in Japan. For example, Yi 
Su-jong travelled to Japan as a member of a diplomatic delegation in 1882 and 
was converted by a Japanese Christian (Elizabeth Underwood 2003: 63-64). Yi 
translated the book of Acts and the gospels into Korean in 1885. Yi also translated 
the gospel of Mark which was the one that Henry G. Underwood brought to Korea 
before revising it later (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 127). As observed in the following 
chapter, when the first missionaries arrived in Korea, they had to disguise their 
religious identity, however, as they began to assist Koreans especially with their 
medical work, they endeavoured to establish a relationship of trust with the 
Koreans. After a coup d’état attempt led by a progressive group and a section of 
the Japanese military against the pro-Chinese royal family, Dr. Horace N. Allen 
was called to treat a royal relative high-ranking official Min Yong-ik who had 
been severely wounded. Thus, Dr. Allen gained the trust of the royal family and 
was able to open a hospital in 1885. Consecutively, other missionaries such as 
Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller were allowed to establish new schools and 
build hospitals (Chung- shin Park 2003: 21).   
Christianity spread throughout the country and scholars have attempted to 
identify the factors that have contributed to the growth of Christianity in Korea. 
The next chapter will examine how the religious background of Koreans and their 
spirituality helped with the integration of the gospel. The evangelising methods 
used by the missionaries are also often referred to in order to understand the 
successful integration of the Christian faith. Missionaries used the Nevius method 
which was based on the Venn-Anderson principles of self-propagation, self-
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support and self-government (Three Self) but included additional elements such 
as: personal evangelism; the centrality of the Bible in every aspect of the work 
and bible study by every believer; strict discipline in accordance with the 
teachings of the Bible; cooperation and union with other bodies and 
denominations; help with economic circumstances of the people (Palmer 1986: 
27-28). The application of these principles means that not only did the 
missionaries import a very pious faith but that also, they recognised the 
importance of working across denominations and expressed concern for the 
economic circumstances of the people (not least because it was seen as important 
that churches should be financially viable).  
Missionaries targeted every layer of society and taught Koreans to read and 
write in han’gŭl. They translated the Bible into the vernacular language and 
opened schools. Therefore, groups, which were previously discriminated against 
in terms of education and literacy, were enabled to produce and read literature in 
the vernacular language. Churches provided a space where everyone, regardless of 
their class or background could receive some kind of education. Women, 
especially, benefited from the process of literacy and the social activities 
organised by the churches (Yong-shin Park 2007: 24-25). Koreans were 
encouraged to learn about, debate, and adopt new ideas. An excellent example of 
this is the establishment of the “Independence Club” in 1896 by a Korean 
Christian leader, Sŏ Chae-p’il (who took the name of Philip Jaisohn after 
acquiring American citizenship) on his return from exile in the United States and 
its publication of the very first newspaper in the vernacular: the Tongnip Sinmun. 
The newspaper, written in vernacular, called for radical reforms based on 
Christian doctrine (Palmer 1986: 76).  
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The Great Revival of 1907 
 
A major event in the history of Christianity in Korea is the Great Revival of 
Pyongyang in 1907. The reasons for the missionaries to hold revivals were 
twofold: first because they desired for the Koreans to genuinely repent of their 
sins and become ‘born again’ Christians; second because they wanted to keep the 
church away from the political situation as explained below (Timothy S. Lee 
2010). According to Kyoung-bae Min, the revival started in 1903 with a group of 
Methodist missionaries in Wonsan. A missionary felt moved to confess his sins to 
other missionaries and in front of the congregation. Deeply touched, he says, 
Korean Christians were compelled to follow him. In 1904, the same experience 
was repeated at the same conference as the previous year. News of the conference 
spread to Pyongyang where similar meetings were consequently organised.  
On the 12th of January 1907, in Pyongyang, missionaries held a meeting to read 
and meditate on the Bible (in Korean such a meeting is called sakyunghoe). 
William Newton Blair, an American Presbyterian missionary read the 27th verse 
from the 12th chapter of the first book of Corinthians preaching about unity in the 
body of Christ. After his sermon, the congregation started praying and reportedly: 
“immediately, the room full of men was filled with voices lifted to God in 
prayer...It was remarkable!... Some were crying and pleading God’s forgiveness 
for certain sins which they named to Him in prayer. All were pleading for the 
infilling of the Holy Ghost. Although there were so many voices, there was no 
confusion at all” (McCune quoted in Kyoung-bae Min (2005: 223).  All the 
members of the congregations started to confess and repent from their sins and to 
better understand God’s forgiveness. News of the revival spread to Seoul where 
Korean Christians organised similar meetings and experienced similar feelings 
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(Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 223-225). Revival meetings were soon organised across 
the whole peninsula. 
The reasons behind such a success were a combination of several factors. First 
of all, the revival started in the north of the peninsula. As argued in the previous 
chapter, Christianity was widespread in the north. People in the north were 
believed to be more receptive because they felt discriminated against by the rulers 
in Seoul and were suffering from deprivation. Donald Clark (2010) has identified 
the socio-geographical factors that explain the rapid spread of Protestantism in the 
north of the peninsula: 
1 the geography of the northwest acting as a corridor for communication 
between Korea and Manchuria, Liaodong, and China proper and as an 
area for the positioning of military personnel in connection with border 
defense; 2 the commercial traffic through the corridor and the high-level 
of merchant activity on both sides of the Sino-Korean border crossing 
making for a certain tolerance for diversity; 3 the difficulty of agriculture 
in much of the region above the coastal plain, the small size of farms, 
and the corollary reliance on economic activity other than agriculture, 
namely mining, lumbering, handcrafting, and trading; 4 the isolation of 
the northwest from the political center of Korea in Seoul; and together 
with this, 5, a simmering sense of discrimination borne out by the 
inability of northern literati, despite rapidly rising rates of examination 
passage, to gain significant membership among the national’s aristocratic 
elite (Clark 2010: 234).     
 
Resentment against the Seoul rule was materialised with a revolt in 1811. A 
young man called Hong Kyŏng-nae failed the national examinations and realised 
that chances of improving his way of life were very slim because of his 
background so he organised a protest against the central government by attacking 
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the office of appointed rulers in the Pyongyang (P’yŏngan) area. Local people, 
who were already resentful of the government mismanagement and suffering from 
famine, joined in and after weeks of fighting, Hong was captured and beheaded. 
Another factor, which, according to Palmer, contributed to the rise of Christianity 
in the region is derived from the battles of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
wars that were fought in the Pyongyang area. Much Korean property was 
destroyed during these wars and the people suffered greatly and lived in fear 
(Palmer 1986: 83-84).  Palmer also argues that people in the north were also very 
appreciative of missionaries: an epidemic of cholera in Seoul brought news of the 
great courage and compassion of missionaries who worked relentlessly to combat 
the epidemic. Koreans were very moved and believed that these foreigners loved 
them (Palmer 1986: 84).  
Another reason is the importance of bible study. According to Roy E. Shearer, 
Korean Christians were able to experience the presence of the Holy Spirit because 
of their knowledge of the Bible, which they studied intensively. Bible study 
classes were held in both rural and urban areas and were very well attended (Roy 
E. Shearer 1966: 64-65). 
Critics say that as a result of the revival, Korean Christians started to 
emphasise the importance of personal salvations and neglected social reforms. 
However, Ung-kyu Pak (2005) proposes that this criticism is unfounded. The 
revival produced a “spiritual rebirth and the purification of the church” and also 
brought people from different denominations together: “the revival was one of the 
religious factors that helped to bind the nation together against foreign 
denominations” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 120-121). Thus, the revival did not only 
strengthen the faith of Korean Christians, it also reignited their evangelistic zeal 
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as Christians were willing to work together regardless of their respective 
denominations. In the long term, it also gave them a greater incentive to resist the 
Japanese occupation. In other words, their focus on personal salvation and 
evangelisation did not distract them from carrying out social reforms. As analysed 
by Kenneth Wells (1990), Christians understood the struggle of the nation as a 
sign of spiritual weakness which means that personal transformation had to 
precede the improvement of earthly circumstances: “this conviction was fervently 
expressed by a movement to repent of both personal and national sins, which 
became a basic premise of Protestant self-reconstruction nationalism. Personal 
renewal was considered foundational to national renewal” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 
122). Christians therefore contributed greatly to the struggle against Japanese 
occupation. 
Struggle for independence  
 
A form of Korean Christian nationalism emerged in the late 19th century as 
some Korean scholars promoted Christianity and Western ideas as a way of 
gaining independence and achieving modernity. These scholars were not only 
opposed to the political and cultural influences of China and Japan on the Korean 
peninsula, they also believed in the reformation of the Confucian system.  
Protestant reformers such as Yun Chi-ho developed the idea that “Korea’s 
material weaknesses were regarded as symptoms of moral and spiritual decline” 
(Wells 1990:  9) and “a lack of public morality and a fatal tendency to rely on 
large powers in times of both peace and crisis” (Wells 1990: 10).  Wells further 
argues that Korean intellectuals associated philosophy with civilisation--
“Confucianism and civilization were virtually synonymous—and believed that 
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Protestantism might provide the necessary virtues for the re-construction of the 
nation, for example the implementation of democracy” (Wells 1990: 51).  
Whereas the objective of nationalism is to construct identities and establish 
boundaries between peoples, the main role of Christianity is to transcend the 
barriers of language and ethnicity. Thus, Wells argues, Christianity constitutes 
nationalism’s antithesis (Wells 1990: 4). The history of Christianity on the Korean 
peninsula however negates this affirmation. Wells believes that religion and 
nationalism both emerged as “similar modes of cultural expressions” (Wells 1990: 
6). However, the fact that religion and nationalism do not share common 
objectives can generate tensions especially in the case of Korea where Christianity 
was originally a foreign religion. According to Wells, Korean protestant 
nationalists reconciled the two concepts by shaping people’s nationalism 
according to their faith i.e. the implementation of an ethical nationalism, “a 
nationalism which would align the people with the values of the ‘Kingdom of 
God” (Wells 1990: 10). This process of “self-reconstruction” implied that 
“inward, spiritual and ethical strengthening was required before outward, material 
strength could be achieved” (Wells 1990: 9). In order to reconstruct their 
civilisation, Korean Protestants had to separate the ‘state’ from the ‘nation’ (Wells 
1990: 10). As argued by Wells, in 1905, the level of opposition to political 
involvement by the Japanese Government General was such that Korean 
Protestants had to “emphasise the priority of cultural reconstruction over political 
action” (Wells 1990: 10). Wells argues that they believed that strong new nations 
“derive from civilisation which is founded on an ethico-spiritual ideal” (Wells 
1990: 11). The practice of Christianity meant that Koreans were required to let go 
of some Confucian rituals, such as the worship of ancestors. However, Wells 
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argues that Protestant self-reconstruction nationalists “carried over neo-
Confucianism’s faith in the civilizing function of education and self-
improvement” (Wells 1990: 12).  
In 1910, Japan forcibly annexed Korea. Some Korean scholars such as Yi 
Kwangsu and Yun Chi-ho believed that the United States would be sympathetic to 
their plight and continued to believe that Protestantism had freed the West and 
brought it on the path of modernity. However, as they continued to focus on 
cultural reconstruction over open political action against the Japanese, the rise of a 
more populist socialism meant that people came to regard them as passive (Wells 
1990: xxxiv) and even active collaborators (Chung-shin Park 2003: 156). 
By contrast, many Koreans chose to attend church precisely because it 
provided them with a space where they could freely express their opposition to the 
Japanese occupation. Furthermore, for the average Korean, disillusioned by 
politics and wearied by the successive wars and invasions, the Christian message 
provided solace and comfort as expressed by Timothy S. Lee (2010): “[m]ore and 
more Koreans suffered and searched desperately for salvation—from disorder, 
fear, hunger, and humiliation. One place where salvation was promised was the 
Protestant church, where a new life was offered to whoever would convert” 
(Timothy S. Lee 2010: 13).  
At the end of the First World War in November 1918, Koreans in exile in 
China and the United States sent a Protestant delegate to plead their case to the 
Paris Peace Conference but the Western powers never meant to grant 
independence to the Japanese colonies. Nevertheless, Koreans in Japan started to 
organise demonstrations. More significantly, a number of Christians took the lead 
in organising the March First Independence Movement of 1919. The March First 
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Movement was followed by more demonstrations around the country but the 
demonstrations were brutally repressed by the Japanese gendarmes. In view of the 
violence used against the Korean Christians, the missionaries began to resent the 
Japanese and reported the atrocities (7,645 killed and 15,961 injured) to their 
home country (Wells 1990; Timothy S. Lee 2010). 
Initially, missionaries did not support and at times discouraged Christian 
participation in politics. Therefore, as instructed by the government of the United 
States, American missionaries urged their congregations to stay away from 
politics. Independently, they were also concerned that political activity within the 
church could result in religious persecution and in the forcible end of their 
operations by the Japanese authorities. As a matter of fact, for a long time, the 
Japanese believed that the American missionaries were working on behalf of their 
government.  
In 1911, the Japanese authorities had begun to persecute and to arrest 
missionaries and Christian converts in a series of incidents which culminated in a 
massive arrest known as the ‘Conspiracy case’ in 1912. In the course of the trial, 
it quickly became obvious that the charges against the missionaries had been 
fabricated and the Japanese authorities failed to prove their theory of conspiracy. 
Out of the hundred and five men who had been imprisoned, all were released 
except for six who remained in prison for a few years (Blair & Hunt 1977: 83-84). 
The missionaries felt relieved because the failed trial had demonstrated to the 
Japanese that they were indeed not involved in political matters. Nevertheless, 
Koreans were disillusioned by the apolitical apathy and sometimes pro Japanese 
stance of the missionaries and felt that the Church was indifferent to their political 
plight (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 32). The missionaries’ response to the massacres, 
	   118 
however, helped to renew the bond between Koreans and the missionaries 
(Timothy S. Lee 2010: 38-39).  
The resistance movement against Japanese colonialism was weakened by a 
lack of unity and dividing ideologies. Thus, in spite of the significant number of 
Christian signatories to the March First declaration (15 out of 33 signatories), the 
proclamation did not comprise a defined Christian position, as the objective was 
to represent national unity and it was felt to be counterproductive to “identify [it] 
with a Protestant or Cheondokgyo cause” (Wells 1990: 100). Reformers had also 
failed to plan a long-term strategy for independence and dissension arose not only 
among the various groups but also within the Church. During this time the 
Protestants split into three factions: a group promoting democracy placed itself 
under the leadership of Syngman Rhee; a group led by Yi Tongwhi adhered to the 
ideas of socialism and armed response; and finally a group chose to follow the 
Japanese gradualist policy (the Japanese policy of teaching Koreans about 
governance) (Wells 1990: 100-101). In addition to these questions of politics, the 
church suffered additional divisions because of the Shinto shrine issue of whether 
church and state could be separate.  
Shinto shrine issue 
 
In the 1930s, the Presbyterian Church became very divided for different 
reasons: many were personal and political reasons, but mostly the conflict was 
theological. Churches in the northwest were conservative and those in the south 
were mostly progressive and accused churches in the north of dominating policies 
and assemblies (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 462). Donald Clark actually reveals that a 
less well-known form of resistance had developed in Korean churches against 
missionaries and the imposition of a theology by foreigners. The seminary in 
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Pyongyang, in particular, advocated a type of conservative theology that some 
Koreans objected to. Clark argues that one of the founders of minjung theology, 
Kim Chejun, founded his own seminary in 1940 to break away from the influence 
of conservative theology (Clark 1995: 93-94). The Church became more divided 
over the question of whether to attend Shinto shrine services.  
Koreans were first required to attend Shinto shrine services after being annexed 
by Japan. They were asked to bow down to photos of the Japanese emperor as a 
sign of courtesy toward his rule. Missionaries opposed the practice and even 
submitted an appeal to the Government-Central of Chosen (Shinto). In the late 
1920s, it was said that Shinto and religion were two different matters and that 
therefore asking to bow down to a shrine was not a violation of religious freedom. 
Kyoung-bae Min (2005) says that matters became more complicated after the 
establishment of the Chosen (Shinto) shrine in October 1927 at Namsan in Seoul: 
“the situation began to change, because the loyalty to the Japanese polity which 
ordered ‘to worship (Japanese) Deities and their ancestors as the nucleus of the 
state’ was strictly enforced” (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 480-481). In 1935, the 
Japanese started to force Christian pupils in Pyongyang to attend Shinto shrine 
services. Christian leaders working in the city such as Dr. G.S. McCune refused to 
comply and organised a meeting with other ministers to discuss the issue. All 
except for one agreed that they would not allow their students to bow to the 
Japanese emperor. Missionaries however were in disagreement over the nature of 
Shinto shrine services and were worried that they might have to close down the 
schools. In 1936, missionaries decided that mission schools in Pyongyang would 
close and eighteen schools were closed down by the end of 1938. A few schools 
in Seoul decided to conform to the policy and remained open. After the schools, 
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the Japanese police started to systematically crack down on churches and 
Christian leaders. Actually, the exact nature of Shinto shrine services was not 
clarified by Japan itself until 1938 when it was eventually decided that it was not 
a religious service. In 1938, the government also manipulated the General 
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church to approve a motion granting approval to 
Shinto worship.  
In April 1939, a bill for the “Religious Body Law” was adopted and 
implemented immediately. According to the bill, “Shintoism is not a religion, but 
it is the Way corresponding with the indigenous tradition of our country, which 
transcends religion” (Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 482-485). The bill also threatened 
Christianity affirming that “religious belief is basically not only anti-Japanese but 
also despising the principle of national polity and disregarding the national spirit” 
(Kyoung-bae Min 2005: 485). Finally, the bill also attempted to subdue all 
religious bodies by placing them under the supervision of the state which could 
not only regulate their administration but also intervene in matters of religious 
doctrines. As explained by Bruce F. Hunt: 
The government used the religious control law to amalgamate all the 
denominations into a government controlled, government serving church. 
The church was forbidden to read certain parts of the Scriptures and to sing 
certain hymns. Shrine worship, bowing to the flag and to the east (kyujo 
yohai) were made compulsory in the church and the latter at least at all 
worship services. Small shrines (kamidana) were then installed in the 
churches. Non-cooperating ministers were imprisoned, several tens dying 
there; church groups which did not cooperate were dissolved, or, what 
amounted to the same thing, arbitrarily amalgamated with groups that 
would cooperate (Hunt quoted in Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 188).  
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Most of the Methodist churches decided to accept the fact that Shintoism was 
not a religion and thus survived. In 1942, the Japanese attempted to dissolve 
religious denominations by asking churches to come under a single umbrella, 
Kyodan (denomination). Their plan failed because of the resistance of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (Seoul Presbytery). In June 1945, however, fifty-
nine representatives from different denominations accepted to dissolve and form a 
unique body, the Federal Reformed Church of Korea. Pastors were also sent to re-
education camps to be reconverted to Shinto (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 188-189). 
According to Pak, the number of Christians who were imprisoned for their faith 
during that period amounts to more than a thousand, and more than fifty died in 
prison (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 197). Major resistance against the cult of Shinto came 
from the north, especially led by graduates of the Pyongyang Theological 
Seminary and Christian leaders in Kyungam province (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 190-
192).  
After the liberation of Korea, the Presbyterian Church was divided over the 
question of whether to punish the ministers who had collaborated with the 
Japanese during the time of colonisation that is those who had accepted to 
worship the Shinto shrine. They were accused of idolatry by other Christians but 
refused to resign which created many tensions.  Those who had refused to bow in 
front of the shrine emphasised the monotheistic nature of Christianity and thus 
“deepened the extreme conservative nature of the Korean Protestant Church ... 
their theology became so inflexible that it did not allow the slightest difference of 
opinion” (Suk-man Jang 2004: 136-137). Therefore, they created a new group, the 
Kosin group, within the Presbyterian Church (Suk-man Jang 2004: 138).   
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Furthermore, after the liberation and during the Korean War, North Korean 
conservative Christians who fled to the South (in Korean wŏlnamin) founded most 
of the churches that can be found in present day South Korea. They carried with 
them a conservative theology and a strong anti-communist agenda. A significant 
number became involved with the newly established South Korean government 
and the military especially, even though at that time only 2% of the South Korean 
population was Protestant (In-chul Kang [Inch’ŏl Kang] 2007: 405-431).  
5. Anti-communism/ anti Kim-Ilsungism 
 
Cold War era 
 
Tensions between Christians and communists started in the years of Japanese 
occupation.  The conflict between Christians and communists has been very well 
described in Sok-yong Hwang’s novel The Guest, where the inhabitants of 
Hwanghae Province fought against each other. In the novel, the characters are 
haunted by the ghosts of the people who were killed. The novel also illustrates 
how members of the same families or friends were torn apart by the different 
ideologies and ended up killing each other (Sok-yong Hwang 2008). As a result of 
the conflict, for over sixty years, Christians (liberals and conservatives alike) were 
strongly anti-communist as explained by a Catholic scholar, Anselm Kyong-suk 
Min (2006): 
Since the liberation of 1945, Christianity, Catholic and Protestant alike, 
was seized with an anticommunist Cold War ideology and tried both to 
justify the extreme gap between rich and poor and reinforce the political 
division of the nation. Lacking a historical consciousness and blindly pro-
American and anticommunist, the churches ignored the challenge of social 
justice in the name of the condemnation of atheism and reinforced the 
division of the nation by demonizing and antagonizing fellow Koreans of 
the North” (Anselm Kyong-suk Min 2006: 267).  
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After the liberation of Korea and the establishment of the Republic of Korea, 
they supported the politics of the successive presidents. Ironically, it did not 
matter whether these leaders were committed Christians or not as long as they 
were anti-communist. Syngman Rhee was a leader in the Methodist church and 
appointed Christians as members of his cabinet, however Park Chung-hee, leader 
of the military junta, was closer to the Buddhist faith and married a very 
committed Buddhist. The successive leaders Syngman Rhee (between 1948 and 
1960, the First Republic), Yun Bo-seon and Chang Myon (1960-1961, the Second 
Republic), Park Chung-hee (1963-1972; 1972-1979), the Third and the Fourth 
republic), Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988, the Fifth Republic), drew their legitimacy 
from their opposition to communism. For the sake of national security, they 
repressed the civil and political rights of the population and for the sake of 
economic growth; repressed the social and economic rights of the population.  
Christian antagonism toward North Korea, communism and Juche during the 
Cold War is best illustrated by the relationship between evangelicals and the 
military. Originally, Christians’ reasoning for rejecting communism was slightly 
different from today’s rejection of the Juche ideology. In-chul Kang [Inch’ŏl 
Kang] (2007) in his book on anti-communism in the Korean Protestant Church, 
Han’gukŭi kaesingyowa pankongjŭi, writes that they rejected communism first 
because it advocated atheism; second because communism was based on human 
materialism and a humanistic perspective (self-actualisation); third because 
communism was against religions; fourth because it was achieved by means of 
violent revolutions and the establishment of dictatorship; fifth because it had been 
imposed on the peninsula by a foreign power, the Soviet Union (In-chul Kang 
2007: 65).  
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Thus, in their efforts to eradicate communism, evangelicals supported the 
efforts of the civil war. In his novel written in 1964, The Martyred, Richard E. 
Kim—a Korean born in North Korea who fought for the South Korean army and 
later emigrated to the United States—challenged the manufacturing of Christian 
martyrdom for the sake of propaganda. His novel is about the investigation of the 
execution of twelve Presbyterian ministers by the communists in the beginning of 
the Korean War. It is progressively revealed throughout the novel that ten 
ministers in fact begged for their lives and one refused to pray before being 
executed. One survivor, whose life was spared because he had the courage to spit 
at his executioner’s face, decides nevertheless not to unveil the truth because he 
believes that Christians and the nation must believe in Christianity to survive the 
horrors of the war. Thus, the South Korean army and minister decide to 
manufacture martyrs even though some of them in fact were betrayers and 
cowards: “The twelve martyrs are a great symbol. They are a symbol of the 
suffering Christians and their eventual triumph. We mustn’t let the martyrs down. 
We must let everyone witness their spiritual victory over the Reds” (Richard E. 
Kim 1964: 48-49). This novel, written in 1964, wants to illustrate how 
evangelicals used the discourse of martyrdom to construct their propaganda and 
legitimise the atrocities committed against the other side during the Korean War. 
Timothy S. Lee (2010) states that after the war, Christians conducted successive 
campaigns of evangelisation, organising mass revivals across the country. They 
also established chaplaincies in the army, police departments and prisons and used 
the media, especially the radio, to reach as many people as possible (Timothy S. 
Lee 2010: 90). These campaigns always carried a similar message: “Going to 
Jesus Christ is Our Only Way to Survive; Let’s Return to the Pentecost; Let’s 
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Evangelize the Fatherland; Let’s drive Out Communists” (Timothy S. Lee 2010: 
94). 
Vladimir Tikhonov (2013) argues that the institution of military chaplaincy, 
especially, in the 1950s and 1960s served South Korean propaganda by turning 
young men into loyal anti-communist Christian citizens: “the majority of 
Protestant clergymen identified ‘democratic spirit’, ‘anti-Communism’, and 
‘Christianity’ as largely synonymous, and felt committed to ‘grounding our new 
country in the Gospel’s message’, with obvious encouragement from the political 
authorities who saw them as their strongest most unwavering supporters” 
(Tikhonov 2013).  
This is also demonstrated by another novel by Sok-yong Hwang, the Old 
Garden, a novel based on his experience as a political prisoner during the years of 
authoritarianism.  Sok-young Hwang explains how Protestant leaders were made 
to visit prisons to turn human rights activists who had violated the National 
Security Law into true patriots: “Our speaker today, Reverend Kang, began his 
work in the purifying operation for Communists during the post-war period, and 
he has served with distinction for many years. He has turned many, many 
National Security Law offenders toward humanism. He has taught so many 
bloodless, cruel Communists to repent and to regret, and shaped them into good 
citizens. He is a true patriot” (Sok-yong Hwang 2009: 388).  
Evangelicals also supported the Vietnam War as Dae-young Ryu (2009) argues 
that they wanted to help the Americans who had come to their help during the 
Korean War. According to Dae-young Ryu, a great majority of the commanders 
sent to Vietnam were Christian. A troop composed only of Protestant soldiers 
changed their name to ‘Emmanuel’, betraying the then close relationship between 
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Protestants, the military and the government. They believed that it was the will of 
God for Korean troops to be in Vietnam and that missionaries should be sent to 
eliminate shamanistic beliefs and communism. Soldiers called themselves 
freedom crusaders (chayu sipcha kun) (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 277-278). 
Evangelicals believed that people had to be saved not only for the sake of 
spirituality but also because Christianity is the source of “prosperity, moral 
harmony, international recognition, and security against communism” (Timothy S. 
Lee 2010: 85).  
Present day 
 
Today, many evangelicals continue to uphold an anti-communist ideology, 
though with an increasing understanding of the North Korean political system, it 
would be more correct to say that they are anti-Juche or anti Kim Il-sungism. This 
means that in their efforts to bring about democracy in North Korea and achieve 
the reunification of the two countries, some evangelicals may be ready to distort 
elements of the truth in order to portray the North Korean system in a negative 
light. For instance, North Korean leaders are often ridiculed and downgraded.  On 
9 October 2009, a group of Christian human rights organisations working with the 
North Korea Freedom Coalition, gathered in front of Seoul station as part of a 
campaign to take the North Korean leaders to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). In order to raise awareness about the human rights situation in the North, 
the groups organised a photo exhibit in front of the station. One of these pictures 
showed the then leader Kim Jong-il without clothes on, sitting on a chair and 
drinking beer. It not clear whether the picture was genuine or fabricated however 
it was placed between pictures of starving children in an effort to shock the 
audience further. 
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Another example of this can be found in the story of Robert Park. In the 
beginning of 2012, the Korean press highlighted the plight of human rights 
activist Robert Park who crossed the North Korean border illegally in 2009 and 
was detained for two months before being released by the North Koreans. Robert 
Park, a Korean American from Arizona, was the founder of the organisation 
Reunification 2009. He claimed that he wanted to raise awareness about the 
human rights situation in North Korea by crossing the border from China on the 
25th of December 2009 with a message of ‘love and forgiveness’ for the North 
Korean leaders:  
To Mr. Kim Jong Il and North Korea's Leaders: 
I proclaim Christ’s love and forgiveness towards you today. God promises 
mercy and clemency for those who repent. He promises forgiveness for 
every sin and re-birth through the Holy Spirit for those who believe Christ 
died for the atonement of all their sins, as a sacrifice from God, given in 
love. He is the true and living God. He loves you and wants to save you and 
all of North Korea today. Please open your borders so that we may bring 
food, provisions, medicine, necessities, and assistance to those who are 
struggling to survive. Please close down all concentration camps and release 
all political prisoners today, and allow care teams to enter to minister healing 
to those who have been tortured and traumatized. All we are asking is for all 
North Koreans to be free, safe and have life. 
With Love, Respect and Goodwill Towards All People, 
Robert Park 
(Robert Park quoted in Sung-rae Jo 2009). 
Robert Park said his prison guards subjected him to torture and he has been 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress. Understandably, he does not want to share 
the details of his ordeal with everyone but nevertheless wants to see the 
perpetrators of the crimes committed against him be brought to justice. Robert 
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Park has claimed that the conservative South Korean press and some evangelical 
groups, especially Pax Koreana11, are distorting the facts about his detention and 
exploiting his case to promote an agenda of hatred towards North Korea 
(Interview with Robert Park 10 February 2012). Pax Koreana’s response to the 
case of Robert Park betrays a Cold War mentality whereby emotions and a 
confrontational attitude prevail over facts and constructive criticism. As Young-gi 
Hong (2009) explains, Korean evangelicals’ political theology is weak and lacks a 
social vision and that Korean evangelicals still need to establish sound theological 
foundations that would support “freedom, justice, and peace, not political 
preconceptions or particularistic interests” (Joshua Young-gi Hong 2009: 230).  
Some evangelicals continue to believe that conversion to Christianity is 
necessary to ensure prosperity and loyalty to South Korean political and economic 
structures: according to the Union to Plant Churches in North Korea, a missionary 
organisation, North Korean refugees must convert to Christianity in order to 
successfully integrate into South Korean society: defectors are therefore requested 
to adapt and adjust to South Korean capitalistic values:  
North Korean refugees need some time to achieve the minds and 
competitiveness, as South Korea is not North Korea. South Korea has spent 
a hard time to develop their economy and society like today. North Korean 
refugees should try hard for quite a while for the successful settlement in 
South Korea [sic]. Even when the self-respect is hurt, it is better to think 
positively to have another opportunity to try once more [sic]. Jesus Christ 
will the cure the wounded mind and exalt them to the worth being [sic]” 
(The Union to Plant Churches in North Korea NGO 2010).   
                                                
11 Pax Koreana is a right wing organisation that has been very active in human rights activism 
towards North Korea, working towards the reunification of the nation relying on the belief that, 
based on its spiritual foundations and rapid economic development; South Korea should be able to 
become a superpower (Pax Koreana 2008).  
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In addition, churches provide North Korean refugees with a free space where 
they can strategise, share and design human rights campaigns. As examined in the 
last chapter, between the years 1998 and 2008, South Korean Presidents 
discouraged North Korean refugees from becoming involved with anti-North 
Korea activity because they feared that their actions might have negative 
repercussions on their politics of engagement with the North. Evangelical 
churches filled the void, and in many ways acted on behalf of the state the same 
way churches acted like the state under Japanese occupation.  Jung says that the 
“church is the primary contact zone where the migrants and their southern 
counterparts encounter unexpected cultural differences and negotiate a new sense 
of belonging by envisioning a Christianized reunified nation” (Jin-heon Jung 2011: 
19). The report published by the think-tank International Crisis Group in July 
2011 revealed that: “Christian churches have become popular among defectors as 
organisers of defector groups and advocates for human rights in the North” 
(International Crisis Group NGO 2011: 26).  
Anti-Kimilsungism also translates into an ongoing support for the use and the 
existence of the National Security Law.  In September 2010, a group of North 
Korean refugees based in South Korea announced the establishment of a new 
organisation to promote and facilitate the collapse of the North Korean regime in 
view of achieving reunification, peace and democracy on the Korean peninsula - 
the North Korea People’s Liberation Front (Tongp’o haebang). In order to do so, 
in an email sent to a prayer network on the 17th of September 2010, the group 
vows to “prevent the actions of those who support the Kim Jong Il regime in 
South Korea and take the lead in exposing and seeking prosecution of those who 
violate the national security law and show sympathy for Kim Jong il regime and 
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North Korea” (North Korea People’s Liberation Front NGO 2010). In order words 
this group is willing to sacrifice the civil and political rights of South Koreans in 
order to defend human rights and the development of democracy in North Korea.                               
The National Security Law of the Republic of Korea was enacted in 1948 and 
was used to arrest, torture and punish anyone accused of dissent and/or 
sympathising with the regime of North Korea. Former Presidents and democracy 
activists Kim Dae-jung and Kim Yong-sam were both imprisoned for violating 
the National Security Law. The law was also used to crack down on freedom of 
the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of thought. For example, it was 
strictly forbidden to study about North Korea or possess literature produced in 
North Korea. With the advent of democracy and the implementation of President 
Roh Tae-woo’s opening policy towards the communist block—Nordpolitik—
democracy activists started to ask for the abolishment of the law. The use of the 
law has not been the prerogative of conservative Presidents as, after the IMF crisis 
of 1997-1998, Kim Dae-jung use the law to arrest workers and students who 
demonstrated against unemployment (Kraft 2006: 631-633).  
In 2001, a delegation of peace activists who had visited Pyongyang were 
arrested for violating the National Security Law and the same year a sociology 
professor from the university of Dongguk was arrested for visiting the alleged 
birthplace of Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang (Kraft 2006: 634). The leftist Pastor Han 
Sang-ryeol, who made an unauthorised trip to North Korea in the summer 2010, 
was arrested for violating the National Security Law. In response to the incident, 
Kae-seok, former researcher at Human Rights Watch, said:  “These are just the 
latest episodes in the South Korean government's opportunistic use of the National 
Security Law to severely restrict the right to freedom of expression. Under the 
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law, South Koreans are barred from meeting with North Koreans or visiting North 
Korea without state permission. They are forbidden from praising North Korea or 
disseminating North Korean propaganda. The law clearly violates South Korea's 
international human-rights obligations” (Human Rights Watch NGO 2010).  
The law is still being used to limit the rights of South Koreans to enjoy full 
freedom of speech and movement but the very existence of North Korea ensures 
that South Korea Presidents cannot abolish it. The only way for South Koreans to 
enjoy full democracy would be the reassurance that North Korea no longer 
constitutes a threat. Thus, human rights activists who work to protect the rights of 
South Koreans have been actively working towards reconciliation and the 
establishment of a peace treaty with North Korea as they rightly regard peace as a 
precondition to the implementation of full democracy and a greater respect for 
human rights on the Korean peninsula. 
Many domestic human rights organisations and the international human rights 
organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned 
the use of the law, which breaches South Korea’s commitment to international 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCE). However, the South Korean constitution stipulates that international 
law equals domestic law but if there is a conflict between the two, domestic law 
prevails (Kraft 2006: 649-650).   
Divided church: human rights versus food aid 
 
Opposition to North Korea also translates into opposition to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance as a mission strategy. The South Korean evangelical 
humanitarian workers have channelled a lot of food to North Korea with the help 
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of the North Korean Christian Federation. Many evangelicals do not believe that 
the members of the North Korean Christian Federation are actually ‘Christian’. In 
other words, they do not believe that they are ‘born again’ but that instead they are 
the mouthpieces of the North Korean government created to attract foreign 
investments. The only church that they recognise as genuine is the underground 
church. For example the conservative Christian human rights activist and 
journalist Sung-uk Kim asserts: 
Ironically, Korean Churches are the most enthusiastic over supporting North 
Korea. Christians gives the most amount of material aid on the civil basis in 
the name of ‘Mission for North Korea’ ... There are religion bodies including 
the Korean Christian Federation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, and the 
Korean Association of Roman Catholic in North Korea. These are just ways 
to attract foreign currency ... Some of the Christians who have been to North 
Korea are leftists but a significant number of them are moderate. Most of 
them realize what KCF really is. Nevertheless, they tend to agree to the 
statements where South Korean church should brace, aid, and exchange with 
North Korea. It means that even if CFK is surely counterfeit Christian 
Church, they can’t stop practicing the mission for North Korea (Sung-uk 
Kim 2008: 110-112).  
Members of the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) on the other 
hand, do not question the ‘faith’ of their North Korean counterparts.  For 
example, Jong-sun Noh argues that as of 2006, one of the leading elders of the 
Bongsu [Pongsu] church in Pyongyang is the 77 years old Kang Seyoung. Her 
father was a pastor in North Korea who supported the communist reform of the 
land because he believed that it would benefit the tenants.  Noh has no doubt that 
the faith of Kang Seyoung is genuine and argues that she is committed to her 
Christian faith and committed to justice (Jong-sun Noh 2008: 156). Increasingly, 
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some evangelicals are now admitting that the official congregation may include 
genuine believers (Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim] 2005: 23; SK7).  
Alongside the provision of food and development assistance, churches and 
denominations have been involved in the construction of churches in Pyongyang. 
Prior to the advent of communism, it is estimated that there were 2850 protestant 
church buildings registered in the north of the peninsula. The different 
denominations in the South hope to rebuild those church buildings and some have 
already done so. For example, the Presbyterian Church has sponsored the 
construction of the officially recognised Bongsu church in Pyongyang. This has 
been perceived as unfair by some, however, since not all traditions/denominations 
have been able to re-build a church in the North. This strategy is also criticised as 
it is said that the reconstruction of the church in North Korea should not be about 
the reconstruction of buildings but about the reestablishment of a community of 
Christians (SK7). 
In his book on mission strategy to North Korea, published prior to the death of 
Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Chŏng il chŏngkwŏn wahaewa pukhan sŏngyo, Seok-
ryul You [Sŏkyŏl Yu] (2011) says that Christian groups that visit the Bongsu 
church in Pyongyang and build orphanages label their activity mission (sŏngyo). 
You [Yu] disagrees and argues that mission means sharing the gospel of Jesus 
Christ with your neighbour. If you are not doing so you are not allowed to label 
your work ‘mission’. Sung-uk Kim (2008) similarly condemns the evangelicals 
who are providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea: 
It is beyond our understanding that Republic of Korea is overflown with pro-
North Koreans persons and groups, and peace-mongers brainwashed by 
them. While attempting to protect, defend, and support Kim Jung-il regime, 
they thoroughly keep silent on the human rights being ruined in North 
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Korea. So do Korean churches. Instead of assisting North Korean Christians 
(underground Christians) under suppression, they have headed for helping 
the regime persecuting the underground Christians. They spread lies 
indicating that “North Korea has the freedom of faith.” They disguise the aid 
to Kim Jung Il as the humanitarian aid or mission for North Korea (Sung-uk 
Kim 2008: 75).  
The way Kim Il-sung proceeded to exterminate Christianity in North Korea 
and forced his citizens to worship him echoes the policy of the Japanese coloniser. 
Equally the question of whether to collaborate with such a government has created 
division not only between liberals and conservatives Christians but also among 
conservative Christians/evangelicals themselves. There are obvious tensions 
between the groups who are working in North Korea and providing assistance; 
and the groups who are raising awareness about human rights issues in North 
Korea.  
This division between Christian groups is reflective of a wider divide within 
South Korean society including civil society. Richardson argues that South 
Korean civil society often reflects (or is reluctantly associated with) the 
“ideological polarization” between those on the so-called left, who have supported 
the Sunshine Policy and efforts of “reconciliation, cooperation, and aid”, and 
those “who have taken a more conservative, hard-line stance, towards the North 
mostly raising human rights issues” (Richardson 2008: 168-170). After the 
division of the peninsula along the 38th parallel, the two states had to develop 
different identities in opposition to the other (Snyder 2004: 22) as a result of 
which the US government and South Korean President Syngman Rhee proceeded 
to the systematic elimination of left-leaning civic movements and North Korea 
sympathisers (Steinberg & Myung Shin 2005: 10; Kraft 2006: 628). However, as 
	   135 
South Korea democratised, it established diplomatic relations with former 
enemies. Conjointly with the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea initiated talks 
with Eastern countries and the Soviet Union. Relations with the former Soviet 
Union were finally normalised in 1990, followed by normalised relations with 
China in 1992. In 1991, the first Inter-Korean Basic agreement, which opened 
more trade and exchange opportunities, was signed.  
President Lee Myung-bak was a member of the conservative Grand National 
Party (GNP). The GNP, now Saenuri Party, in Korea was often associated to 
authoritarianism because it was originally founded under Park Chung-hee and 
called the Democratic Republican Party. The main ideological differences 
between democrats and conservatives are that democrats work in favour of “the 
rights of laborers, higher taxes for the rich, and greater scrutiny of chaebols” and 
ally themselves with civic movements whereas conservatives are against 
governmental interventions and regulations which could hinder economic 
development (Sook-jong Lee 2005: 104). The biggest areas of contention, 
however, are North Korea and South Korea-US relations.  
Democrats believe in engagement with North Korea, economic and 
humanitarian assistance to the impoverished North and want to gain greater 
independence from American influence. Conservatives believe in a strong 
partnership with the US and still regard North Korea as the enemy. Scott Snyder 
(2004) summarised the situation as follows: “Conservatives expect that North 
Korea will adapt and join South Korea’s vibrant democracy, while progressives 
appear to uphold Korean unification as a higher ideal than the preservation of 
democratic reforms. Or perhaps progressives see the triumph of Korean 
democracy as so inevitable that there is little need to worry about the forms of 
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unification; in the end the only choice for the two Koreas will be to pursue a 
unified democratic social and political system” (Snyder 2004: 34). Civil society is 
equally divided, especially over the question of North Korea. 
For instance, at a human rights conference organised by Pscore (an 
organisation with offices in Seoul and Washington D.C and sponsored by the 
North Korea Freedom Coalition), in the context of ‘Freedom Week 2009’, three 
Korean organisations—namely the Korea Fathers Federation, Activists Finding 
Out Underground Tunnel from North Korea and American Korean Friendship 
National Council—distributed a statement that reads as follows: “Now is the time 
for us to pay God’s blessing by taking cross to liberate North Koreans and to 
prevent North Korea dictator regime and leftists from threatening our free 
country. We warn North Korea and leftists not to threaten our national security 
and democracy by sinking our navy ship12[sic]” (unpublished brochure13).  
On the other hand, human rights organisations that stemmed from the years of 
democratisation refuse to address the question of human rights in North Korea. 
For example, the May 18 Memorial foundation (518kinyŏm chaedan) based in 
Kwangju claims that it “aims to commemorate as well as continue the spirit and 
struggle and solidarity of the May 18 uprising; to contribute to the peaceful 
reunification of Korea; and to work towards peace and human rights throughout 
the world. Thus the spirit of the May 18 is inherited and passed on, significantly 
influencing the progress of democracy in Korea” (May 18 Memorial Foundation 
NGO 2013). The organisation was founded in memory of the Kwangju massacre 
                                                
12 They are referring to the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean navy vessel, which caused the 
death of 46 seamen on the 26th of March 2010. The cause of the sinking of the ship is attributed to 
North Korea, accused of having torpedoed the ship. Non-conservative politicians and NGOs have 
questioned this assertion. 
13 The paper I received was in English only and I have been unable to identify the Korean names 
of these organisations. 
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of May 18 1980. In the aftermath of the assassination of Pak Chung-hee on 
October 26 1979, as Koreans had established an interim government and 
discussed a new constitution, Major General Chun Doo-hwan, loyal to Pak’s 
regime, carried out a coup d’état. On May 17 1980, “he declared martial law, 
closed the universities, dissolved the legislature, banned all political activity, and 
arrested thousands of political leaders and dissidents in the midnight hours of May 
17-18” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 381-382). On May 18, 500 people protested on the 
streets of Kwangju demanding the abolishment of the martial law. Elite 
paratroopers, apparently drugged, were sent to terminate the demonstration and 
killed indiscriminately children, women, students and everyone that had gathered 
on the square. Citizens of Kwangju managed to drive soldiers out of the city but 
nine days later, the army re-entered the town and killed those who refused to give 
up their arms (Cumings 2005 (1997): 382-383).  
The May 18 foundation has been incredibly active in promoting democracy 
and supporting the rise of civil society throughout Asia. However, as the website 
and published reports show, the foundation is not engaged into any activity either 
to support North Korean refugees or support democracy in North Korea. Some 
other mainstream humanitarian groups have also accused North Korean defectors 
and human rights activists of lying about human rights violations committed in 
North Korea and even asked human rights groups to stop criticising the North 
Korean regime so that they could pursue their activities in North Korea (SK2). 
They also sometimes believe that the human rights movement is driven by 
political considerations and that the North Korean authorities themselves should 
address the question of human rights in North Korea because foreign interference 
constitutes a threat to their sovereignty (SK8).  
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In response, right-wing activists have engaged in a veritable witch-hunt and 
established a black list of so-called pro North Korea politicians as exemplified by 
an article published by Sung-uk Kim on the website IPF (Kukche pangsong) 
condemning politicians who want to send more aid to North Korea (Sung-uk Kim 
2010). Organisations which have demonstrated a certain level of engagement with 
the North Korean authorities are considered pro-North Korea: the Korean 
Teachers and Education Workers Union; the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and 
the associated journal Asian perspective; the National Council of Churches in 
Korea (NCCK) are among the institutions that have been referred to as being pro 
North Korea.  
By satanising the North Korean authorities and the North Korean system, some 
conservative human rights activities effectively condemn engagement policies and 
humanitarian efforts conducted in collaboration with the North Korean 
authorities. At a prayer meeting taking place in Seoul and organised by the same 
organisation-Jesus Army-on Friday October 9 2009, Suzanne Scholte, chair of the 
North Korean Freedom Coalition, said that she had the intimate conviction that 
once North Korea is liberated, the North Korean Church is going to be 
instrumental in converting the Muslim World (Scholte 2009). By connecting the 
experience of North Koreans to the Muslim World, Scholte establishes a parallel 
between the Cold War and the war on terror. As examined in the first chapter, 
many evangelicals believed that mission to communist countries would help 
eradicate communism and create a new world order. My interpretation is that 
Scholte suggests bringing about political change first in North Korea then in 
Muslim countries by means of mission. She was also quoted by Nami Kim (2010) 
affirming, “if you do anything to help Kim Jong Il or give him higher stature, I 
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think that you are basically partnering with the Devil... This isn’t just a misguided, 
misinformed regime that needs to be introduced to the salvation of Jesus Christ. 
This is a regime that is totally against Jesus Christ” (Scholte quoted in Nami Kim 
2010: 15). Conservative Christians who hold such beliefs also think that the 
combination of the Juche and communist system is demonic: “Juche represents a 
powerful evil in the spiritual realm. While it is essential that Christians love 
people who are caught up in the Juche faith, we should not be ignorant about the 
evil associated with Juche idol worship. As believers in our Lord Jesus Christ, 
Christians must unite in prayer against Juche until we see its unholy influence 
over North Korea defeated” (Belke 1999: 164).  
Opponents to food aid and to the politics of engagement implemented by the 
South Korean administrations between the years 1998 and 2008 argue that their 
policy toward North Korea not only sustained the regime in place but in fact 
prolonged the state of division which, as argued below, they regard as sin. 
Therefore, prolonging the division effectively means living in sin. The policies of 
peaceful coexistence have been greatly criticised by human rights activists 
because it gives legitimacy to the North Korean regime. Seok-ryul You [Sŏkyŏl 
Yu], for example, loathes the idea of peaceful co-existence even more as it was 
originally Kim Il-sung’s plans for a peaceful reunification: “[W]e consistently 
maintain the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great 
national unity which the north and the south agreed upon and jointly declared; we 
hold that on these principles the country should be reunified by founding a 
confederacy based on one nation, one state, two systems and two governments” 
(Kim Il-sung (1993) 2011: 27). By definition coexistence is a less loaded term: “it 
is more mundane. It carries none of the religious overtones, or peace-building 
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implications of reconciliation; it lends itself less easily than reconciliation to a 
pejorative use” (Bloomfield 2006:13). Furthermore, You claims that the policies 
had an impact upon the South Korean population that had started to entertain the 
idea of a peaceful co-existence with North Korea and resist the idea of 
reunification (Seok-ryul You 2011: 256).  
 However, not all evangelicals who believe that the North Korean system is 
evil are opposing the provision of humanitarian assistance. On his website, Ben 
Torrey, an American missionary raised in South Korea, says the following about 
North Korea: “North Korea is ‘owned’ by Satan, the Prince of the world.  The 
land and people are captives in darkness. Ultimately, the Lord Jesus Christ—who 
has already overcome Satan (‘I watched Satan fall like lightning from heaven’ 
Luke 10:18)—will have total victory.  However, that day has not yet come.  In the 
meantime, Satan controls the territory of North Korea” (The Fourth River Project 
NGO website 2010). In spite of his perspective on the situation, Ben Torrey has 
been actively engaged in the American relief efforts in North Korea. 
In fact, as humanitarian NGOs accepted to work under the conditions 
established by the North Korea aid programme as promulgated under the 
administration of Kim Dae-jung, they were made willingly or unwillingly partners 
of a given policy which resulted in them losing the trust of opponents to the policy 
of engagement including conservatives in the United States and South Korea. In 
its 2004 report, the International Crisis Group (ICG) refers to the Korean Sharing 
Movement as progressive and World Vision Korea as pro-reconciliation 
(International Crisis Group 2004). However, it is arguably mistaken to believe 
that all evangelicals who are working in North Korea approve of the North 
Korean government. An aid worker interviewed for the purpose of this research 
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said that South Korean Christians who provided development and humanitarian 
assistance to North Korea had developed a deep sense of pride because they saw 
themselves as more educated and more advanced than their northern counterparts 
(F1). South Korean evangelicals also take deep pride in the fact that they can 
deliver aid to North Korea as it symbolises the triumph of Christianity over 
communism. For example, Kwan-woo Lee from Campus Crusade Korea, 
describes South Korea as the sheep inside the gate who needs to go and rescue the 
sheep that is standing outside of the gate (Kwan-woo Lee 2007: 95). Arguably, 
their attitude can be interpreted by some as one of self-righteousness whereby the 
‘sinless’ South Korean Christians are showing God’s love to their ‘enemies’ in the 
hope that they will eventually see the light. As such, they have placed themselves 
in a position of moral superiority. It will be argued below that the anti-
communism ideology and religious nationalism of South Korean evangelicals are 
not only a response to North Korea’s anti religion policies but that their reasoning 
is also the result of their interpretation of the Bible. 
Identification with Israel and spiritual welfare 
 
Pak argues that under the influence of shamanism, “the power of 
communication with the spirit-gods is possible only at the place of divine 
revelation” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 228). He further explains that as Korean 
conservative Christians understand the Bible literally, they often give 
eschatological significance to biblical prophecies which they relate to 
contemporary events (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 225).  Therefore, in the eyes of South 
Korean evangelicals, the territory of North Korea itself is very significant. They 
believe that God has especially chosen the Korean people and the Korean 
peninsula the same way he had chosen the people of Israel and promised them to 
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give them a land where they would prosper. From the early stages of Japanese 
colonialism, the Korean Church quickly identified with the nation of Israel in 
exodus from Egypt: 
This book of Exodus is written about the God who, with his power, saved 
the people of Israel from suffering and enslavement, and made them the 
people who enjoyed glorious freedom; He appeared as Jehovah before Israel, 
and as a whole and just God. He exists by himself and of himself, he has 
sympathy, and He is the Savior. Exodus is the book of the miracle of God’s 
liberation of the people of Israel from the power of Pharaoh with His power. 
God has saved Israel first and established her holy. This book is a 
foreshadowing of the redemptive love of Jesus in the Gospels and of his 
power that cleanses, that is, the miracle of the grace shown forth... Egypt is 
the shadow of the power of sin just as Japan represented a symbol of evil in 
their situation. Just as the people of Israel got acquainted with the power of 
evil and sin, the Korean people are learning about the nature of evil (Ung-
kyu Pak 2005: 227). 
According to Palmer, missionaries themselves had established similarities 
between Korea and the Palestine and Judea described in the Bible: “they taught 
that by habit, custom, and doctrine the Koreans were prepared to understand the 
Bible; their inner thoughts were recorded in the Scriptures; their superstitions 
were just as those in the days of Israel’s decline; their understanding of spiritual 
forces just what the nations around Judea understood them to be; their 
conclusions concerning to life were what the world of the Bible concluded life to 
be” (Palmer 1986: 32). Korean Christians came to believe that God had elected 
them not only to struggle against the perceived evil of the governing regime, but 
also to play a role in the evangelisation of the world.  
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In-chul Kang (2007) argued that after the Korean War, the idea of nationalistic 
superiority (sŏnmin ŭisik) combined with salvific elements and anti-communism 
became a strong ideology among emerging churches. New churches that emerged 
in the aftermath of the Korean War spread the belief that the new Messiah would 
come to the Korean peninsula because it was the centre of world salvation. This 
appealed to mainstream conservative Christians. In the 1960s, the churches 
conducted revival campaigns and popular preachers argued that Korea was a 
‘spiritual Israel’ and that Korea, in her capacity of chief priest, had been handed 
over the baton to carry world mission (In-chul Kang 2007:70-73). Brouwer, 
Gifford & Rose picked up the argument and claimed that fundamentalists in 
Korea viewed “Korea as the Holy Land of the East, sharing with the United 
States the task of evangelizing the world, maybe even superseding the U.S. in 
God’s plans for Asia ... : ‘Americans are the generation who planted the seeds. 
We [Koreans] will harvest them” (Brouwer, Gifford & Rose 1996: 20).  
According to In-chul Kang in 1999, the Christian Council of Korea became 
actively involved in helping North Korean refugees and thought that with the 
help of the underground church in North Korea they would be able to reconstruct 
the Jerusalem of the East. In 2004 the US congress adopted with a hundred 
percent of votes a North Korean Human Rights Act. They believed that the law 
would mean the end of the North Korean regime and allow South Korean 
churches to enter the country to evangelise (In-chul Kang 2007: 70-73). Many 
compare the division between South and North Korea to the division of the 
kingdom of Israel that occurred after the death of king Solomon.  
For example, Seok-ryul You (2011) argues that Koreans are the descendants 
of the same ‘tribe’ which have been separated but believes that it is the will of 
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God for Korea to become ‘one nation under one king’ again: “This is what the 
Lords says: I am going to take the stick of Joseph—which is in Ephraim’s 
hand—and of the Israelite tribes associated with him, and join it to Judah’s stick, 
making them a single stick of wood, and they will become one in my hand” 
(Ezekiel 37: 19 quoted in Seok-ryul You  2011: 270).  
A Korean pastor, Eung-su Han, who was born in North Korea and is the head 
of a small church which sends food to North Korea, also advocates for the 
restoration of the nation and argues that the aim of missions should be the 
reconciliation of the Kingdom/ Korean peninsula. Comparing the Korean situation 
to biblical Israel, he relates in Korean: Israel was a united country where people 
worshipped the same God. However, after the death of Solomon, his son 
increased the taxes and provoked the rebellion of ten tribes in the north. They 
elected another king Jeroboam, and founded a new capital, Tirzah. Thus, the 
kingdom was divided between Israel in the north and Judah in the south.  In the 
south, people continued to worship the God of the Bible and were generally more 
faithful to God therefore it was God’s ‘favourite’ kingdom. In the north, on the 
other hand, people would worship idols. This evidently implies that the southern 
kingdom, South Korea, is more faithful to God and therefore is his favourite. The 
northern kingdom, on the other hand, worships its leaders like idols and is 
unfaithful to God. 
Eung-su Han goes on to say: the Assyrians eventually destroyed the northern 
kingdom, whereas the southern kingdom, which was corrupted and unfaithful to a 
lesser extent, was destroyed by the Babylonian empire. However, the city of 
Jerusalem, which had been surrounded by Babylonian troops, did not surrender in 
	   145 
spite of the many attacks. Many died of hunger and the last king of Judah was 
eventually captured. 
The temple of Jehovah was destroyed and Jerusalem was burnt. People were 
taken to Babylonia and the rest of the people were massacred. The Prophet 
Jeremiah (the weeping prophet) came in the midst of this and brought a message 
of hope to Israel. He claimed that Israel had been destroyed because of their sins 
but that God would save them eventually. God listened to the cries of his people 
and rescued them from Egypt and also from Babylon.  
Han argues that like Israel, the Korean peninsula is surrounded by powerful 
countries that stand in the way of reunification but they cannot stop what God is 
doing. Eung-su Han believes that the people of North Korea are punished because 
they worship their leaders, but he also thinks that the punishment of God will not 
last long. Punishment brings suffering but the suffering of the sons is not greater 
than that of the father who punishes because the father loves his sons and his love 
is greater. North Korea is also seen as the Holy Land where martyrs shed their 
blood. Their blood is never going to be wasted and will save them. South Korean 
churches cannot stand straight if they abandon their brothers and sisters who 
suffer in the North. The prosperity and growth of South Korean churches could 
be praised but God will be in pain when he sees brothers and sisters who suffer. 
South Koreans are called to go to the North and tell the people to repent the same 
way God sent Jonah to Nineveh telling the people to repent so that God would not 
destroy the city (Eung-su Han 2011: 13-20). By referring to several passages of 
the Old Testament, Eung-su Han envisions a God-led reunification with the help 
of the South Korean Church. This entails that it is the responsibility of South 
Korean Christians to go and convert people in the North.  
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South Korean theological professor and Dean at Seoul Theological University, 
Young-hwan Park, defends a similar argument. Park compares the situation in 
North Korea to that of the land of Edom. In the Old Testament’s book of Obadiah, 
God warned Edom of their forthcoming fall. The people of Edom were 
descendants of the house of Esau, brother of Jacob the founder of Israel. Edom 
betrayed Israel and collaborated with Babylon. In a vision, the prophet Obadiah 
foresaw God’s judgement upon Edom. Park, however, believes that the 
judgement of God should be left to God and that South Koreans should love and 
help their brethren by providing humanitarian assistance regardless of the 
political situation. By not doing so, Park argues that it would be giving up on 
Korean reunification (Park quoted in Sang-hyun Baek 2011).  
Many South Korean pastors clearly believe that only the South Korean Church 
can evangelise effectively North Korea. In another recent Korean book on 
mission to North Korea entitled T’ongilŭl hyanghan sŏngyo chŏngch’aek (2012), 
Jin-hwan Kim [Chinhwan Kim] proposes the establishment of a Christian 
community as a peaceful way of spreading Christianity in North Korea. The 
author argues that South Korean Christians who work and live in North Korea 
can take advantage of their position to preach the gospel secretly. He argues that 
the strategy neither does constitute an attack on the North Korean government’ 
political or social structures nor does it try to ‘fix’ the regime. The author believes 
that the South Korean Church especially has a role to play in the evangelisation 
of the north of the peninsula and that Christians who are currently working in 
North Korea could share the gospel. Quoting form the first book of acts, verse 
eight he says-- “But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes on you; 
and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and to 
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the ends of the earth”  (1 Acts: 8)— Jin-hwan Kim argues that before going to the 
ends of the earth, the South Korean church should first evangelise Judea and 
Samaria (Jin-hwan Kim 2012: 184).  
Yong-seok Im [Yongsŏk Im], in his book on Korean reunification, T’ongil 
chunbi doeŏssŭmnikka? (2011), holds a similar position and explains that in the 
book of Matthew, Jesus orders his disciples to go to the house of Israel first, 
before going to the gentiles: these twelve Jesus sent out with the following 
instructions: “Do not go among the Gentiles or enter any town of the 
Samaritans.  Go rather to the lost sheep of Israel. As you go, proclaim this 
message: ‘The kingdom of heaven has come near.’ Heal the sick, raise the dead, 
cleanse those who have leprosy, drive out demons. Freely you have received; 
freely give”(Matthew 10: 5-8 quoted in Yong-seok Im 2011). The authors believe 
therefore that it is the prerogative of the South Korean Church not only to 
evangelise North Korea but also to care for those who are ill and suffering in the 
North. They also believe that this should become a priority before proceeding to 
the evangelisation of the world. 
Furthermore, as the North Korean system is perceived as evil, it is believed that 
no human power will be able to defeat it but that only the power God can bring 
about its destruction. Therefore, South Korean evangelicals do no longer 
encourage a physical conflict as such but instead believe that they are waging a 
spiritual warfare. It was said already that Kim Il-sung resented the growing 
number of Christians in the South and saw their existence as an obstacle to 
unification. Likewise, evangelicals believe that they constitute a rampart against 
communism and therefore, are the guardians of South Korean democracy as 
demonstrated by an article published by the Korean version of the Christian 
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magazine Christianity Today in January 2012. In the article, Yong-hoe Lee, a 
representative of Jesus Army (literally in Korean: Chijosŭ ami)—a group of 
conservative Christians with prayer houses on the Chinese North Korean border, 
Muslim countries and Israel— argues that North Korea wants to destroy churches 
in the South. He speaks of spiritual warfare between Christianity and the Juche 
ideology of Kim Il- sung. Lee reports in his article that the North Koreans have a 
branch of their intelligence services in Seoul and that there are currently over 
50,000 North Korean spies who have infiltrated different institutions and 
governmental departments including the South Korean intelligence bureau. He 
also condemns late President Kim Dae-jung for his policies and South Korean 
pro-North Korea activists and salutes the use of the National Security Law to stop 
them.  According to Lee, Hwang Jang-yop, a late high-ranking defector who 
designed the Juche ideology on behalf of Kim Il-sung, said that the only reason 
why South Korea had not yielded to the North Korean ideology yet in spite of all 
the spies is because of the powerful presence of the evangelical church in South 
Korea. He argues that North Vietnam had a spy office in the South prior to its 
victory over the South and that is how the communist Vietnamese succeeded in 
communising the South. In 2008, Kim Jong-il reportedly enquired to his head of 
intelligence: “why did it work in Vietnam and not for us?” The head of the 
intelligence reportedly replied: “that is because of the church. If we could reduce 
the power of the church by one tenth, then we could successfully communise the 
South”. Lee further argues that the strategy of the North therefore is to reduce the 
power of the church and destroy the ten largest churches through the help of spies 
(Yong-hoe Lee 2012). 
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 Another example of reference to spiritual warfare can be found in a prayer 
booklet published in both Korean and English by the Korean branch of the 
mission organisation Youth With A Mission (YWAM or in Korean yesu chŏndo 
dan). In one of the prayers, it is said that God created one nation and that the 
division is the work of Satan acting through human forces. Once again, it is 
believed that the Korean peninsula and Israel have already been liberated by God 
who has overcome evil: 
God does not depend on military power or economic development to free 
His people. The fact-reality- is: They are free! 
Application: Even today, Korea is one! 
There exists no North Korea, no South Korea, except in the organisation of 
governments, economic and political, military powers (which are transient). 
But these temporary, passing institutions do not change God’ reality, which 
is that Korea is one people, one nation. Why? Because God created one 
nation on the Korean peninsula. Who would dare claim that the dividing wall 
between North and South Korea is the work of God? No! It is the work of 
Satan. But just as He did in Israel, so God has already worked. The people of 
Israel had not yet appropriated their freedom, but nevertheless they had been 
set free! (YWAM Korea 1999: 48). 
You argues that the South Korean Christians must prepare for reunification 
because it might occur at the least expected time. You contends that regardless of 
how much effort Korean Christians put into preparing for reunification, God is the 
only one that will make reunification possible (Seok-ryul You 2011: 271): “one 
God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all” (Ephesians 4: 6 
quoted in Seok-ryul You 2011: 270). Not only will reunification happen at the 
least expected time, it will only happen in God’s time: “Now, brothers, about 
times and dates we do not need to write to you, for you know very well that the 
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day of the Lord will come like a thief in the dark” (1 Thessalonians 5: 1-2 quoted 
in Seok-ryul You 2011: 271).  
Therefore, Christians are called to hope and to pray for reunification. 
According to Durihana/ back to Jerusalem, one of the leading missionary 
organisations that helps North Korean refugees escape from China and, in the 
process seek their conversion; “the hope of this time is only the Cross on which 
Jesus was crucified, and our nation will be given from God the unified Korea 
through the prayers from the believers of God and their dedication” (Durihana 
NGO 2009).  
The above passages demonstrate a strong belief in the forthcoming 
reunification of the two countries: the state of division is a sin and cannot be 
endured. In the same way Jesus liberated the people of Israel, North Koreans will 
be saved if they convert to Christianity. It is the will of God for the country to be 
reunited. The South Korean Church is also required to pray and act because it has 
been blessed and the blessing must be shared with people in North Korea. In fact, 
the South Korean Church might face God’s wrath unless they take action as 
exemplified by Han’s reference to the destruction of the southern kingdom by the 
Babylonian empire. 
After the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, many were hopeful that with his death 
the country would open to the world and similarly, Christians were praying for 
change: “It is imperative that Christians around the world pray for the Lord to 
open doors for the gospel to spread in the country ... Please pray for revival to 
break out in North Korea and for the Lord to restore His glory to cities like 
Pyongyang, which was once known as the Jerusalem of the East” (International 
Christian Concern’s (ICC) NGO 2011). In Seoul, prayer meetings for North 
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Korea operate similarly to revival meetings and as illustrated by this email sent to 
the prayer network, the Korean Church is asked to confess its sins and to repent 
both for personal and national sins:  
We Repent before God!! Our sins and crimes are so grave and deep that will 
result in God's wrath. But we, intercessors for Korean penninsula [sic] are 
humbly asking God's mercy and compassion toward us once again. Day and 
night we are groaning. Please pray for Korean Churchs' repentance, 
especially leaders'. May the Holy Spirit reveal the gravity of our sins in 
whole nation soon.  (Pukhan kido 25th of July 2010)   
  
Groups working inside North Korea hope that their activity will bring them 
closer to the possibility of another revival. In 2007, the organisation Lighthouse 
Foundation launched a campaign to mark the revival in Pyongyang: 
Working to bring Unity and Revival once Again 
2007 marks the Centennial Anniversary of the Pyongyang spiritual revival. 
We believe that the value of this spiritual revival not only brings a turning 
back to the Lord, but also a sharing of love between the North and the South. 
So for us at the Lighthouse Foundation, this Centennial is both a special 
occasion and also a wonderful opportunity. We have embarked a new project 
and work of faith entitled, ‘Celebrate the Pyongyang revival by doing a five 
loaves and two fish miracle of feeding one million North Korean children’ 
(Lighthouse Foundation 2007) 
The organisation South-North Sharing Campaign (founded in 2003 by a 
coalition of progressive and conservative churches referred to in the next chapter) 
also motivates its humanitarian actions by comparing Koreans to the people of 
Israel.  In her introductory statement, one of the female pastors, representative of 
the organisation, recalls that North Korea was first to receive the gospel, first to 
plant churches and send missionaries around the country. She then asks the 
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question: ‘in light of so much pain and suffering, has God forsaken its people’? 
She then refers to a passage in the book of Romans. In the passage, Paul is 
puzzled by the fact that Israel has not accepted the good news and questions: “I 
[Paul] ask then: Did God reject his people? ... God did not reject his people, 
whom he foreknew ... And what was God answer to him? I have reserved for 
myself seven thousand who have not bowed the knee to Baal. So too, at the 
present time there is a remnant chosen by grace” (11 Romans: 1-5). At the end of 
the passage, Paul comes to understand that God has also come to save the gentiles 
but is yet to save the whole of Israel. North Korea, in other words, is yet to be 
saved and there is hope. 
Therefore, the organisations pray and provide assistance hoping that the North 
Koreans will realise that what is given is from God and not from South Korea 
because one day God will fulfil his promise: “Come, you who are blessed by my 
father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of 
the world” (25 Matthew: 34) (South-North Sharing Campaign NGO 2013). Even 
though the organisation does not refer to the idea of revival as such, the concepts 
of inheritance and the fulfilment of God’s promise imply a restoration of what 
was lost and a renewal of the kingdom of Israel/Korean peninsula.  
By restoring the Korean peninsula as a Christian nation some evangelicals also 
believe that they will open the way to the Silk Road which connects China to 
Jerusalem. This movement is also called the ‘back to Jerusalem movement’ and 
was initiated by the Chinese church in the 1920s. It vouched to send missionaries 
to all the Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist countries that stood between China and 
Israel. Presently, the organisation Back to Jerusalem says that it is working with 
the North Korean underground church sending Chinese Korean Christians to 
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evangelise and support the underground church of North Korea (Martin & Bach 
2011). The Sarang community church argues that we need to create a new Korea 
(NK). This new Korea can only be created through the cross of Jesus Christ 
which brings reconciliation and unifies the country once more. In the new Korea, 
people would enjoy freedom of religion and the people of Korea are united, 
opening the way for the re-evangelisation of Jerusalem and of the countries 
located around the Silk Road (Sarang community church 2010: 56).  
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that Korean evangelicals’ theology of revivals was 
intrinsically linked to their political theology, which is characterised by a 
pervasive anti-Juche/anti-communism ideology. Even though their vision of a 
reunified Korean peninsula is clearly rooted in their Christians beliefs and 
understanding of the Bible, in practical terms it means that evangelicals are 
challenging North Korean political structures. Historically, they have often been 
accused of being ‘apolitical’ and have often claimed themselves that they did not 
wish to become involved politically. Likewise, Christian organisations that 
provide aid to North Korea say that they are acting independently of political 
concerns and that they want to show God’s love to the North Koreans with 
“sincerity” and “no condition” (SK5), however, their campaigning for a re-
unified and evangelised peninsula can only translate into regime change in the 
North. Once again this shows that Korean evangelicals believe that personal and 
national transformations cannot be easily separated. As the next chapter will 
argue, their focus on inner salvation combined with their humanitarian and 
human rights activity to achieve societal change means that they have fully 
embraced consciously or unconsciously a particular concept of holistic mission. 
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Chapter 4: humanitarian assistance as mission to North 
Korea 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, religious organisations including evangelical 
groups took the lead in the campaigns to send food aid to North Korea 
challenging at times the South Korean government. While some organisations are 
more open about their evangelising objectives, others argue that, as Christians, 
their duty is to feed the hungry without any other agenda in mind. In any case, 
this chapter will argue that evangelicals have responded to a perceived great need 
and have sought to alleviate suffering in North Korea. In doing so, it will clarify 
common misunderstandings with regard to evangelicals’ attitude toward poverty 
and social injustice. This chapter will show that evangelicals in Korea have also 
been concerned with the material and physical well-being of people in spite of 
their focus on the salvation of souls.  
2. History of South Korean aid to North Korea and the role of faith-
based organisations 
 
In September 1995, affected by heavy rains, North Korea asked the 
international community for help. The humanitarian agencies and organisations 
who first responded to the appeal were soon to realise that the situation was much 
worse than previously expected and that in fact people were suffering and dying 
from starvation. NGOs began to operate in North Korea in October 1995 with the 
help of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), which was also starting its 
activities in the country at this time. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
and a few other programmes, however, had for some years been represented. A 
small WFP office opened in 1996, and in 1997 and 1998 NGOs operations were 
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stabilised after some organisations gained permission to establish residence in the 
country (Snyder 2003: 3-5). Most aid agencies, especially faith-based 
organisations, continue to operate under the umbrella of the UN through the Food 
Aid Liaison Unit (FALU), which was founded in 1997. In 1998 and 1999, 
European and American agencies expanded their activities to include food 
security, agriculture, health and water and sanitations programmes (Schloms 
2004: 163). Unlike in other countries where NGOs work mainly in partnership 
with the local population and/or local organisations and grassroots associations, 
foreign NGOs operating in the DPRK have limited interaction with the local 
population and in the absence of local counterparts, must collaborate with the 
authorities. Indeed, interaction is limited to line ministries, professional 
associations, educational institutions or cooperative farm management and is 
carefully monitored and without continuity (Weingartner 2001: 19).  
On 17th of June 1995, the South Korean President Kim Young-sam government 
had agreed in a meeting held in Beijing to send 150,000 tons of rice to the North. 
The process of delivering it, however, was delayed by two incidents: first, the 
South Korean public was angered at Pyongyang’s insistence to hoist a North 
Korean flag on the delivering ship, the Seafex, while in port in Chungjin on 27 
June 1995. On 2 August 1995, North Korea detained the crew of a South Korean 
rice-carrier ship and accused them of espionage. However, North Korea 
apologised for the Seafex incident and South Korea apologised for the incident 
with their ship. The crew was liberated and aid resumed (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 
118). The South Korean government, however, established a series of conditions 
which had to be met in order to proceed with food shipments: “Pyongyang had to 
make an official request for rice aid to the South Korean government; refrain from 
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making derogatory comments about the South Korean government and conduct a 
new round of government-level talks with Seoul” (Gory 2008: 111).  
In the summer of 1995, South Korea’s six largest religious denominations 
established an organisation called the ‘Pan-Religious Order Promotion Committee 
to Help Our North Korean Brethren’. They collected food items such as instant 
noodles that were sent via the Korea National Red Cross (Gory 2008: 105). In 
January 1996, South Korean religious groups organised a Peace Conference to 
help victims of the floods.  Later in 1996, the movement increased its activity to 
appeal the government to open the aid channel to North Korea and thus abolish 
the monopoly of the Red Cross. The movement led to the launch of the Korean 
Sharing Movement (KSM) to help North Koreans not only in North Korea but 
also those located in Russia and on the China North Korea border (Oknim Chung 
2003: 83-84). In addition to KSM, other organisations were created and started to 
assist North Koreans in the domain of health and medical care. These 
organisations were Medical Aid for Children of the D.P.R. Korea, the Eugene 
Bell Foundation, and the Korea Welfare Foundation (Oknim Chung 2003: 84). 
The movement experienced a setback after renewed series of provocative 
attacks by North Korea including a threat to quit administering duties included in 
the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the penetration of North Korea troops into the 
Joint Security Area, incursions into disputed waters and crossing of the Military 
Demarcation Line by North Korean soldiers (Gory 2008: 107). As a result, the 
Kim Young-sam government decided to suspend further shipments of aid but 
nevertheless, contributed $3 million toward a food aid package collected and 
distributed by the United Nations (Gory 2008:107). In spite of its principle of 
neutrality, the South Korean Red Cross refused to send more food aid unless 
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North Korea apologised for the incidents thus betraying a possible close 
relationship between the organisation and the South Korean government (Gory 
2008: 108). On 1 January 1997, the government eventually decided to allow 
NGOs to continue raising funds for North Korea. In March of the same year, the 
organisations revealed to the South Korean public that the North Korean Public 
Distribution System (PDS) was dysfunctional and organised an international 
congress on the North Korean food crisis. All sectors of society were represented 
at the dinner which 700 people attended. The conference led to another national 
campaign to raise funds which, according to Oknim Chung, resulted in the largest 
national rally in South Korea since the March First Independence Movement 
(Oknim Chung 2003: 85). 
Some religious organisations, however, had already decided to defy the ban 
and had been providing aid to North Korea illegally through China (Gory 
2008:110) 14 . The South Korean government took legal action against the 
organisations, namely the Korean Sharing Movement and the National Alliance 
for Democracy and Reunification of Korea (Chŏn'guk yŏnhap); in an effort, it is 
said, to exert tighter control over the assistance programme (Gory 2008: 112-
113). In the meantime, representatives of major religious groups and prominent 
NGOs organised a campaign to buy relief corn. Later in July, the leaders 
organised a signature campaign to plead the government to provide additional 
food and medicine to the North. The campaign represented an evolution from 
fundraising activity to advocacy (Gory 2008: 113).  
South Korean direct aid to North Korea is always dependent on political 
considerations. Jong-moo Lee, from the Korean Sharing Movement, argues that 
                                                
14 This incident was repeated in May 2011 when the National Council of Churches decided to 
send 172 tons of food aid to North Korea without the permission of the government. 
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the fact that the successive governments choose to deliver aid directly to North 
Korea as opposed to funnelling it through the UN and NGOs demonstrates that 
South Korean governments’ decisions to deliver aid is not based on humanitarian 
principles (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 123).  
In March 1999, South Korea sent 50,000 tons of fertiliser to North Korea 
without any conditions. Between May and June of the same year, both parties met 
secretly in Beijing and South Korea agreed to ship an additional 200,000 tons of 
fertiliser to North Korea. As a result, North Korea accepted to hold talks to 
discuss a potential reunion for separated families (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 119). Kim 
Dae-jung used the provision of aid to North Korea as a means to obtain 
concessions and avoid an unexpected collapse of the North Korean regime. Under 
his administration, the North Korea aid programme was established and NGOs 
registered with the South Korean government were given direct access to North 
Korea. In 2003, Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer, became President of 
South Korea. Under his watch, the North Koreans conducted a missile launch on 
5 July 2006 and proceeded with a nuclear test on 9 October 2006. They also 
suspended talks with the South after the latter decided to receive 426 North 
Korean refugees from Vietnam. Roh used aid as way to put pressure on North 
Korea and persuade them to resume dialogue. However, although Roh provided 
twice the amount of aid his predecessor had, he could not uphold the 
reconciliation momentum (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 121-122).  
Under the following South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, the annual 
delivery of 400,000-500,000 tons of rice and 300,000-350,000 tons of fertiliser 
ceased. Lee Myung-bak wanted to reward North Korea for good behaviour and 
for taking concrete steps towards the denuclearisation of the peninsula (Hyeong-
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jung Park 2009: 153). Aid to North Korea has dramatically decreased as 
illustrated in the table below: 
 
 2006 2007 2008 August 2009 
Food 39.4 150.5 - - 
Fertilizer 120.0 96.1 - - 
International 
organisations 
13.9 33.5 19.7 1.7 
NGOs 13.4 21.6 - - 
Emergency 40.6 47.1 - - 
Total 227.3 348.8 43.8 5.6 
(Source: Unification Department statistics used by Jong-moo Lee 2009: 122) –Unit: billion won 
 
According to NGOs, the South Korean government’s policies with regards to 
assistance was as follows: “When the North asks for aid, the government will 
give aid directly after examining its demand; in cases of severe famine or natural 
disaster in North Korea, it will aid the North; considering the public opinion in 
the South; to the humanitarian aid from the South, the North should show its 
appreciation by some countermeasures on such problems as separated families, 
persons kidnapped to the North, or prisoners of the Korean War” (Jong-moo Lee 
2009: 123). 
3. Scope of activities of evangelical organisations 
 
In May 2002, the Korean version of the evangelical magazine Christianity 
Today (K’ŭrisŭch’aenŏt’i t’udei Han’guk p’an) proudly reported that South 
Korean Christian organisations delivering aid to North Korea were responsible 
for 50% for of the total NGO aid delivered to North Korea, 75% of the total aid 
channelled by religious organisations was evangelical (Christianity Today Korea 
2002). According to Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim], between 1995 and 2007, the 
total amount of South Korea aid to North Korea was 1.6 billion dollars. Out of the 
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total amount, 11 hundred million dollars were donated from the government and 
five hundred million dollars came from private organisations. Byung-ro Kim says 
it is difficult to assess how much Christian organisations contributed to these five 
hundred million dollars but that their contribution must probably amount to one 
third of the total. Kim argues nonetheless that their contribution declined after 
2007 (Byung-ro Kim 2010: 12).  
The South Korean history of humanitarian assistance to North Korea shows 
that Christian organisations from a conservative/evangelical background were 
able to bridge the divide and cooperate with organisations that are labelled more 
liberal or progressive. In July 1990, progressive and conservative Christians sent 
ten thousands gama (80kg units) of rice to North Korea. Shortly after, the “Third 
Movement of Reunification of the Korean Church” was established. Their 
cooperation was institutionalised with the establishment of the South-North 
Movement for Sharing for Peace and Reunification (Nambuk nanum undong) on 
the 27th of April 1993. The organisation has now become the South-North Sharing 
Campaign. Mahn-yol Yi notes that conservative evangelicals wanted to help 
North Koreans but needed the expertise of progressive Christians who had been 
working with North Koreans for over a decade. The organisation promotes 
reconciliation and a peaceful reunification but does not have a proselytising 
agenda. In 1994, progressives and conservatives established another organisation: 
the Korean Christian Council to Promote Reunification (Han’guk kidokkyo 
p’yŏnghwa t’ongil ch’ujin hyŏpŭi hoe) that functions as an umbrella organisation 
for 116 Protestant groups (Mahn-yol Yi 2006: 252). In addition to organisations 
established with members of the progressive groups, evangelicals also 
collaborated with secular leaders and leaders of other religious traditions as 
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exemplified by the creation of the Korean Sharing Movement already mentioned 
above. 
Secular and religious leaders from various denominations and faiths 
established the Korean Sharing Movement in 1997. Today, it represents the 
interests of diverse South Korean humanitarian groups and constitutes one of the 
leading organisations involved in North Korea. The Korean Sharing Movement 
was co-founded by an evangelical pastor, Reverend Soh, a former democracy 
activist. Rev Soh is also the founder of the Citizens Committee for Economic 
Justice (CCEJ) (in Korean Kŏngsil ryŏn), an evangelical organisation that draws 
on evangelical teachings to address the economic and social injustices induced by 
the South Korean economic and political policies. Both organisations seek to 
achieve social justice and equality through “sharing” and a more just 
redistribution of wealth. It is also inclusive and aims to gather all citizens: the 
wealthy as well as the marginalised; believers and non-believers. The CCEJ’s 
mandate includes issues of environmental protection, building of democracy and 
national reunification (Joshua Young-gi Hong 2009: 222-224). KSM has been 
involved with a large number of projects especially with regards to food security 
and agricultural projects. As of 2008, KSM’s projects in North Korea included: 
agriculture modernisation, collective livestock support, education support project, 
malaria prevention support, medicine prevention support, and hospital 
modernisation, meal service for children, information technology education and 
aid for Koreans residents in Russia (KSM NGO 2009). 
In the field of food aid and agriculture, the evangelical organisations that have 
been very active are the Korean Sharing Movement, Good Neighbors Korea and 
the International Corn Foundation. The International Corn Foundation works in 
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partnership with churches and has also obtained consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). The 
organisation was established in 1998 to provide North Korea with “super corn” a 
special hybrid of corn. Although the organisation is not explicitly clear about its 
Christian background, the English website states the following: “Suppose a 
brother or a sister is without clothes and daily food. If one of you says to them, go 
in peace; keep warm and well fed but do nothing about their physical needs, what 
good is it? Faith by itself, if it’s not accompanied by action is dead”  (James 2: 
15-17) (International Corn Foundation NGO 2012).  The International Corn 
Foundation together with Good Neighbours Korea signed a contract with the 
North Korea’s Academy of Agricultural Science to pursue a project of inter-
Korean agricultural technology cooperation (Oknim Chung 2003: 97). 
Another organisation that has been involved in providing food assistance to 
North Korea is Food for the Hungry International. The organisation “was founded 
in 1971 in the United States by Dr. Larry Ward as a Christian NGO to raise 
awareness of poverty and hunger around the world, bring food and love to the 
hungry with the spirit of bread and gospel and help them build secure, self-
sufficient communities” (Food for the Hungry International Federation NGO 
2010). In 1989, the organisation founded a Korea branch: “KFHI supports 
domestic social welfare of broken homes, elderly, handicapped through regional 
offices and welfare facilities and water development, meal programmes and a 
North Korea programme as well” (Food for the Hungry International Korea NGO 
2010). Bringing bread and gospel effectively means concern for both the spiritual 
and physical welfare of North Koreans. The organisation says it wants to help 
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North Korea achieve independence through exchange and cooperation (Food for 
the Hungry International Korea NGO 2010).  
Finally, one of the leading organisations in terms of food security and 
agriculture is World Vision Korea. One of its main projects has been to develop 
more effective methods of propagating potato seeds (Oknim Chung 2003: 98). 
World Vision is a development organisation that was founded by Han Kyung-chik 
(see below) and the American missionary Bob Pierce in 1951 to support orphans 
during the Korean War. The organisation has developed to become one of the 
largest and most experienced development organisations in the world but it 
continues to cultivate strong links with North Korea. World Vision Korea is 
committed to the concept of ‘holistic mission’: World Vision Korea vows to bring 
about economic, social, emotional, physical and spiritual changes in the 
communities they are working with (World Vision Korea NGO 2013). The 
organisation has rules that prohibit direct evangelism as they aim to show by 
example; to demonstrate God’s love in the hope that their work will raise 
questions to which they believe God is the answer. World Vision began its work 
in North Korea in 1994 and provided emergency assistance in the wake of the 
famine. World Vision Korea works with North Korean counterparts, the KNECA 
(Korea National Economy Cooperation Association) and with KAAS (Korea 
Academy of Agricultural Science), a National Agricultural Institute under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. World Vision is involved in agricultural programme for 
food security (World Vision Korea NGO 2013). 
In terms of medical assistance and care for children, the elderly and the 
disabled, some of the most prominent organisations have been the North America 
Christian Doctors Association, the Korean Foundation for World Aid, Medical 
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Aid for Children of the D.P.R. Korea, Okedongmu and the Eugene Bell 
Foundation (Oknim Chung 2003: 99). The Korean Foundation for World Aid 
(formerly Korean Welfare Foundation) was established in 1997 and has obtained 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC). It has been operating in North Korea since 2000, mainly providing 
food for the children and working with nurseries. It says that it wants “to open a 
window in the heart of North Koreans through the delivery of aid” (Korean 
Foundation for World Aid NGO 2007).  In 1998, the organisation was involved in 
modernising Sunbong hospital (Oknim Chung 2003: 100). 
Eugene Bell Foundation was founded in 1996 and has been mostly involved in 
treating tuberculosis but some of its programmes also included: “the provision of 
vitamins for children, antibiotics, skin care ointment, and medical equipment, as 
well as establishment of pharmaceutical factories, the eradication of diseases, and 
nutritional meals for children” (Oknim Chung 2003: 101).  
According to Oknim Chung, medical aid in North Korea started in the early 
1990s with a group of U.S. based doctors including Korean doctors living in the 
United States, the Christian Association Medical Mission (CAMM). CAMM 
helped build the Third People’s hospital in Pyongyang with funding from South 
Korean Christian groups Oknim Chung 2003: 99). After 2000, other organisations 
popped up and started getting involved in the provision of assistance in North 
Korea. For example, the Lighthouse Foundation has been involved in North Korea 
since 2003. It focuses on soyamilk and bread delivery to orphanages and has been 
working with the Belgian/French organisation Handicap International to promote 
the rights of the disabled and supply training and equipment such as wheelchairs. 
The organisation says that it hopes to demonstrate God’s love to the people of 
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North Korea as a means to win converts as illustrated in the verse chosen by the 
organisation to reaffirm its mission: “You are the light of the world... In the same 
way, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and 
praise your Father in heaven” (Matthew 5:14-16). The Lighthouse Foundation 
Mission Statement is as follows:  
From a Christian perspective, the Lighthouse Foundation’s mission is to 
shine God’s love by meeting human needs in North Korea helping to prepare 
the way for national reunification on the Korean Peninsula and to also assist 
those suffering in other nations, ultimately contributing to world peace. We 
primarily focus our efforts on helping the vulnerable people of North Korea, 
such as young children, orphans, disabled persons, the elderly and mothers in 
childbirth. By giving this kind of assistance where help is needed, hope and 
love are made known and the Korean peoples are brought closer together” 
(Lighthouse Foundation NGO 2008). 
Good People is an organisation established by the Yoido Full Gospel Church in 
1999: “Good People World Family share their Christian love by assisting those 
who need education and development in underdeveloped countries and relief from 
hunger and sickness, including North Korean brethren as well as those in other 
countries” (Good People NGO 2013). The aim of the organisation is clear: it 
wants to evangelise North Korea. 
[T]he world's largest church is preparing to evangelise its sister to the north. 
"Reunification of this peninsula is the great desire of our country," declares 
Rev. Jae Woo Chung, senior pastor of one of Full Gospel Church's fifteen 
satellite congregations ... Pastor Chung speaks confidently of "when 
reunification comes ... we can't say when this will happen. But we are 
preparing. Getting ready to evangelise North Korea has been a focus of our 
church for fifteen years already." ... Former director of the World Mission 
Department of the 700, 000 member congregation, Chung describes a three-
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part strategy for evangelizing the country ...,"Our strategy is to work through 
an NGO called 'Good People,' our North Korea Mission and through 
intercessory prayer," he explains ( Lausanne World Pulse 1995).  
 
Other Korean branches of internationally based missionary organisations, such 
as Campus Crusade and the YMCA, have also been very active. Bill and Vonette 
Bright founded the Campus Crusade for Christ International in 1951 on the 
University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus. Campus Crusade has 
developed into an international organisation with ministries around the world. The 
organisation also sometimes operates under a different name in order to attract 
less attention to its mission and intentions. For example, Campus Crusade in 
Western Europe has been renamed Agapé. Campus Crusade’s mission is: 
“[h]elping to fulfill the Great Commission in the power of the Holy Spirit by 
winning people to faith in Jesus Christ, building them in their faith and sending 
them to win and build others; and helping the Body of Christ do evangelism and 
discipleship” (Campus Crusade for Christ International 2013). In 2003, Campus 
Crusade established a development agency to attend to the physical and spiritual 
needs of people afflicted by poverty, conflict and/or natural catastrophes: “Global 
Aid Network is a multi-national network of ministries serving to demonstrate the 
love of God, through word and deed, to hurting and needy people around the 
world through relief and development projects” (Global Aid Network NGO 
2013).  
Similarly, Campus Crusade Korea has been involved in humanitarian 
assistance to North Korea since July 2000 and the organisation sends goats to 
North Korea. Inspired by Mark’s verse: “You give them something to eat” (Mark 
6: 37), Campus Crusade Korea has been working in North Korea to construct not 
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only goat farms but also cheese and milk farms. The organisation also believes 
that its activity in North Korea is an act of “pre-evangelism” (Kwan-woo Lee 
2007: 95).  It means that the organisation is presenting one hand with love and 
one hand with the gospel. The organisation equally hopes to help achieve the 
peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. 
YMCA Korea: the movement has been present in Korea since 1903 and was 
originally aimed at young men. It has been involved with North Korea since 1990 
as explained below: 
Movement Towards a Peaceful Reunification: Ever since the declaration of 
this movement in 1990, Korea YMCA has been active in contributing to 
reconciliation and peace between the South and North. In addition, it also 
has implemented a campaign for unity overcoming division between the 
South and North Korea. Particularly, The YMCA launched a 'Fund-Raising 
Campaign to Help North Koreans who have been suffering from hunger and 
famine' by appealing to South Koreans' fellow-feeling towards the hunger-
stricken North Korean brethren. The YMCA has played a key role in closely 
connecting with various organisations to raise up to 1 billion won. The 
significance of this humanitarian relief effort lies in the fact that it helped to 
move one step nearer toward its goal of reconciliation (YMCA c. 2008).  
Finally, other organisations with strong links with the United States and also 
those acting in China have been involved in medical relief care. Cross 
Mission/Sam stands for ‘Spiritual Awakening Mission’. According to the website 
of the organisation, it is a NGO that provides medical and relief assistance to 
impoverished and forgotten people: “Through our field clinics and medical 
missionary teams, we hope to save lives and souls by sharing their pains and 
spreading the love, centred on the Gospel” (Cross Sam Mission NGO 2011) The 
organisation has offices in China, South Korea and the United States. Though it 
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provides mostly medical care, the organisation has expanded its activities to 
include the smuggling of MP3s with recorded sermons in North Korean, helping 
North Korean refugees in China and supporting the underground church (Mission 
Magazine 2011).  
The section above illustrates the high level of evangelical involvement in North 
Korea. Even though the organisations mentioned above express a clear desire to 
address the spiritual needs of North Koreans, they have taken the lead in lobbying 
the South Korean government and implementing relief programmes in North 
Korea to address their physical needs first.  
4. Respect of North Korean anti-religion laws and secularisation of 
activity  
 
For some organisations, providing humanitarian assistance is merely a means 
to a greater end: that of evangelising North Koreans. For others, social action is a 
substitute for evangelism. Finally, for other groups, the two activities walk hand 
in hand. Regardless of these organisations’ understanding of holistic mission, 
they have been addressing a need and have contributed to the international efforts 
to relieve hunger and suffering in North Korea. Hyun-man Im [Hyŏnman Im] 
argues that the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea is a way of 
expressing practical love to the people and is necessary before any verbal 
message of love can be received and understood (Hyun-man Im 2012: 278) 
However, there is a problem related to their activity: the fact that in North 
Korea, the recipients of food and development assistance— mostly the elderly, 
children and the disabled— are not aware that the aid they receive comes from 
Christian organisations. In fact, Christian organisations have to accept the fact that 
the North Korean children who benefit from their assistance are made to thank 
father Kim Il-sung for the food that they receive.  
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The organisations however constantly try to develop creative ways so that the 
children will know that the food that they receive is not only a gift from the South 
but is in fact God’s provision (F2). For example, they say that it is now possible to 
pray before sharing a meal with their North Korean counterparts. Others say that 
they have found creative ways to distinguish themselves from the regime, for 
example by reading the Bible aloud in front of an official. Christian Friends of 
Korea, the American organisation, is displaying Christian crosses on the vehicles 
used in North Korea. Finally, the director of an evangelical organisation said that 
North Koreans liked Christians because Christians do not smoke or drink (SK4). 
This might sound anecdotal but in a country where the majority of men smoke 
heavily, it is actually very significant. 
Christians, who provide humanitarian and development assistance to North 
Korea, believe that their activity in North Korea may have an impact in the 
spiritual realm that might not necessarily be directly experienced in the earthly 
world: their activity might exert invisible power that is not yet realised and 
therefore not yet exercised. They think that they can subvert the North Korean 
regime not through confrontation but by embracing it with ‘God’s love’. Some of 
them also believe that their activities prepare the ground for the process of re-
evangelisation (SK3). Others argue that the North Korean territory is not fertile 
yet--comparing it to the rocky soil of a parable in the Bible—and that Christian 
humanitarian activists can clear the way for the proclamation of the gospel. 
In fact, the difficulty of carrying of mission work in North Korea means that 
organisations and churches have had to develop creative ways to do mission work 
that are actually more multi-dimensional than more straightforward evangelism 
methods such as church planting. More significantly, Christian organisations have 
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been able to mark themselves out by showing great determination and 
perseverance. FBOs’s workers tend to see their work as a calling from God and 
therefore behave differently from workers of secular organisations in the sense 
that they are often more willing to make long-term commitments and will 
continue to work until “change occurs” (Graddy & Ke 2006: 312). The 
establishment of a relationship with the recipient of a service and the service 
provider is also characteristic of faith-based organisations (Graddy & Ke 2006; 
O’Connor & Netting 2008).  Bradley argues that in the case of Christian 
organisations, their staff are always motivated by a strong sense of duty and 
spirituality (Bradley 2005). The case of James Kim, the founder of the 
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), is such an example. 
James Kim strongly believes that capitalism and a market economy will lead 
the North Koreans on the path to redemption and for precisely those reasons; 
American and South Korean evangelical businessmen have supported his projects. 
James Kim’s father converted to Christianity at a young age and attended a 
university in Pyongyang that had been founded by Presbyterian missionaries in 
1897. He was the head of a Christian school near Pusan when the Japanese 
invaded the peninsula and the whole family fled to Heilongjang province in 
northeastern China to avoid bowing to a Shinto shrine. After the liberation of 
Korea, the family returned to South Korea but the civil war broke out in 1950. At 
the age of 15, James Kim became the youngest solder enlisted by the South 
Korean Army. James Kim says that one night, on the battlefield, he read the 
gospel of St. John and the verse 3:16 spoke to him: “That whosever shall believe 
in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life”. Consequently, James Kim 
said he vowed to devote his life to working with the then enemies: China and 
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North Korea. James Kim studied in Europe and emigrated to the United States in 
the 1970s. His dream was to follow his father’s steps and establish universities 
both in China and North Korea. He successfully managed to secure funding from 
evangelicals in the United States and South Korea to found the Yanbian 
University of Science and Technology (YUST) in Yanji, China. But his dream 
was to construct an international university in Pyongyang where there would be 
courses in English, computers and Internet access. Ultimately, his aim was to lay 
grounds for a MBA programme to train future generations of North Koreans on 
the virtues of capitalism. In fact, James Kim has been nicknamed “the capitalist 
who loves North Korea”. James Kim had travelled many times to North Korea 
before he saw his dream realized and in 1998, he was arrested and accused of 
spying. He was imprisoned and tortured for more than 40 days in a North Korean 
prison. He was eventually released and one day to his surprise the North Koreans 
visited YUST and asked him to build the same university in Pyongyang. He raised 
10 million dollars and received great support from the evangelical elite and 
business corporations in South Korea. Because of a strong sense of anti-
communism pervasive among South Korean Christians, he says that this money 
was a miracle, a gift from God (Powell 2009: 60-65). It was very difficult to 
secure funding in South Korea as Christians and churches are usually only 
interested in giving as long as it contributes to the reconciliation and reunification 
with North Korea. Thus, every time North Korea shows signs of hostility, 
churches withdraw their pledges.  
Not all organisations however want to appear different and some of them 
prefer to secularise their work and mandate, arguing that they are only interested 
in famine relief.  For example, Good Neighbors hires Christian staff and works in 
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partnership with churches but denies that it wants to evangelise North Korea. It is 
composed of ‘Good Neighbors International’, which carries out international 
relief and development projects and North Korea aid projects; and ‘Good 
Neighbors Social Welfare Corporation’, which focuses on domestic social 
welfare. The organisation has expanded and includes offices in the United States 
and other regions of the world. It is registered with the United Nations. Good 
Neighbors claims to be a secularised development organisation that is not 
involved in missionary activity. The website does not refer to any bible verse or 
Christian statement. Nevertheless, Good Neighbor’s staff upholds the founder's 
Christian belief - stewardship and "love your neighbors as yourself".  The 
organisation has been accused several times in the Korean press of using 
humanitarian activity to secretly carry mission work in North Korea (and other 
countries). In a clarifying argument that can be found on its website, the 
organisation argues that its goal is not to plant churches in North Korea and 
elsewhere but to provide assistance to the North Korean children. It vouches to act 
in complete transparency and address issues of concerns with regard to 
transparency and mission statement. It also argues that it is impossible to establish 
churches in North Korea anyway and that the Christian groups and churches that 
are providing assistance are not planting churches (Good Neighbors Korea NGO 
2008).  
5. Korean evangelicalism and social involvement 
 
In this section, I will argue that historically, evangelicals have been engaging 
with issues of poverty and injustice. I will reflect on Korean conservative 
Christianity especially with respect to their understanding of poverty and concern 
with ‘earthly matters’.  
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Prosperity Gospel  
 
Traditionally, evangelicals and conservative Christians believe that injustice, 
wars, corruption, poverty, illness, human rights violations and so on are all 
consequences of the ‘fall’. In the beginning, God had created a perfect world 
where man could live in perfect harmony with God. When Adam and Eve ate the 
forbidden fruit, sin was introduced into the world and man was separated from 
God. In the Old Testament, God makes a covenant with his people and asks them 
to obey the law that he dictates but they constantly disobey him. Consequently, in 
the New Testament, Jesus comes to forgive humanity for their sins. In other 
words, it is through Jesus only that one can re-establish the lost relationship with 
God and be reaccepted into the kingdom of God. They believe that born again 
Christians are no long subjected to the law, as they were in the Old Testament, as 
they have already been forgiven through the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ. In contrast, they believe that the rest of humanity is subjected to the law of 
the Old Testament as they have not recognised Jesus Christ, and therefore they 
stand forever condemned (see Stott 1986). Adherents to this belief will emphasise 
the importance of evangelism and the salvation of souls. However, for some, 
salvation will also come in the form of material prosperity. God is the key to a 
successful life because they believe in a gospel of prosperity.  
The prosperity gospel argues that poverty and illness are the direct 
consequences of sin. Material poverty is interpreted as a lack of faith. The poor 
are therefore led to believe that the salvation of their soul will allow them to be 
blessed financially and materialistically. To receive eternal salvation, the 
individual is required to repent from his or her sins. Followers of the prosperity 
gospel are also asked to give to God, through the church, in the form of offerings 
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or tithes.  The teachings from the prosperity gospel are in fact interpretations of 
the following Bible verses: John 10:10—“I have come that they may have life and 
that they may have it more abundantly” and Luke 6:38—“Give, and you will 
receive. Your gift will return to you in full—pressed down, shaken together to 
make room for more, running over, and poured into your lap. The amount you 
give will determine the amount you get back”. Typically, the prosperity gospel 
emphasises the individual’s relationship with God and personal economic gains 
but expresses little or no concern for issues of social justice (Machado 2011). 
Although the prosperity gospel is often associated to a segment of 
Christianity—Pentecostalism—it has in fact become a trans-denominational 
widespread movement around the world. It is particularly present in the United 
States, Colombia, Brazil, Nigeria and Guatemala.  There is a growing concern 
across the world amongst other evangelical groups about the apparent success of 
the prosperity gospel. Time Magazine for instance covered the subject extensively 
in 2006. According to a poll by Time, 17% of Christians surveyed said they were 
adherents of such a movement, “61% believed that God wanted people to be 
prosperous and 31% … agreed that if you give money to God, God will bless you 
with more money”. It is defined as being “fuelled by the combination of 
Pentecostal teaching and American consumerism” (Van Biema & Chu 2006).  
Koreans have also developed similar forms of theologies, the Full Gospel 
Theology and theology of blessings (Kibok sinang), in response to the state of 
distress and poverty engendered by the Korean War. Just like the minjung 
theology was developed independently of liberation theologies in Latin America, 
these theologies should be understood in light of the Korean socio-political 
context of the twentieth century. The Full Gospel Theology is associated to (Paul 
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David) Yonggi Cho, founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church, a Pentecostal 
church that started in 1958 with a handful of people and has developed to become 
one of largest churches in the world. The theology advocated by the Full Gospel 
Church is as follows: 
The Seven Theological Foundations of the Full Gospel are 
1. Faith in the Cross on Calvary 
Full Gospel faith refers to the acceptance and belief of Christ shedding His 
blood and dying for us to provide eternal salvation so that anyone who 
believes and accepts can be born again in Christ. Since salvation was made 
complete on the cross on Calvary, it is part of the foundation of the Full 
Gospel faith. 
2. Faith in the Fullness of the Holy Spirit 
It is the purpose and hope of Full Gospel theology to bring back the faith of 
the early church Christians, the faith which clearly reflected the fullness of 
the Holy Spirit.  
3. Faith in the Spreading of the Gospel to All the World 
Those who are born again through the redemption of the cross of Jesus 
Christ and have received the fullness of the Holy Spirit, will naturally find 
their faith growing and filling them with a desire to witness to others. 
4. Faith in the Good God 
Full Gospel Faith places absolute faith, in a good God, the God of love Who 
not only provided the salvation for us, but continues to bless us. 
5. Faith in Christ Who Carries Our Diseases 
Full Gospel Faith firmly believes that Christ not only redeemed our spirits 
but also our bodies from the curse of disease, and that He continues to 
bestow that blessing on Christians today. 
6. Faith in Christ Who Will Return 
Full Gospel Faith is an eschatological faith which hopes for the New Heaven 
and the New Earth as stated in the Bible, and which allows the faithful to 
live in complete devotion to the Lord.  
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7. Faith in Sharing 
Sharing faith refers to that which allows the faithful to first thank God for 
the blessings he has received, return that blessing through tithing, and then 
share the blessing with others. It is a redemptive, charitable faith (Yoido Full 
Gospel Church c. 2007).   
Adherents to this theology believe that when Adam and Eve committed the 
original sin, humankind was cursed. Their sin brought about spiritual death, 
physical death and destruction of the environment/surroundings. By sending his 
son Jesus, God forgives human beings who therefore must believe in Jesus if they 
want to be forgiven. Points five, six and seven are particularly important as they 
specifically relate to issues of poverty and illness. Point five emphasises that Jesus 
did not only come to redeem spirits but also bodies. According to Yonggi Cho, in 
the mind of God, body and spirit are united: “For the word of God is alive and 
active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, it penetrates even to dividing soul 
and spirit” (Hebrews 4:12 quoted by Yonggi Cho 1992: 70-71). Point six argues 
that people should have faith and hope in the coming of a new heaven and of a 
new earth. Finally point seven commands us to bless others through tithing. 
Critics of the full gospel often argue that it is promoting an individual faith and 
the search for personal gains. However, point seven clearly commands believers 
to share their blessings with others and to be charitable. Finally, point four serves 
as a reminder that God is good and has sent Jesus to redeem humankind from the 
original sin. Therefore, if people believe in Jesus, they are healed from the curse 
and God can bless them in three different ways: spiritually, physically and 
materialistically. This is commonly referred to as the three blessings theology 
(sam chung ch’ukpok). 
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The Full Gospel theology has also been criticised because of the emphasis on 
material prosperity and success however this must be understood in the context of 
intense poverty in the aftermath of the Korean War. As Yonggi Cho himself 
relates, the church started under a tent left by American soldiers and was there to 
attend to the needs of the poor and of the sick: “People with all types of 
illnesses—stroke, stomach disorder, rheumatism, tuberculosis, physical disability-
came and received healing from the Holy Spirit. Even the local hooligans and 
troublemakers had a change of heart and became members of the congregation. 
However, the church was always in financial difficulty” (David Yonggi Cho 
2008: 43-44). Yonggi Cho did not only attend to the needs of society at that time 
but also showed his desire to transform injustices by appointing women leaders 
and thus, challenging directly Confucian traditions. The theology developed by 
Cho is believed that have responded adequately to the social and spiritual needs of 
Koreans after the War (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2008: 138). David S. Lim (2004) 
writes that by advocating a “positive faith”, Cho helped the poor to overcome 
their condition of suffering and despair and trained them to become leaders and 
overcomers (David S. Lim 2004: 136). However, the theology of Yonggi Cho has 
also been criticised in Korea and internationally. As Lim further argues, Cho 
might perpetuate “a false consciousness that Korea is the last remaining 
powerhouse of world Christianity and that the Korean Church is a house of prayer 
when in fact it may be swollen with pride in thinking that religion is a way to 
become rich, successful and respectable” (David S. Lim 2004: 141). Furthermore, 
according to Cho, the health of Christians is dependent on the integrity of their 
faith. Cho has developed the concept of a fourth-dimensional world which is 
spiritual. As Cho describes, “the human spirit rules over the flesh that comes from 
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the three-dimensional world. If the spirit grieves, then the flesh becomes ill; when 
the spirit is sound, then the flesh is healthy” (David Yonggi Cho 2006: 11). There 
is arguably a danger in attributing physical sickness to sin in the life of a believer. 
The church and its leaders have also been criticised for being shamanistic and 
thus propagating a syncretised Christianity. The impact of shamanism on Korean 
Christianity is at times criticised and at times valued.  
Influence of native religions and beliefs on Korean eschatology 
 
In his extensive research on early Korean eschatology, Ung-Kyu Pak (2005) 
argues that missionaries introduced a premillenialist worldview to Korea which 
Christians adopted promptly because of their desperate socio-political conditions 
of that time. Pak also argues that the Korean worldview, which had been shaped 
by shamanism and other traditional religions and beliefs in Korea, fit into the 
premillenialist worldview, which means that Korean Christians tend to be 
conservative, otherworldly and individualistic.  
Shamanism is “Korea’s earliest and most indigenous religion” (Ung-kyu Pak 
2005: 22) and is believed to have influenced the Korean Christian worldview 
dramatically. There is no consensus on whether the term ‘shamanism’ can 
adequately describe Korean indigenous practices. The term shamanism has 
historically been used to describe indigenous practices in the region of Siberia. 
According to Howard, the Sino-Korean character mu is used to refer to the Korean 
practices. For example, mudang is used to describe the practitioner, musok is the 
belief complex, muga refers to the texts and so on (Howard 1998:2). Scholars 
such as Tae-gon Kim (1998) and Seong-nae Kim (1998) debate whether the term 
musok can indeed be referred to in English as Korean shamanism. Tae-gon Kim 
(1998) argues that musok is indeed a Korean indigenous version of shamanism 
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and suggests the following definition:  
Korean shamanism is a traditional religious phenomenon based on nature, 
interpreted in a way peculiar to Korea. The Korean shaman is endowed with a 
specific gift of trance-possession that allows her to communicate with the 
supernatural. By means of supernatural power given to her by the spirits, the 
shaman is able to fulfil human desires for explanation, understanding, and the 
telling of fortunes (Tae-gon Kim 1998: 23).  
Seong-nae Kim broadly defines musok as follows: “a religious system 
grounded in the specific socio-economic and historic conditions of Korean 
society” (Seong-nae Kim 1998: 34). However, Seong-nae Kim is reluctant to 
adopt a more specific definition as she distinguishes regional variations of musok. 
She therefore suggests “to look at the contextualization of regional variations” 
(Seong-nae Kim 1998: 41) rather than identify “regional typicality” (Seong-nae 
Kim 1998: 41).   
Shamanism is an animistic religion. Animism is the “tendency to 
anthropomorphise natural objects that are normally inanimate” (Baker 2007:16). 
In the past, Koreans not only worshipped household gods but also mountain gods 
and the Dragon King who ruled over the waters (Baker 2007: 15). Shamanism 
continues to thrive in contemporary Korea. When facing difficulties, Koreans like 
to resort to the services of shamanic diviners, usually women, who will perform a 
dance and sing to attract the attention of the spirits during a ritual known as kut.  
She will then intercede with the spirits that are causing distress to her clients 
(Baker 2007: 16-17). 
Shaman texts also include Korean creation myths. Even though those tales 
betray the influences of Chinese cosmological representations and influences from 
orthodox Buddhism, they describe the creation of the world, a separation of 
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heaven and earth with a paradise that is not unlike the Garden of Eden (Walraven 
2007: 244-246). 
According to Pak, some of the influences of shamanism on Christianity are “1 
the concern with power, and the attraction of a God who can dominate other 
spirits and protects people; 2 the hope for tangible results from faith in 
Christianity, just as shamanism pursue specific familial, medical, or financial 
objectives; 3 the belief in ubiquitous and potentially dangerous spirits” (Ung-kyu 
Pak 2005: 31). Christian scholars usually argue that because of shamanism, 
Koreans already believed in the existence of one supreme being, a ‘High God’: 
“[t]he Korean concept of a High God was formed from shamanism thought and 
later transformed through encountering other beliefs from the outside world. 
However, Korean[s] never lost the distinctive character of the High God who is 
the supreme being over all the spirits and gods” (Sung-wook Hong 2009:45) [.]  
Pak believes that shamanism reinforced the dualistic nature of Korean 
Christianity: “While shamanistic Christians seek for the well-being of their 
present life, they also pursue eternal life when their earthly desires are not 
fulfilled. They in turn regard this life as a secular life to be ignored or escaped. 
This tendency produces two conflicting tendencies: a clinging to this world and an 
avoidance of this world” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 31).   
Buddhism formally entered the Korean peninsula at the end of the fourth 
century. Baker (20007) argues that in the beginning, Buddhism was not very 
different from folk religion/shamanism and the first Buddhist monks claimed they 
could cure illnesses that gods could not (Baker 2007: 18). An analysis of Korean 
religious history by James Huntley Grayson (2002) shows that Buddhism was 
never a unified movement in Korea. Baker (2007) argues that Korean Buddhism 
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is Mahāyāna (great vehicle) Buddhism. A significant feature of this particular 
form of Buddhism is its focus on compassion: “there are a large number of 
buddhas and bodhisattvas who, out of compassion, offer assistance to suffering 
humanity and, indeed, to all sentient beings” (Baker 2007: 19).  However, 
Grayson (2002) writes that in the sixth century, another form of Buddhism, 
known as Hināyāna (smaller vehicle), developed alongside Mahāyāna Buddhism 
(Grayson 2002 (1989): 31). In the seventh century, Buddhism flourished on the 
peninsula and a form of esoteric Buddhism grew together with a more orthodox, 
monastic form of Buddhism (Grayson 2002 (1989): 47).  Grayson also argues that 
in that period of time, orthodox Buddhism became more sophisticated and 
developed schools of Buddhist doctrine also knows the Five Schools (O-gyo) or 
orthodox sects (Grayson 2002 (1989): 59). 
According to Don Baker  (2007), many Koreans were attracted to Buddhism 
“for its soteriological message: its promise of effective techniques for escaping 
suffering by developing insight that will dissolve the illusions that cause that 
suffering” (Baker 2007: 18). Buddhism also offered supernatural beings that 
individuals could turn to request assistance to overcome health, familial or 
financial problems (Baker 2007: 18-19). It can be suggested therefore, that the 
Buddhist background strengthened the dualistic nature of Korean Christianity. 
Buddhism is also said to have brought fatalism into Korean thinking. Ung-kyu 
Pak argues that Buddhism itself was a syncretic religion that adopted Shamanistic 
practices and beliefs. Buddhism’s greatest influences on Korean Christianity were 
its pessimism and focus on the other world: “It may be said that Buddhism does 
not appreciate the value and meaning of life, but inspires faith in the other world” 
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(Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 36). Referring to another Korean scholar, Ung-kyu Pak 
quotes: 
It was a coincidence that the futuristic asceticism of Buddhism was in line 
with the imminent eschatology of Christianity. Christian eschatology 
includes in itself the danger of denying the present life and overemphasizing 
the other world. By doing these two things, it may lose its sense of 
responsibility and duty for the present life and end by being apathetic toward 
society (Young-hoon Lee quoted in Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 36).  
Finally, according to Ung-kyu Pak (2005), Confucianism and Taoism from 
China also influenced Koreans’ belief system and the dualistic understanding of 
human beings:  
The ancient Koreans believed that human nature is composed of body and 
soul, and death was conceived of as a separation of the two. It has been 
believed; furthermore, that the soul exists beyond death (...) the belief in the 
eternal existence of the soul was developed into ancestor worship in 
combination with traditional filial obedience to ancestors (Ung-kyu Pak 
2005: 46-47). 
In light of the above, it can be argued that at the time of Japanese colonisation 
of Korea, the impact of traditional religions and beliefs on Korean mindset means 
that Koreans held a dualistic understanding of human being, distinguished soul 
from the body, and tended to be otherworldly but not necessarily at the expense of 
social justice. The preoccupation with spiritual and physical well-being means that 
many Korean Christians have historically been concerned with issues of poverty 
and spiritual salvation. Chung-shin Park says that “Koreans who had long been 
humiliated by foreign powers, were frustrated and angry when their country 
became a protectorate, later a colony, of neighbouring Japan. Their despair and 
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helplessness led to search for psychological consolation and a source of new hope” 
(Chung-shin Park 2003: 30). Christianity allowed Korean Christians to unite 
under a unique belief to fight against a common enemy. It also provided them 
with a positive alternative to the state of occupation. As argued in the previous 
chapter, for some Korean Christians, the coming of the Kingdom of God involved 
the end of Japanese occupation.  
Additionally, shamanism is also said to be the religion that inspired minjung 
theologians to combat social injustice and human rights violations because it is the 
religion that has “traditionally been the religion of the poor, the oppressed, the 
uneducated, and during the Neo-Confucian Yi Dynasti, the religion of women” 
(Adams 2012 177). As argued by Ung-kyu Pak (2005), shamanism and other 
traditions prepared the ground for the successful integration of Christianity in 
Korea but this does not mean that Christianity, especially the conservative 
Christianity imported by missionaries, reinforced their fatalism or world escapism. 
On the contrary, Christianity provided them with a new hope and functioned as a 
driving force to resist the colonising power.  
Influence of American evangelicalism 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of my research, Kwang-sun Suh argued that 
“Americans put a fundamentalist stamp on Korean religion that has lasted until 
the present day: “the revival meetings...set the tone of Korean Protestantism: 
emotional, conservative, Pentecostal, individualistic, and otherworldly” (Kwang-
sun Suh quoted in Brouwer, Gifford and Rose 1996: 112). Early Korean 
Christians were also exposed to the middle-class values and attitudes promoted by 
the American missionaries. American Protestant missionaries to Korea came from 
a middle-class background and brought capitalism to Korea. The expansion of 
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trade was indeed “a desirable result of foreign missions” (Dae-young Ryu 
2001:109). But were American missionaries really individualistic and 
otherworldly?  
First, they did not want to be engaged politically: Wells (1990) says that 
missionaries followed the principle of church state separation that originated from 
the European Reformation as a means to prevent the state from interfering in 
religious affairs (Wells 1990: 35). Second, it is also said they had come to save 
souls and bring inner peace and were not interested in solving Korea’s political 
and social problems (Timothy S. Lee 2000: 127). Western missionaries who went 
to Korea came from different backgrounds and were following the different 
theologies and eschatological views taught in their respective theological colleges 
and churches. However, it is also true that most missionaries had been exposed to 
and therefore followed a premillennialistic eschatological orientation (Ung-kyu 
Pak 2005: 84). As explained in the introduction, in the aftermath of the civil war, 
evangelicals in the United States developed a pessimistic view of the world. They 
interpreted suffering and catastrophes as signs of the imminent return of Jesus on 
earth but also as evidence of the corruption of humankind. The world is evil and 
individuals must be urgently saved before Christ comes back to earth to rapture 
his saints. In spite of their pessimism, Ung-kyu Pak argues that premillennialists 
were the “world’s greatest optimists” and supported world mission programmes 
that sought to establish schools and hospitals to improve the living conditions of 
people (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 71). Because they believed in the imminent return of 
Christ, the question what would you want to be doing when Jesus comes back? 
dictated their behaviour. Therefore decisions taken on a daily basis were very 
important and had to be ethically and morally acceptable: “[t]he nearness of the 
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Lord’s coming gave added meaning to their lives in the present” (Ung-kyu Pak 
2005: 59). In other words, life on earth mattered. Therefore, regardless of their 
eschatological orientation, missionaries to Korea were involved in medical or 
social activity: early missions in Korea aimed to release people from: “disease 
(medical missions), ignorance (educational missions), fear of spirits, oppressive 
social structures, and evil customs” (Ung Kyu Pak 2005: 95).  
Another reason why missionaries focused on social and medical activities is 
because, at that time, Korea was still hostile to the introduction of foreign 
religions. In 1884, when the American Horace N. Allen arrived in Korea to preach 
the gospel, the country was still wary of Western religions and thus, Allen was 
introduced as a medical doctor for the American diplomatic representation. In 
1885, two American missionaries: Henry Appenzeller, from the Northern 
Presbyterian mission; and Horace Underwood, from the Northern Methodist 
mission, became the first ordained missionaries to Korea.  Chung-shin Park 
describes the then Korea as anti-Christian and anti-Western. Firstly, this was 
because of a strong Chinese influence on the peninsula and the prevalence of 
Confucian ideas; secondly because Catholicism was associated to the elite from 
the South and their political rivals regarded Catholicism as a heresy; thirdly 
because of the history of colonialism and aggressive behaviour of Western powers; 
finally because Korean Catholics had challenged the authority of the throne 
(Chung-shin Park 2003:18-19). Because of this hostile environment, missionaries 
focused on indirect acts of evangelisation such as the provision of social services, 
education and medical care. Missionaries had to downplay if not disguise their 
religious identity and adopt a ‘non-evangelistic policy’. However, Elizabeth 
Underwood (2003) argues that Horace Allen wanted to bring about social changes 
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in Korea because he adhered to a postmillenialistic worldview: “He heartily 
believed that through the promotion of good works the Presbyterian could bring 
about both an opening to evangelical work and the conversion of the Korean 
society from top-bottom” (Elizabeth Underwood 2003: 66-67). She argues, 
however, that her ancestor, Horace Underwood, was premillennialist and therefore 
for him education and medical work were merely a means to an end (Elizabeth 
Underwood 2003: 67). Not only missionaries but Korean Christians quickly 
became involved in social activities. Although at a later time than the first 
missionary activity in this area, in his research on the relationship between 
Christianity and social welfare written in Korean, Han’guk kyohoewa sahoe 
pokchi (2008), Moo-yeol Choe [Muyŏl Ch’oe] explains that Yun Ch’i-ho and O 
Kŭng-sŏn were the first Protestant Koreans to open orphanages. The first one was 
opened in Seoul in 1919: the kyŏngsŏng koa kujehoe then in Pyongyang in 1921, 
1925 in Sŏnch’ŏn  and 1934 in Wŏnsan (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 94). 
Chung-shin Park says that Koreans adopted the apolitical conservative views 
of the missionaries but it affected them differently: Protestant Christians 
associated Christianity to the advanced West, modernisation, and thus by 
embracing Christianity they sought to reform Korean society politically and 
socially: “The early Protestant church’s doctrine and theology, though 
conservative fundamentalist in nature, made Korean Christians more hostile 
toward Confucian ethics and practices, and thus truly revolutionary” (Chung-shin 
Park 2003: 55).  
In many respects, today’s missionary activity taking place in North Korea is 
not very different from early Western missionary activity in Korea when 
missionaries with different eschatological orientations sought to fulfil God’s 
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mission by bringing assistance to Koreans in spite of a hostile political 
atmosphere. Many of these organisations are in fact continuing the missionary, 
education and medical work that their predecessors started. For instance, the 
Korean children of American missionaries who had worked in Pyongyang 
establishing schools and orphanages have formed the Lighthouse Foundation. The 
Eugene Bell Foundation has been named in the memory of the American 
missionary Eugene Bell (1865-1925) who worked in South Jeolla province. His 
descendants have established the organisation in partnership with ethnic South 
Koreans.  
Failure of the March First Movement and the emergence of socialism 
 
As examined in the previous chapter, the movement for independence that led 
to the March First Movement failed. After the massacre of Koreans by the 
Japanese, many Christians withdrew from the public sphere and criticised those 
who chose to remain politically and socially active. Chung-shin Park (2003) says 
that Korean Christians retained the same conservative theological beliefs but 
became disillusioned and resigned. What functioned as a political drive in the 
early stages of colonisation, became a hindrance to political activism in the 
aftermath of the March First Movement (Chung-shin Park 2003: 65). Therefore, 
the Christian leaders who had stood against the Japanese withdrew from the 
public sphere and sought security rather than activism to protect their newly 
acquired social position (Chung-shin Park 2003: 67). Chung-shin Park also argues 
Protestantism started to separate itself from the poor, the alienated and the 
oppressed. Church leaders became socially established and began preaching a 
‘pure gospel’ (sunsu sinang). Churches, which had previously formed a united 
front to resist Japanese occupation, became divided and more competitive 
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(Chung-shin Park 2003: 152-153). Many Christian Protestants moved from being 
nationalists to being collaborators. Some were forced to collaborate, others chose 
to collaborate so that they could continue to operate schools and churches and 
finally others collaborated to keep their wealth and social status (Chung-shin Park 
2005: 156). This focus on the otherworldly was accompanied by a split of 
theology between those who were “influenced by the pessimistic worldview of 
dispensational premillenialism” and those “who came under the influence of 
socialism and social gospel. One of the reasons for this diversification was that, 
often after having first suppressed them, the Japanese rulers allowed many books 
to be published and many social associations to be formed. Through these 
associations and publications, socialism began to influence Christian intellectuals, 
while nationalist Christians began to establish numerous social associations for 
their purposes” (Ung-kyu Pak 2005: 145).  
At the same time that Christianity was losing its significance in society, 
communism emerged as an alternative nationalistic and progressive voice. As 
explained in the second chapter, communism was first introduced on the Korean 
peninsula in the 1920s via Japan, China and Russia. Its encounter with 
Christianity quickly became problematic. Communists initiated anti-religious 
campaigns, especially, an anti-Protestant missionary movement. Mostly, they 
criticised Christians for being indifferent to social injustices and for promoting 
imperialistic and capitalistic ideas.  They also accused Christians of entertaining 
close links with Japan. Churches responded to these criticisms in two ways: some 
Christians ignored the criticism and retreated from the public sphere even further; 
others attempted to integrate socialist ideas to transform the inner spiritual and 
individualistic nature of the Church.  
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The social gospel, or social Christianity, was both a response to and under the 
influence of contemporary theories as explained by Kirsteen Kim: “social 
Christianity emerged within the liberal Protestant tradition—a movement 
encompassing both progressive and modernist views—in the mid-late nineteenth 
century under the influence of Hegelian idealism (the progress of human spirit), 
Darwinian theories of evolutionary progress, and comparative religion, and in 
reaction to the rise of individualism in religion and society” (Kirsteen Kim 2007: 
14). In Korea, Christians adopted a new perspective on the relationship between 
capitalism and labour and realised that churches were responsible to the Korean 
public.  
For example, the YMCA influenced the Church greatly by teaching a social 
gospel and working for a more just society. In 1925, the organisation started a 
social programme to improve farm villages “to awaken the Korean Churches to 
understand the real situation of the villages which increasingly suffered grinding 
poverty under the colonial exploitation, and to turn the attention of the Churches 
and missionaries towards the hardships of the farm villages” (Kyong-bae Min 
2005: 352). The YMCA, together with the Presbyterian Church, Changnokyo 
kongŭihoe, promoted the rights of women developing empowering and literacy 
projects. The YMCA also challenged Korean traditions by campaigning against 
second marriages (in other words men taking concubines or ch’ŏp in Korean). The 
movement developed into Chosŏn yŏja kidok ch’ŏngnyŏnhoe or YWCA in 
English (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 104-105). 
The social gospel (sahoe pogŭm) must be distinguished from Christian 
socialism (kidokkyo sahoejuŭi) which actively adopted socialist/communist 
ideology. The social gospel denied socialist elements like historical materialism. 
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But in practice, these two streams proceeded in the same way to promote a form 
of utopian socialism. Some Christians tried to combine Christianity and a socialist 
utopia (Dae-young Ryu 2009: 204-209). These Christians, says Chung-shin Park, 
wanted to keep society united over the question of Japan and initially thought that 
Christianity and socialism could work together for the good of society. However 
as socialists continued to label Christianity a religion of the wealthy, Christians 
began to turn anti-socialist and defended the gospel as being good news for the 
poor and the oppressed (Chung-shin Park 2003: 144-145). It is difficult to 
differentiate Christian socialists from Christians who advocated a social gospel 
and identify the extent to which some believed in one idea or the other. However, 
the encounter between Christianity and socialism on the Korean peninsula shows 
that the relationship between Christians and socialists has not always been as clear 
cut as we are sometimes led to believe. It also means that from the beginning, 
Christians associated the term society/socialism (sahoe) to the term common 
property/communism (kongsan) and thus did not distinguish between socialism 
and communism (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 258). The fact that North Koreans 
used the term sahoe in their constitutions further reinforced their prejudice and to 
this day continues to influence evangelicals’ attitude toward the term socialism or 
social justice. 
In spite of the rhetoric however, more conservative churches continued to 
address some of the issues that affected directly the Korean public. For example, 
as schools were forced to follow a Japanese curriculum and teach the Japanese 
language instead of Korean, they became involved in campaigns for Korean 
literacy and language. Churches would run Sunday and summer programmes for 
children who would otherwise have been unable to learn Korean (Moo-yeol Choe 
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2008 (1999): 132-133). Undoubtedly, in doing so, these churches wanted to make 
sure that forthcoming generations would not turn away from Christianity. But, 
practically, this means that children were given the opportunity to learn their 
mother tongue properly. 
While Christianity somehow lost some of its influence in society in the years 
that followed the March First Movement, Christianity became influential again 
after the liberation and division of the country. During the Korean War, “almost 
half of the foreign aid organisations which joined the Korean Association of 
Voluntary Agencies (KAVA) were Christian. US Presbyterians alone raised USD 
1,800,000 for Korea in 1950-1954 and most of this money was channelled 
through Korean churches” (Tikhonov 2013: 5). American missionary 
organisations also helped Korean Christians to build churches, orphanages, 
schools, shelters and clinics (Haga 2012: 99). 
After the Korean War and the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the 
Korean evangelical churches continued to assert that they did not want to become 
involved in political matters and wished to preserve a separation of church and 
religion by advocating a pure faith. It would be more correct to say that churches 
were politically aligned with the policies of the successive South Korean 
governments and therefore did not see the need to challenge them.  Evangelicals 
enjoyed the freedom of religion granted by the successive authoritarian South 
Korean governments and did not contest its legitimacy until the late 1970s. 
Equally, evangelicals never completely stopped caring for poverty and social 
injustices. Sebastian C.H. Kim explains that in the aftermath of the Korean War, 
there “was a shift in thinking from the early revival phenomenon of emphasising 
‘spiritual blessings’ in its eschatological dimensions to include the material 
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manifestation of those blessings” (Sebastian C.H. Kim 2007: 44). Evangelicals 
therefore supported the economic growth of the country prompted by the free 
market policy and were actively involved in the relief campaigns. For example, 
one of today’s leading international development organisations, the evangelical 
organisation World Vision, which started programmes of child sponsorship to 
assist orphans of war, was established during the Korean War, in Seoul, South 
Korea.  
Holism in the church 
 
As mentioned above, World Vision was co-founded by an American doctor, 
Robert Pierce, and a North Korean pastor, Han Kyung-chik, who later became a 
dominant figure in Korean evangelical circles, promoting social action and 
working relentlessly for the well-being of Korean society.  According to Daniel J. 
Adams, the theologians Rhee Jong-sung and Pastor Han Kyung-chik epitomised 
the Korean churches’ efforts to reconcile evangelicalism and ecumenism. Both 
were members of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap), the largest 
denomination in Korea. 
Rhee Jong-sung was born in South Korea in 1922 and received a very broad 
theological education (Adams 2012: 104). He became assistant pastor at 
Youngnak Presbyterian Church in 1957 and advocated a holistic theology (t’ong 
chŏnjŏk sinhak) “1. It is Trinitarian; 2. It focuses on the whole gospel; 3. It is 
concerned with the whole person; 4. It brings together the church and the secular 
world; 5. It is not anthropocentric but rather cosmic in scope; and 6. It is 
concerned with the kingdom of God” (Adams 2012: 109). As Adams argues, one 
of the most important points of his theology is the emphasis on the trinity, which 
means that we should not ignore or play down one person of the trinity. For 
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example, Pentecostals tend to focus exclusively on the person of the Holy Spirit 
whereas minjung theologians focused on the presence of Jesus while ignoring the 
Holy Spirit (Adams 2012: 113-114).  
Han Kyung-chik was born in North Korea in 1902 and served as a pastor in the 
north where he was fighting against the Japanese occupation. In 1945, he founded 
the Christian Social Democratic Party with another pastor, Yun Ha-young. He 
wanted to build a new nation based on Christian values but as he was going to be 
arrested by Soviet agents, he fled to South Korea (Adams 2012: 117).  Han 
Kyung-chik’s form of holistic ministry included five elements:  
First, he was the ideal “gentleman minister” and leader of the church and 
society. Second, he was the humble shepherd of his congregation. Third, he 
showed solidarity with those who suffered in society and sought to alleviate 
their sufferings. Fourth, he always remained in the center and took the 
middle-way and was thus a force for unity rather than division. And fifth and 
finally, through his dedication to social service he was respected both 
nationally and globally (Adams 2012: 120).  
Su-jin Kim [Suchin Kim] (2011) has written a book in Korean on Han Kyung-
chik emphasising the contribution of the Korean pastor to a holistic form of 
evangelism (Arŭmdaun pinson Han Kyŏng Chik). Han Kyung-chik believed that it 
is by the grace of God that South Korea had been blessed spiritually, 
economically, politically and socially. He said that mission, education and social 
services were nonetheless necessary to overcome the difficulties faced by the 
country (Han Kyung-chik quoted in Su-jin Kim 2011 (2000): 130). Like most 
North Korean Christians who had found political asylum in the South, Han 
Kyung-chik was openly against the North Korean system and demonised its 
supporters. However he became acutely aware of the humanity of the North 
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Korean people as he met wounded soldiers during the Korean War. On the 29th of 
April 1992, Han Kyung-chik visited Berlin to receive the Templeton Prize and 
donated the entirety of the award to Youngnak church to use for their mission 
project to North Korea: the Rice of Love (Sarang ŭi ssalnanugi undong) (Han 
Kyung-chik quoted in Su-jin Kim 2011 (2000): 138-139). 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the great level of involvement and dedication of 
evangelical churches in addressing hunger and poverty in North Korea. While it is 
still difficult for these mission organisations and churches to conduct 
straightforward evangelistic work in North Korea, they have developed methods 
to address the perceived needs of North Koreans while respecting North Korea’s 
prohibition of conducting religious activity. It was argued that in spite of the 
rhetoric and uneasy relationship with socialism and social issues, evangelicals 
have always been concerned to a certain degree with issues of poverty, hunger and 
physical health. However, their commitment does not mean that evangelicals have 
lost their anti-communist attitude. Their aim is to achieve the re-unification of the 
peninsula so as to re-evangelise the north of the country.  
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Chapter 5: Juche and mission to North Korea 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the advent of communism in the North, Christians have actively been 
engaged in anti-North Korean campaigns as explained in previous chapters. These 
campaigns translated into efforts to evangelise North Korea. This research argues that 
humanitarian aid is one of the methods used by evangelicals to approach North 
Koreans in a more holistic way. There are, however, different strategies that have 
been implemented: Korean evangelicals have directed their efforts toward the 
evangelisation of North Korea through various means ranging from the broadcasting 
of the gospel into North Korea to the evangelisation of North Korean refugees in 
China and in South Korea. However, as some evangelicals come to revaluate mission 
to North Korea, they also seek to gain a greater understanding of the North Korean 
system and culture. This chapter will argue, therefore, that some evangelicals are 
gradually moving from an anti-North Korea agenda to the recognition that an 
understanding of the North Korean worldview is necessary to conduct mission 
successfully in North Korea. 
This chapter will therefore seek to expose how some evangelicals have come to 
understand Juche/Kim Il-sungism. In their attempts to understand the North Korean 
worldview better, evangelicals have engaged in an analysis of the North Korean 
ideological system which they believe no longer functions as mere ideology but has 
become the religion of the state.  Evangelicals no longer believe that they are facing a 
government that promotes atheism but that that they must tackle another religion 
altogether. This chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, it will analyse the 
concept of Juche and argue that North Korea has developed a form of civil religion as 
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defined by the 18th century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Then it will 
examine the views of scholars, including evangelical scholars, on the North Korean 
religion. It will then present the various mission methods that have been used so far in 
relation to North Korea. Finally, it will summarise recent assessments and mission 
appraisals by Christian scholars and pastors with regard to North Korea and it will 
argue that some evangelicals imply that cross-cultural missiological principles must 
be followed in order to pursue successful mission with North Korea. 
 
2. Analysis of Juche 
 
North Korea’s civil religion 
 
Theologians, sociologists and other scholars have debated for years over the 
meaning of the term religion.  The concept of ‘civil religion’ as formulated by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in his Social Contract can be used to describe the 
North Korean religion adequately.  According to Rousseau, prior to Christianity, 
each state had its own cults and gods. Governments made no distinction between 
their gods and their laws. Gods of one nation had no power over the gods of other 
nations and thus there were no wars of religion. When Romans developed their 
empire, they often adopted the new gods of the conquered countries and thus the 
empire was soon full of different gods and cults, a development became known as 
paganism. As Rousseau argues, when the Jews refused to worship the gods of 
their conquerors, the latter had no other choice but to enslave and persecute them. 
However, Jesus came to build a spiritual kingdom on earth, which, argues 
Rousseau, disrupted the order of things. Rousseau says it became difficult for 
people to pledge allegiance both to the priest and to the master. Rousseau argues 
that Christianity “gives men two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two 
countries [which] renders them subject to contradictory duties” (Rousseau 1762). 
	   197 
Rousseau adds that there are two other kinds of religions: one that is the religion 
of man and the other that is the religion of the citizen. The religion of man does 
not require temples and cults but implies a direct relationship with God as well as 
“the obligation of morality”. The religion of the citizen is codified by the state and 
includes allegiance to cults and rites as prescribed by the laws. However, that 
religion might turn bad as it might be “founded on lies and error” and become 
tyrannous and exclusive.  Rousseau, therefore, proposed a combination of both: a 
religion which combines a relationship with God and a sincere faith (religion of 
man) with a religion that prescribes loyalty to the nation (religion of the citizen). 
Rousseau has labelled this kind of religion civil religion (Rousseau 1762).  
In the second chapter, we examined how Kim Il-sung and the North Korean 
authorities proceeded to eliminate all forms of dissidence. Christians in particular 
have been targeted because they refuse to pledge allegiance either to the country 
or to the man who is now being idolised by the propaganda. Chapter two also 
explained that Juche was not part of the original building of the North Korean 
state and only formally emerged in the late 1960s in an attempt by North Koreans 
to distance themselves from the Chinese and Russian ideologies. However, it can 
be argued that since its inception, North Korea has been in the process of 
developing a civil religion. That religion needed a name and they called it Juche. 
First, it started with requiring allegiance to the state and to the nation. As 
explained by Andrew Shanks (2000): “whereas church-religion was the 
establishment of a rival organisation to that of the state, Rousseaunian civil 
religion was intended simply as a form of social cement, helping to unify the state 
by giving sacred authority to republican law” (Shanks 2000: 29). In other words, 
civil religion is an expression of one’s nationalism. As such, North Koreans are 
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required to follow the rituals and acts of civil obedience imposed by the state. 
With the emergence of Juche and the subsequent idolisation of its leaders, it can 
be argued that North Koreans attempted to develop a ‘religion of man’ as well. 
Rousseau defined civil religion as follows: 
It follows that it is up to the sovereign to establish the articles of a purely 
civil faith, not exactly as dogmas of religion but as sentiments of social 
commitment without which it would be impossible to be either a good 
citizen or a faithful subject.... While the State has no power to oblige anyone 
to believe these articles, it may banish anyone who does not believe them. 
This banishment is not for impiety but for lack of social commitment, that is, 
for being incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice or of sacrificing 
his life to duty in time of need. As for the person who conducts himself as if 
he does not believe them after having publicly stated his belief in these same 
dogmas, he deserves the death penalty. He has lied in the presence of the 
laws (Rousseau 1762). 
According to Rousseau, it is the right of the king to enact laws and dogmas of a 
civil religion. Civil faith means commitment to the nation. The king cannot force 
citizens to follow such laws but if citizens refuse to obey, they will be banned and 
punished. Furthermore, just like in North Korea, the citizen is required to sacrifice 
his or her life for these laws and, for the nation. Rousseau further states: 
The dogmas of civil religion should be simple, few in number, and stated in 
precise words without interpretations or commentaries. These are the 
required dogmas: the existence of a powerful, intelligent Divinity, who does 
good, has foreknowledge of all, and provides for all; the life to come; the 
happy rewards of the just; the punishment of the wicked; and the sanctity of 
the social contract and the laws. As for prohibited articles of faith, I limit 
myself to one: intolerance. Intolerance characterizes the religious 
persuasions we have excluded (Rousseau 1762). 
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As will be discussed in further detail later below, Kim Il-sung embodies the 
dogmas of North Korea’s civil religion: he is powerful, intelligent, does good, is 
almighty, provides for all, gives meaning to life, rewards the just and punishes the 
wicked. Rousseau also includes another important aspect in his definition, 
tolerance, however he highlights that one’s expression of faith cannot challenge 
one’s duties to the state: “Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive 
national religion, tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so 
long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship” 
(Rousseau 1762).  This again, seems to be true in the case of Juche, which, in 
principle, does not reject other beliefs but actually makes it impossible for North 
Koreans to follow another religion.  One of the main issues with regard to Juche 
and religious freedom, says David Hawk, is the monolithic nature of the system, 
which he argues does not leave any room for other interpretations or ideological 
systems (Hawk 2005: 83).  Juche rejects the idea of an abstract God who is above 
human experience (Byung-ro Kim [Pyŏngro Kim] & Yong-kwan Cho [Yonggwan 
Cho] 2012: 62). As examined in the second chapter, in its early stages, the North 
Korean constitution included religions and religious believers as part of the 
formation of the new state. Kim Il-sung, however, eliminated those he deemed to 
be disloyal to the nation. As Christianity is associated with the United States (the 
enemy), Christians are labelled as being unfaithful to the state and must be 
eliminated.  
Juche has evolved over time and has been adapted to reflect North Korea’s 
domestic and international policies. It is therefore very different from other 
mainstream religions, such as Christianity, which rely on the truth of sacred texts 
which are not meant to be changed or altered. The section below will describe 
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how scholars, and especially evangelicals, have interpreted Juche in its current 
form. 
 
Religious characteristics of Juche 
 
Eun-hee Shin argues that Juche became North Korea’s national religion in the 
1990s but the notion of Kim Il-sung, as father of the North Korean nation, started 
as early as the 1980s. Juche became exclusive and systemised by Kim Jong-il in 
1982 (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 5715). Since his death in 1994, 
Kim Il-sung has been described as ever present with the Korean people and most 
of the monuments built in his image that can be found this day in North Korea 
were built after 1994. The North Korean dictionary of philosophy does not record 
any definition for Juche. Instead Juche is referred to as Kim Il-sung’s 
revolutionary thought. What follows is Kim Jong-il’s analysis of the Juche idea in 
1982: 
The Juche idea is a new philosophical thought which centres on man. As the 
leader said, the Juche idea is based on the philosophical principle that man is 
the master of everything and decides everything ... 
That man is the master of everything means that he is the master of the world 
and of his own destiny; that man decides everything means that he plays the 
decisive role in transforming the world and in shaping his destin ...  
Man, though material existence, is not a simple material being. He is the most 
developed material being, a special product of the evolution of the material 
world. 
Man was already outstanding as he emerged from the world of nature. He 
exists and develops by cognizing and changing the world to make it serve him, 
                                                
15 Kim Byung-ro is probably the most knowledgeable South Korean scholar in terms of the 
relationship between North Korean society, Juche and Christianity. The book referred to here is a 
collaboration with Cho Yong-kwan in Korean: Pukhan han kŏlŭm tagasŏgi (2012). 
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whereas all other material lives maintain their existence through their 
subordination and adaptation to the objective world.  
Man holds a special position and plays a special role as master of the world 
because he is a social being with Chajusong, creativity and consciousness. The 
leader gave a new philosophical conception of man by defining Chajusong, 
creativity and consciousness as the essential features of man, the social being ... 
Man cannot, of course, live outside the world; he lives and conducts his 
activity in the world. Nature is the object of man's labour and also is the 
material source of his life. Society is a community where people live and 
conduct activities. Natural environments and social conditions have a great 
effect on human activity. Whether natural environments are good or bad and, in 
particular, whether the political and economic systems of a society are 
progressive or reactionary -- these factors may favourably affect human 
endeavour to remake nature and develop society or limit and restrict that 
activity.  
But man does not merely adapt himself to environments and conditions. By his 
independent. creative and conscious activity, man continuously transforms 
nature and society, changing as he desires what does not meet his needs, and 
replacing what is outdated and reactionary with what is new and progressive. 
This is man's endeavour and struggle to change and transform the world into 
one that serves man better (Kim Jong-il 1982).  
In summary, according to the text above: man is the centre of everything. Man, 
as a human being, is characterised by three significant components: chajusong 
(sovereignty), creativity and consciousness. Man does not exist independently of 
the world but lives in a given socio-political context and has the power to 
transform it. Accordingly, human beings cannot function independently of each 
other and cannot achieve chajusong, creativity and consciousness outside of 
society. According to Juche, society consists of three elements: human beings, 
social wealth (materialistic wealth, cultural wealth), the social relations between 
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people and relations between people and social wealth. For example, a capitalistic 
society is a system whereby people with social wealth control those who have 
less. On the other hand, North Korean society is formed by people who have 
relations of love (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 60-62). In that sense, 
Juche differs from Marxist-Leninist theory that views human beings as means of 
production (Eun-hee Shin 2007:521).  
Byung-ro Kim argues that Juche became a religious faith because it started 
with the socio-political life whereby a human being is not only a biological entity 
or a spiritual being but primarily a social being that interacts in society. As such, 
individual souls become collective objects of worship (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-
kwan Cho 2012: 59). As social beings, human beings acquire historic spiritual and 
materialistic wealth. Western philosophy has tried to understand the origin of the 
universe by trying to identify what came first, the substance or consciousness 
whereas Juche argues that human beings must be understood as basic units who 
have both (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 58). Therefore, lives of 
humans consist of a physical life and a socio-political life. Humans die but their 
socio-political life is eternal. Here, Juche also differs from Marxism-Leninism 
which never discussed issues of life and death. 
Finally, the body cannot function without the brain and as such, the revolution 
cannot be accomplished without the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. According 
to Byung-ro Kim, a contemporary understanding of the notion of Juche starts with 
the idolisation of the leader Kim Il-sung (suryŏng) (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan 
Cho 2012: 58). Eun-hee Shin describes the leader as being the “unifying 
principle” of the Juche thought: “in theory, the leader is considered to be a co-
relational partner, not a power that controls or dominates the people or the party. 
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The unity of the people, the party, and the leader is profoundly social, as each of 
the three is interpenetrated by the other two” (Eun-hee Shin 2007:521). The three 
entities act like a unit that cannot be separated. The leader’s role is to serve the 
people as a “virtuous and benevolent” leader (Eun-hee Shin 2011: 521). 
According to an Orientalist perspective on Asian societies, Asians “idealiz[e] 
benevolent, paternalistic leadership and legitimiz[e] dependency” (Jong-woo Han 
& L. H. M. Ling 1998: 56). However, it is perhaps more accurate to say that, 
under the logic of Confucian political discourse, the “rule of man” or the “rule of 
virtue” supersedes the “rule of law” which means that the head of the state must 
rule and behave with integrity, “his role is to be the moral exemplar and to uphold 
the ethical order of society” (Chaibong Hahm 2005: 426). In other words, to 
secure legitimacy, the head of state must demonstrate an irreproachable 
behaviour. As such, the North Korea propaganda must always highlight the 
countless achievements of North Korea’s ‘perfect’ leaders. 
Cumings provides a detailed analysis of the Korean Neo-Confucian view of 
the human body, which is helpful for understanding the concept of body politics: 
“the body was simply one network of functional interactions within the cosmic 
patter of interrelating and interdependent networks. Disharmony within the body’s 
physiological processes could be either a reflection of disharmony in the cosmos 
at large, or it could itself be a cause of such disharmony” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 
412). Cumings further explains that the Korean assumption is that mind and heart 
are virtually the same thing. Furthermore, he says that the “principle of human 
action is not an ‘if, then’ premise about an a priory human being, whose external 
circumstances motivate him to act in a certain way ... instead the principle is an 
internal condition in the human being, premised on a state of mind” (Cumings 
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2005 (1997): 415).  Cumings says that in fact the “internal condition” is actually 
the virtue (te) embodied in mind (hsin) which is the organic integration of brain, 
heart and body and is the “cause by which material force comes into existence” 
(Cumings 2005 (1997): 415-416).  It is what differentiates us from animals. He 
further agues that the “mind combines principle and material force to become 
master of the body ... now let the body be the body politics, and presto, the 
virtuous king becomes its master” (Cumings 2005 (1997): 415-416).  As such, 
Kim Il-sung is defined as the father of the nation, “his heart is the traction power 
attracting the hearts of all people and a centripetal force uniting them as once” 
(North Korean propaganda quoted by Cumings 2005 (1997): 422). 
3. Juche and Christianity 
 
Bruce Cumings says that the fist statute of Kim Il-sung was unveiled on 
Christmas day 1949 in a conscious attempt, he says, to present Kim Il-sung as a 
“secular Christ, or Christ-substitute” (Cuming 2005 (1997): 420). In 1997, the 
calendar was changed to replace the birth of Jesus Christ with Kim Il-sung’s 
birthday as the basis for calculation. North Korean propaganda relentlessly relates 
imaginary exploits of the great leader. All North Koreans are regularly required to 
take pilgrimages to places of significance for the North Korean propaganda, bow 
to the portraits and monuments of their leaders and memorise texts and guidance 
of the leader.                        
Comparisons of Juche with Christianity also include the institutionalisation of 
Juche as a religion; self-criticism (confession of sins); re-education (sermons); 
acts of worship, prayers and songs (worship, prayer and hymns) and the display of 
religious symbols and beliefs. Byung-ro Kim says that for example, Kim Il-sung 
badges could be compared to crosses. North Korea propaganda also uses words 
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like love, grace, eternity, salvation, faith and redemption (Byung-ro Kim & Yong-
kwan Cho 2012: 66-68). Juche also promotes an ascetic way of life and North 
Koreans are required to follow the teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in 
the same way as Christians are required to follow the teachings of Jesus. North 
Koreans are required to “consider all things that serve our Great Leader, who is 
the Genius of the revolution, the Sun of the people, the legendary Hero, with the 
greatest happiness and greatest honour. Endlessly revere and adore the Great 
Leader, and eternally lift him higher” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide NGO 
2007: 20). Furthermore, Byung-ro Kim argues that Juche helps people endure 
hardship as they are made to believe in the upcoming of a socialistic paradise 
(Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 59). The promise helps people endure 
suffering and pain. However the ‘paradise’ promised to North Koreans or the 
‘kingdom of God’ is never otherworldly or an outer reality but is indeed about the 
improvement of living conditions.  
There are several institutions or seminaries dedicated to the study of Juche and 
the achievements of the leaders scattered in North Korea and North Koreans, like 
Christians, have sought to spread their beliefs around the world (Byung-ro Kim & 
Yong-kwan Cho 2012: 69-70). Thus, Juche followers can also be found outside 
North Korea. As indicated on the website for international study of the Juche idea, 
there are Juche research centres in many African countries (Tanzania, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Benin 
and Uganda) (International Institute of the Juche Idea 2014).  Admirers of the 
system can also be found in the United-Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
in France. 
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In his PhD thesis on the idolisation of Kim Il-sung and its missiological 
implications, Kwang-min Ha (2008) argues that Juche presents characteristics of 
both high and low religions. Ha refers to a distinction made by Gailyn Van 
Rheenen (1991) between high religions, which represent world religions such as 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism, and low religions that are usually 
animistic such as shamanism. Van Rheenen says that high religions can be 
distinguished by four characteristics: they are concerned by the meaning of life 
(where do we come from, where are we going and so on); they refer to written 
texts such as the Bible or the Qur’an as their main source of authority; they are 
institutionalised; they provide believers with moral and ethical guidance (Van 
Rheenen 1991: 57-58) 
First, Juche explains the meaning of life as explained below. Juche relies on the 
teachings (kyosi) of Kim Il-sung whose writings have been recorded in several 
volumes (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 136). Juche is institutionalised and North Koreans 
are taught about the achievements of their leaders from birth. Juche gives people 
moral directives and is based on the existence of a supreme being: Kim-il Sung 
(Kwang-min Ha 2008: 136-139). Finally, Juche possesses characteristic of 
animistic religions because it was been influenced by Confucianism and 
shamanism, which are concerned with people’s everyday life (Kwang-min Ha 
2008: 140-145).  
Kim Il-sung 
 
 Arguably one of the most problematic questions for evangelicals is to 
understand Kim Il-sung’s god figure status. One of the most thorough analysis on 
the matter is Kwang-min Ha’s PhD dissertation (2008) which is worth contrasting 
to the work of non-Christian scholar Brian R. Myers’ The Cleanest Race How 
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North Koreans See Themselves—And why it matters (2010). In his research on the 
North Korean ideology, Brian Myers argues that “yes, we know the country has a 
personality cult, but this fact alone tells us little. Cuba has a personality cult too” 
(Myers 2010: 11). Myers’ comparison to Cuba is inadequate. Cuban propaganda 
is very different from North Korean propaganda and it would be very difficult to 
argue that Cubans have idolised Fidel Castro. As of 2008, Cuban propaganda 
focused on the achievements of a socialist revolution and expressions of anti-
Americanism with limited reference to Fidel Castro16.  Myers also argues that 
American Christian groups are wrong to claim that divine powers have been 
attributed to the two Kims (Myers 2010: 13). Ha’s research endeavours to answer 
that question: do North Koreans believe that Kim Il-sung is a god? In order to do 
so, Ha seeks to compare North Korea propaganda, as presented in literature and 
school textbooks, to the real life experiences of North Korean refugees. His 
findings reveal that “North Koreans possess an idea of a divine being or spiritual 
being and that their concept of God derives primarily from myths and 
superstitious beliefs ... Their conception of divine beings implies two things: that 
North Koreans have an understanding of supernatural beings and, seemingly, that 
Kim Il-sung does not belong to the category of divine beings” (Kwang-min Ha 
2008: 104).  
Myers’ main argument is that Juche teaches that “the Korean people are too 
pure blooded, and therefore too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a 
great parental leader” (Myers 2010: 15). The view of Kim Il-sung as a great 
parental leader is supported by Ha’s findings: Kim Il-sung is portrayed as a 
father-figure for every family and also a father-saviour of the nation who 
                                                
16 I am making these assertions based on my two visits to Cuba where I travelled extensively in 
the context of my work in 2006 and 2008.  
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liberated the country from Japanese occupation and American imperialism. Ha’s 
argues that North Korean literature, opera, songs and school textbooks introduce 
Kim Il-sung as an “alternative father who could protect them from the Japanese 
brutality” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 52). In addition, Kim Il-sung is also presented 
as saviour of the nation: “the sun is the image used to capture this image. There 
are several of Kim’s attributes that are attached to the symbol of the sun. The 
most outstanding attribute is Kim’s power to save his people from the ultimate 
evil, Japan” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 56). Equally, North Korea’s Juche is meant to 
save South Korea from American imperialism and to bring the two nations 
together under its umbrella. 
Ha’s research also make two important contributions: first, Ha argues that 
“Kim rose to a position of absolute power in the early 1970s. Around that time, a 
movement to idolize Kim sprang up in the North. Influenced by this movement, 
North Korean literature began to describe Kim as having ‘omni’ attributes in 
extreme forms. Following Kim’s death in 1994, literature began to present him as 
an eternal being that lives everywhere” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 82). However, 
unlike God, Kim-il Sung is not present outside of North Korea and is therefore 
not omnipresent the way God is. Another difference with God would be that 
according to the Bible, God is creator of the universe and has control over natural 
elements. Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il take control of nature but have not 
created it.  
Ha goes on to say that “the North Korean government invented the divine 
attributes of Kim’s images at politically critical times. Whether or not the 
government is aware of this, however, the images of Kim that are produced 
directly contributed to the process of spiritualizing Kim Il-sung” (Kwang-min Ha 
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2008: 82 emphasis is mine). His interviews with refugees reveal that most North 
Koreans continue to see Kim Il-sung as parent and that they worshipped him 
without realising or thinking about the true nature of his being. This means that 
without realising, North Koreans have been worshipping their leader like a god. 
Ha argues that it is only after leaving North Korea and pursuing further 
education, especially when studying theology, that North Koreans come to 
understand the process of idolisation of leaders that has taken place in their home 
country (Kwang-min Ha 2008). In other words, the deification of the Kims does 
not so much emanate from the propaganda itself but deification occurs in the act 
of worship. In his book, Myers does not verify his theory against the experiences 
of real people. By contrast, in his research on Juche entitled Maŭm ch’iyurŭl 
t’onghan pukhan sŏngyo (2012), the Christian academic Hyun-man Im 
summarises the perspectives of a number of North Korean refugees. Some of the 
testimonies reveal the extent to which North Koreans are led to believe that their 
lives and fate are intrinsically connected to Kim Il-sung. 
For instance, one interviewee defines a true human being as a human being 
who has been transformed by Juche. If the person remains unchanged then they 
are not a human being (Hyun-man Im 2012: 158). Another interviewee confesses: 
I exist because of our great leader Kim Il-Sung. Kim Il-sung controls me and my 
being. There is no distinction between the great leader and me (Hyun-man Im 
2012: 148). 
Finally, another important matter for evangelicals is whether or not Kim Il-
sung was influenced by the Christian faith when he developed Juche. In an article 
published in 1986, Yong-ho Choe explores the Christian background of Kim Il-
sung’s family. First, Kim Il-sung’s father, Kim Hyŏng-jik (1894-1926) attended 
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Sungsil Academy in Pyongyang. The school had been established and was run by 
American missionaries with the objectives of training Christian leaders to spread 
the faith. Kim Hyŏng-jik did not complete the curriculum but Yong-ho Choe 
believes that he must have accepted Christianity at some point because the school 
would require students to prove their commitment to the Christian faith. After 
leaving the school Kim Hyŏng-jik becomes briefly involved in political activism 
against the Japanese. As such, he becomes a member of the Korean National 
Association (Chosŏn kungminhoe).  On March 2013 1917, Kim Hyŏng-jik and 
fellow activists are arrested by the Japanese. The Japanese reported that most of 
the members of the association were either students or former students of the 
Sungsil Academy and that the association recruited Christian followers (Yong-ho 
Choe 1986: 1083-1086). Kim Il-sung’s mother is also believed to have been a 
very committed Christian, daughter of an influential church leader. Yong-ho 
Choe argues that Kim il-sung was made to attend church in his youth and even a 
Christian school between the years 1923 and 1925 (Yong-ho Choe 1986: 1088). 
As such Yong-ho Choe argues that there is no doubt that Kim Il-sung was 
exposed to the teachings of the Christian faith and practices. However, in his 
biography of the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, Dae-sook Suh (1988) says 
that “his parents were ordinary people who suffered the poverty and oppression 
of the time and died early without giving much education or assistance to their 
children” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 5). This suggests that in fact, in spite of their 
Christian background, Kim Il-sung’s parents might not have transmitted Christian 
values to their children as “they did very little” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 53). 
However, after the death of his father, Ryu [Yu] (2009) argues that Kim Il-sung 
was looked after by a Methodist Pastor, Son Jŏng-do. Ryu [Yu] claims that Kim 
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Il-sung regarded him as a benefactor, and for this reason, after the establishment 
of North Korea, continued to involve Protestant leaders in the leadership of the 
country. In fact the first vice-president was a Christian pastor, Kang Yang-uk 
(Dae-young Ryu 2009: 217). In light of the aforementioned, one can only 
speculate on the extent to which Kim Il-sung drew from Christianity to build on 
his own ideological system. It can be argued however that Juche/Kim Il-sungism 
is the product of the history of the Korean peninsula and is a blend of different 
influences: Marxism, Confucianism, shamanism, Shintoism and Christianity. 
When Kim Jong-il took over power, he developed the personality cult. 
Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un 
 
In 1980, Kim Jong-il was appointed successor to his father at the Sixth 
Congress of the Worker’s Party to the Presidium of the Politburo, the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee, and the Military Commission (Cumings 2005 (1997): 
424). The process of succession was carefully prepared and experts identified the 
presence of Kim Jong-il as early as 1973 (Cumings 2005 (1997): 425).  In 1977, a 
booklet published in Japan had also confirmed succession ordering the nation to 
obey unconditionally the son of the great leader and “carry forward the 
uninterrupted revolution and the great revolutionary task of the fatherland 
generation after generation” (Dae-sook Suh 1988: 280). The son is portrayed as 
being both loyal to his father (the leader) and to his family (the nation). Cumings 
quotes a village song from the 1970s to express the relationship between a child 
and his family: 
Silver baby, golden baby, 
Treasure baby from the deepest mountains, 
On the water, sun and moon baby, 
Patriotic baby for the nation, 
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A baby with filial piety for his parents, 
A baby affectionate towards his family and kin (Cumings 2005 (1997): 425). 
Undoubtedly, Kim Jong-il, who was born in the mountain Paektu, comes to 
embody perfectly the child referred to in the song.  Kim Jong-il is presented as a 
‘disciple’ of his father and is also portrayed as a benevolent parent who works 
hard, teaches and loves and cares for his people. A book published in North 
Korea in 1989, entitled The Great Man Kim Jong Il, shows how North Korean 
propaganda describes Kim Jong-il. First the book is divided into different 
sections entitled as follows: devotion; love; trust; servant of the people; our way; 
keen intelligence; boldness. Arguably these virtues are Confucian but some of 
them such as love, trust, devotion and servanthood are also Christian. 
In one of the stories, a young girl working at a TV relay station on top of a 
mountain develops a high fever which no medicine or remedy seems to cure. She 
loses consciousness and her limbs become paralysed. Hearing the news, Kim 
Jong-il sends a helicopter that, in spite of the danger, lands on top of the mountain 
to lift the young girl and take her to hospital:  
She was senseless and her pulse did not throb. The virus which had found its 
way into the brain caused paralysis of her limbs and affected internal organs, 
but strenuous efforts were made to cure the patient. Around this time the 
expensive medicines sent by the dear Comrade Kim Jong Il arrived from 
Pyongyang. The specific medicine bearing his love gave vigour to her body 
... as a result before long she recovered her health and returned to her post on 
the mountaintop. “No one in the world values and loves man as our dear 
Comrade Kim Jong Il does. His love is the elixir of life which brings the 
dead man back to life” the girl said (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 32). 
Some Christians might not help but think of the story of Jesus healing a 
paralysed man. The book is full of similar stories: Kim Jong-il braving the storm 
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or encouraging workers to fill storerooms with fish so that they never go hungry. 
Again these stories echo in one way or the other stories of the Bibles where Jesus 
shows no fear in face of the sea storm and feeds the mass with ten fishes.  
However these stories also aim to discourage North Koreans from protesting 
in the face of hardship. For example, Kim Jong-il is said not to feel the cold 
“They felt uneasy thinking that he must be bitterly cold in his thin short-sleeve 
clothes. However, he went to the next storeroom as if he did not feel the cold at 
all” (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 9). In another passage, Kim Jong-il shows 
that he does not need breakfast: “He scooped a cup of spring water and offered it 
to him politely. The dear Comrade Kim Jong Il said with a smile: ‘drink of water 
helps allay one’s hunger.’ At this the official remembers that he set out without 
taking breakfast and felt a lump in his throat” (Il-bok Li & Sang-hyon Yun 1989: 
15). Kim Jong-il is therefore not only portrayed as a servant leader but also as a 
human being who can endure hardship without complaining and with joy.  
This image of servant leader however is different from that of Jesus as 
presented in the Bible. The Kims are usually presented as brave and victorious 
combatants who are willing to fight against their enemies whereas Jesus is 
presented as the leader who died for his people. Ha explains: “Kim has no 
shepherd image. Maybe the father image resembles that of a shepherd. The caring 
father can replace the loving and caring shepherd. However the concept of 
sacrifice and even death for his flock is not imaginable ... The reality is that North 
Koreans are forced to sacrifice their lives for that of the leaders. The opposite, 
however is not true” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 173). 
Kim Jong-un, the youngest son of Kim Jong-il, was appointed supreme leader 
after the funeral of his father on 28 December 2011. It was argued, and perhaps 
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hoped, that because of the lack of preparation, the succession might engender 
political disunity in the country. However, as early as the 1980s, a Soviet 
diplomat said the following to Bruce Cumings: “a new generation is tied to Kim 
Jong Il’s inheritance and has been brought along with it; he controls all of them 
and their careers, and therefore everything will go smoothly: “You should come 
back in the year 2020 and see Kim Jong Il’s son inherit power” (Cumings 2005 
(1997): 429). This diplomat seems to have predicted accurately relatively smooth 
transfers of power in North Korea. However, the reign of Kim Jong-il was marked 
by natural disasters, famine and consecutive political crisis with South Korea and 
the United States which affected the legitimacy of the leader. It will be interesting 
to see how the future unfolds under the new leader. 
4. Mission strategies to North Korea 
 
Korean Christians, from the North and from the South, have never relinquished 
the hope of evangelising the whole nation. In the aftermath of the Korean War, 
South Koreans had virtually no contact with North Korea. The best way to 
evangelise the North therefore was through the use of radio broadcasting. During 
the Cold War, especially, broadcasting into North Korea was used not only to 
spread the gospel but also to undermine the legitimacy of the North Korean 
government. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, since the 
humanitarian crisis of the 1990s and the flow of North Korean refugees into South 
Korea, evangelicals have developed mission strategies aiming not only at 
evangelising North Koreans but also at addressing their physical needs. 
Broadcasting 
 
Evangelicals were the first religious group to establish radio organisations that 
would broadcast into North Korea. They established two organisations in the 
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1950s and one in the 1970s. These organisations aimed to broadcast the gospel 
into the communist bloc: China, North Korea, the Soviet Union and Mongolia. A 
group of evangelical churches under the umbrella hangiryŏn broadcasted as early 
as October 1954 through the use of the national broadcasting system. According 
to In-chul Kang, archives reveal that in that period of time, 36 people preached 
and the organisation also carried out psychological warfare ten times by including 
political messages in their talks (In-chul Kang 2007: 297-298). In December 
1954, the Christian Broadcasting System (HLKY) was established. The 
organisation used the UN broadcasting system based in Tokyo to broadcast into 
the communist bloc. In 1965, the South Korean government through its ministry 
of culture and public information sent a letter of appreciation to these groups for 
their contribution to society and for their work against communism. This once 
more betrays the close relationship between evangelicals and the South Korean 
conservative governments. 
In December 1956, another Christian broadcasting organisation (national 
broadcasting for the evangelisation of the Republic of Korea or in Korean 
Han’guk pogŭmchŭi pangsong kuk) was established by the organisation TEAM. 
TEAM started in South Korea in 1953 and was established by the American 
Evangelical Alliance Mission which itself began in 1890 in the United States. The 
organisation would broadcast in four languages: English, Korean, Chinese and 
Russian for 19 hours a day. In its constitution, the organisation said that through 
evangelism and messages from the free world, they would fight against 
communism. It changed names several times to be finally renamed Far East 
Broadcasting in March 1979 (Kukdong pangsong) (In-chul Kang 2007: 299-300). 
Far East Broadcasting collaborated with another broadcasting organisation (Asea 
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pangsong) which was founded in June 1973 by the American Far East 
Broadcasting (FEBC). All organisations benefited from the financial and 
technical assistance of American churches. In 2001, Far East Broadcasting and 
Asea pangsong broadcasting merged to become one radio station. In 1971, the 
two organisations held a conference in Los Angeles and agreed that they would 
not cooperate with the World Council of Churches as these organisations were 
and continue to be conservative politically and theologically (In-chul Kang 2007: 
300).  
In September 1995, an American based organisation launched in 1952, Trans-
World-Radio (TWR) established a branch in South Korea: TWR-Korea. They 
broadcast for one hour and a half every day targeting North Koreans and Korean 
Chinese. Since 1995, they have broadcasted into China and North Korea on short-
wave transmitters that are being identified with the Internet application Google 
earth. They want to raise up North Korean Christian leaders through radio 
broadcasting. They hope to supply spiritual food and help North Korean in the 
underground church strengthen their faith. They also want to provide various 
training programmes to Korean Chinese in China to prepare them for mission for 
West China (In-chul Kang 2007: 307-308). 
Contemporary North Korea mission also includes the use of helium balloons 
containing bible verses, anti-North Korea propaganda, US dollars and sometimes 
socks and other material. Fighters for a Free North Korea (in Korean Chayu 
pukhan undong yŏnhap) led by a North Korean defector convert to Christianity, 
Park Sang-hak, have taken the lead in sending helium balloons to the North. 
Missionaries also smuggle Christian material into North Korea through the use of 
memory sticks and other technological devices.  
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Evangelisation of North Koreans in North Korea and internationally 
 
In his book on mission strategy to North Korea, Seok-ryul You says that one 
of the most effective ways to achieve the re-evangelisation of North Korea before 
the reunification is by training missionaries to go undercover into North Korea. 
These missionaries could be highly trained South Korean citizens, ethnic Korean 
Chinese or North Korean defectors. He argues that they should be sent back to 
their hometowns to evangelise their families and friends. According to You, the 
death of Kim Il-sung left a deep void in the heart of North Koreans who had 
based their faith in him. They used to overcome pain, difficulties and hunger 
thanks to him but now that he is gone, they are left with a feeling of emptiness. In 
light of the aforementioned, You argues that they can receive the Gospel easily 
(Seok-ryul You 2011: 291). The process of evangelising refugees in China or 
sending them back to North Korea is highly risky and dangerous and most 
international missionary organisations such as Open Doors will not send refugees 
back but rather work with North Korean Christians inside their home country.  
For the most part, churches in South Korea and missionaries have played an 
important role in helping North Korean refugees integrate into South Korean 
society. Churches and mission organisations have set up networks to help North 
Koreans leave their country and grant them shelter in China and South East Asia. 
In South Korea, they not only address the spiritual needs of North Koreans; they 
also help them deal with their earthly circumstances by providing them with 
various social services and education. Younger generations especially can benefit 
from English language training, vocational training and help entering the South 
Korean education system. The organisation Durihana for example, provides 
North Koreans with education, career advice and so on (Durihana NGO 2009). 
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The organisation Good Seeds (Choŭn ssiat) also provides North Koreans with 
housing, career advice as well as mentoring programmes. It started in 1994 and 
opened the first alternative school for North Koreans, Heavenly Dream School (in 
Korean Hanŭl kkum hakkyo) (Good Seeds NGO 2014). 
Human rights activism 
 
Another critical aspect of evangelical mission to North Korea which is often 
neglected both in secular and Christian literature, is their active involvement in 
North Korea human rights campaigns. Their involvement is not only due to their 
anti-communist/anti-North Korean agenda but is also the result of a genuine 
desire to alleviate suffering in North Korea.  Evangelical organisations and 
churches have thus led South Korean civil society and the international 
community in pursuing justice for North Korea. Many of the North Korea human 
right organisations are faith based as exemplified by the activities of the North 
Korean Freedom Coalition. In 2009, human rights organisations and the North 
Korean Freedom Coalition based in the United States, organised Freedom Week 
in Seoul. The week was dedicated to raising awareness about human rights 
violations in North Korea and establishing new policies. Even though the 
coalition claims that its “members are from all political parties and religious faiths 
and [who] have many different views about North Korea” (North Korean 
Freedom Coalition 2003), the week begins with a Christian prayer vigil and is 
punctuated by other prayer meetings during the course of the week.  
5. Assessing North Korea mission 
 
Methods used to evangelise North Koreans have sometimes been the object of 
criticism. They have been criticised in the international media and have also 
sometimes been condemned by secular human rights organisations. For example, 
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at a conference held in February 2010 in Kyungnam University, the then Asia 
researcher at Human Rights Watch, Kae Seok, accused the South Korean 
organisations of proselytism over human rights and/or humanitarian 
considerations (Kae Seok 2010). In an article published by the New York Times 
in 2007, it was revealed that: “For years, under the leadership of Choi Kwang, a 
hard-driving missionary from South Korea, North Koreans seeking refuge in 
China were taken to apartments where they were put through a rigorous training 
course in Christianity that began daily at 6 a.m. and continued until 10 p.m. 
Before taking breaks for meals, Choi and the North Koreans would embrace and 
pray: ‘Let's spill Jesus's blood in North Korea! Let's become martyrs for North 
Korea!" (Sang-hun Choe 2007). Another article published by the L.A. Times 
revealed how a South Korean American writer rescued a North Korean refugee 
not from the hands of the Chinese police but from the hands of a South Korean 
missionary who was keeping him hostage to raise funds at home (Glionna 2012). 
In light of the impressive number of North Korean converts to Christian 
evangelicalism, a Catholic bishop said: “It must be said that our Protestant 
brothers are very aggressive in their mission and work very hard trying to convert 
North Koreans … We Catholics are however in one sense tougher because we 
want people who choose the Church of Christ to be at peace with themselves and 
fully conscious of their act” (Joseph Li-sun Yun 2011).   
Evangelicals have also criticised some of the methods used in China. In his 
book written in Korean NGOwa hamkke hanŭn sŏngyo (2010), a medical doctor, 
Myung-keun Lee [Myŏnggŭn I], provides several examples of unethical 
behaviours that caused the repatriation of several North Korean refugees to North 
Korea. As Myung-keun Lee himself was overseeing projects to assist North 
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Korean refugees in China, he faced several challenges. For example, a zealous 
missionary tried to discipline North Korean orphans too harshly. Some children 
tried to escape by jumping from the window which attracted the attention of the 
neighbours who called the police. The children were sent back to North Korea 
and the missionary was deported. On another occasion, the doctor received the 
visit of a South Korean pastor who stayed in China for about ten days to teach the 
Bible. Upon his return to South Korea, the pastor shared his story with the media 
which resulted in the repatriation of the refugees involved and the arrest of Dr ’s 
Lee Chinese colleague (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 146-148). In addition, in spite of 
the rhetorical importance given to North Korean refugees by South Korean 
Christians, North Koreans face several challenges in churches. 
For instance, Jung says that “on the diagram of North Korean mission, [North 
Korean refugees] are weighed with the holy God’s calling so that they shall 
‘return’ to their homeland as God’s warriors to enlighten their families and 
neighbours with Christianity and the free market economy even though they are 
located at the bottom of the church hierarchy” (Jin-heon Jung 2011: 23). Kwang-
min Ha also laments in his research the lack of leadership given to North Korean 
refugees in South Korean churches (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 95-96). According to a 
report by the think tank International Crisis Group, the relationship between 
churches and North Korean refugees can sometimes be problematic:  
Financial aid leads some to view churches primarily as a source of money 
rather than spiritual guidance. Kang says he often receives phone calls from 
defectors asking, “how much money does your church give when defectors 
register?” He also points out that some defectors stop attending services once 
the cash stops or they register with several churches at the same time to 
receive multiple benefits. Some churches require a profession of faith and 
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disclosure of past experiences, particularly hardships, in front of the 
congregation. This, Kang contends, is counter-productive and often 
traumatic. Some defectors feel conflicted about religion, since the fervour of 
some churches feels reminiscent of the worship of Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il (ICG  2011: 26).   
In a report prepared for a conference organised by the Sarang community 
church in June 2010, Kwang-min Ha argues that in 2001, 69.8% of the refugees 
who entered South Korea declared to be Christian. In 2007, only 53.8% of the 
same interviewees responded that they were followers of the Christians faith. Ha 
therefore doubts that their faith was genuine in the first place but most 
importantly questions the efficiency of the methods used by missionaries 
(Kwang-min Ha 2010: 44).  
Evangelicals are not only in the process of reassessing their approach with 
North Korean refugees; mission carried out inside North Korea is also being 
revaluated. For example, Myung-keun Lee argues that during the food crisis, 
South Korean churches invested a lot of money in the building of bread factories 
in North Korea. Churches provided everything: from flour to new machinery that 
North Koreans cannot maintain. Myung-keun Lee says that this process 
undermined already existing bread factories. The people no longer wanted to buy 
bread because it was possible to receive a more nutritious and tastier bread 
somewhere else. Myung-keun Lee believes that it would have been more 
effective and less costly to send flour to North Korea and allow the people to use 
it as they pleased (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 158-159).  
Lee makes a similar observation with regard to the building of PUST. He 
explains that for instance, it took eight years for churches in America and South 
Korea to gather the funds necessary for the building of the new university. The 
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aim of the school is to provide a good quality of education and expose students to 
an international environment. Lee argues however that the cooperation between 
the British Council and Kim Il-sung University was more efficient and less 
costly. It did not take as long for the British Council to start its education 
programmes in North Korea and they have made efforts to fit their curriculum 
into the wider North Korean education system whereas PUST was imposed from 
the outside (Myung-keun Lee 2010: 178-180).  
Therefore, some evangelicals have now come to the conclusion that a better 
understanding of the North Korean culture, political and social systems is 
required in order to carry out effective mission to North Korea. They have now 
realised that: 1) mission to North Korea is not the same as domestic mission; 2) 
the fact that North Koreans grow up in a radically different world view means 
that mission to North Korea is cross-cultural. Even though they are not referring 
to the terms cross-cultural missiological principles as such, their desire to study 
the North Korean worldview and to approach mission to North Korea with more 
humility suggests that they are seeking to implement such principles.  Recent 
books published on North Korea mission reflect this desire to understand North 
Korea better (see Kwang-min Ha 2008; Hyun-man Im 2012; Jin-hwan Kim 2012; 
Yeong-sook Im 2011; Byung-ro Kim & Yong-kwan Cho 2012).  
6. Cross-cultural mission to North Korea 
   
Van Rheenen describes cross-culturalism as the “learned skill of relating to 
people of other cultures within the contexts of their culture” (Van Rheenen 1996: 
105). He further argues that cross-culturalists perceive “that cultures have both 
strengths and weaknesses and take other cultures as seriously as their own ... treat 
those of other cultures as equals, just as they would those of their own culture” 
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(Van Rheenen 1996: 106). As argued by Byung-ro Kim, the Christian faith should 
help South Koreans overcome the ideological conflict and heal the wounds from 
the war (Byung-ro Kim 2005: 29). In practice, this means that evangelicals are 
required to express greater respect for the North Korean culture and socio-
political context. However, this does not mean that evangelicals will stop 
challenging human rights violations or the structures that cause North Koreans to 
go hungry. As argued in the introduction of this research, contextualisation means 
that the context will be challenged: “the gospel should be presented in such a way 
that believers in Jesus Christ are both at home in their culture (the indigenous 
principle) and speak prophetically into their context (the pilgrim principle)” (Ott 
et al. 2010: 270). Referring to a statement made by Whiteman (1997), Ott et al.  
(2010) explain further: “When the Gospel is presented in word and deed and the 
fellowship of the believers we call the church is organized along appropriate 
cultural patterns, then people will more likely be confronted with the offense of 
the Gospel, exposing their own sinfulness and the tendency toward evil, 
oppressive cultures and behavior patterns within their culture” (Whiteman 1997 
quoted in Ott et al. 2010: 270). In other words, the transmission of the gospel in a 
way that is respectful of the North Korean culture and worldview will lead North 
Koreans themselves to challenge the structures that cause them to suffer from 
injustice. 
In applying such principles, evangelicals will also avoid pitfalls like 
syncretism. In his dissertation, Kwang-min Ha (2008) says “sharing the gospel 
with North Koreans without acknowledging their worldview may lead to 
syncretism. North Koreans may accept the Christian God while they still believe 
in Kim Il-sung or his ideology” (Kwang-min Ha 2008: 22). Syncretism is not the 
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only cause for concern. There are several challenges that evangelicals must 
overcome when trying to explain Christianity to North Koreans.  
For instance, North Koreans are asked to disassociate Christianity from the 
image of a foreign and hostile power, the United States. As explained in the 
second chapter of this research, North Korean propaganda portrays Christianity as 
the religion of imperialistic America and calls it the religion of the enemy. Many 
of the South Korean churches and organisations that have been providing 
assistance to North Korea have actually done so in an effort to deconstruct this 
negative image. More generally, Juche and the North Korean education system 
and propaganda offer accounts of history that cannot be verified and that are 
severely distorted. It is therefore a process of unlearning and relearning that all 
North Koreans must go through once they have left their country. In fact the more 
educated are more likely to suffer from this, as the more they know, the more 
there is to unlearn. Hyun-man Im says that missionaries must dismantle this 
distorted idea of Christianity (Hyun-man Im 2012: 207). 
However, some evangelicals also propose that the impact of Juche on North 
Koreans can be used in a positive way. For example, Hyun-man Im thinks that 
the necessity to memorise texts, songs and quotes from the leaders mean that 
generally North Koreans are educated and literate. Furthermore, Hyun-man Im 
argues that private companies in South Korea could make greater use of cheap 
labour available under the current North Korean economic system to pave the 
way for greater economic cooperation and development (Hyun-man Im 2012: 
227-228). 
Furthermore, an increasing number of evangelical scholars call for a more 
integrated approach to mission and therefore for a more integrated form of 
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salvation. In the introduction to this research, it was said Korean Protestant 
churches were accused of lacking influence on society because of a limited 
understanding of the term conversion (Joseph Jung 2009).  However, the 
Christian scholar, Moo-yeol Choe (2008) argues the mission of Jesus is not only 
the salvation of individuals but also the liberation of the persecuted and of the 
poor (Moo-Yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 15).  Similarly, Yong-seok Im [Yongsŏk Im] 
(2011) calls not only for the political reunification of the two Koreas but also for 
the reunification of body and mind; politics and society; culture and religion. He 
defines salvation as being a process of holistic transformation  (Yong-seok Im 
2011: 36-37). Im further argues that mission to North Korea is not about planting 
South Korean churches but about understanding the weaknesses of the South 
Korean church and is a process of reformation for both North and South Koreans 
(Yong-seok Im 2011: 74). 
Finally, Joon-sik Park argues that following the example of Anabaptists17; 
Korean evangelicals need to move from an anti-communist position to a 
biblically-based perspective of reconciliation. He also recommends that they 
should move “beyond their evangelistic interest and humanitarian concern toward 
undertaking peacemaking initiatives” (Joon-sik Park 2012: 62). In fact, some 
evangelicals do call for the restoration of relationships (Yong-seok Im 2011: 31-
32) or shalom (Byung-ro Kim 2005: 29).  
Moo-yeol Choe (2008) defines shalom as follows: he says that shalom means 
well-being and peace but that shalom also encompasses other aspects: first, peace 
(p’yŏnghwa) for the family, in society and of the country. Second, he says that 
                                                
17 Anabaptism is a term derived from the Greek meaning ‘rebaptizer’ and used to refer to 16th 
century radical-wing of the reformation (McGrath 2011:465). Mennonites are descendants of such 
a tradition and have become very involved in issues of social justice, peace and reconciliation. 
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shalom also means inner peace (in Korean p’yŏnggang). Third, shalom means 
righteous society (chŏngŭiroun sahoe) which will maintain the peace and the 
inner peace. Fourth, shalom means social order or structure of community, society 
and family (sahoe chilsŏ). Fifth, shalom means that individuals will help each 
other in their weaknesses, filling the gaps of society to make it whole (chŏnch’ 
echŏgin ch’ŭngmyŏnesŏ onchŏnham) (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 14). Choe 
says that shalom should be the goal of every mission (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 
(1999): 15) and that mission should be about both a revival of the kingdom of 
God and a revival for human beings (Moo-yeol Choe 2008 (1999): 20). 
It can be argued that evangelicals who are providing aid to North Korea are 
working toward greater integration and greater unity. In fact, their efforts seek to 
transcend their context—that is a Cold War mentality—as exemplified by a 
statement made by Victor W.C. Hsu in May 2005, at the 4th International NGO 
Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK:  
For the sake of clarifying the issues, let me be polemical and suggest that we 
have become increasingly polarized between supporters and opponents of 
engagement, and the debate has become very intense. In fact, our discourse 
has radicalized because some of us gave [sic] become increasingly vocal, 
arguing not just against engaging in assistance to the DPRK, but actively 
working, not only advocating, for the collapse of the regime. I hasten to note 
that it is not fair to lump all NGOs into only two camps. The pro-
engagement NGOs do not necessarily approve of the DPRK regime. And 
those who are using confrontation tactic do not necessarily seek regime 
change in the DPRK. Their primary motivation is the welfare of North 
Koreans (Victor Hsu 2005: 15).  
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This suggests that some South Korean evangelicals have engaged in a process 
of self-reflection and self-criticism, which includes the willingness to engage in 
dialogue with those who share a different view of the world and that of integrating 
new perspectives. They are willing to engage with the North Korean culture to 
bring about meaningful change. 
7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter argued that in spite of a persistent anti-North Korea agenda, some 
evangelicals have engaged into a process of revaluation of their attitude toward North 
Korea and that of mission strategy. In doing so, they are increasingly trying to 
understand Juche as a religion rather than an ideology. This chapter paid attention to 
the spiritual context within which South Korean evangelicals operate. The next 
chapter will analyse the socio-political context. 
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Chapter 6: Civil society and the South and North Korean 
states 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the political and social structures that 
determine and condition the activity of civil society and therefore, Korean 
Christian organisations, in the North and in the South. Scholars around the world 
and especially in South Korea have analysed extensively the development of a 
civil society in the Republic of Korea and its role in the democratisation of the 
country (Hy-sop Lim 2000; Woong-jae Ryoo 2009; Armstrong 2002).   
Korean civil society has been described as being “contentious and politically 
polarized” (Sook- jong Lee & Arrington 2008: 76) with the success of their 
activities depending on the “political environment in which they are undertaken” 
(Richardson 2008: 170). Korea is still deeply rooted in Confucian ideology.  
Steinberg and Shin (2005) believe that the “population as a whole is socially 
Confucian” and that Confucianism continues to affect the democratisation of the 
Korean peninsula (Steinberg & Myung Shin 2005: 4). It will be argued however 
that civil society in South Korea very much depends on the “political 
configurations” of the state rather than on “cultural predilections” (Glasius, Lewis 
& Seckinelgin 2004: 10) and that Confucian traditions have had limited impact on 
the development of civil society and on its relationship with the South Korean 
state. Since the foundation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, successive 
South Korean Presidents have used the existence of North Korea as a political tool 
to repress, promote and/or control South Korean civil society.  
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In spite of a rapid development of civil society after the democratisation of 
South Korea in 1988, civil society continues to suffer from the sequels of military 
dictatorship. Political corruption and the increasing gap between rich and poor 
have negatively affected the level of confidence of Korean people in political 
institutions (Jong-sung You 2005) and “weakened social cohesion” (Cheon-sik 
Woo, Tae-jong Kim & Won-ho Jang 2007: 8). The absence of a peace agreement 
with North Korea combined with a Cold War mentality have arguably been 
feeding feelings of distrust and division in South Korea.  
This chapter will proceed in the following manner. First, it will look at a 
definition of civil society in the context of the development of civil society in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) since 1948. Second, it will examine issues currently 
affecting the relationship between the South Korean state and civil society. Third, 
it will be argued that South Korean Presidents have used civil society, particularly 
humanitarian NGOs, as a political tool to implement their policies towards North 
Korea. 
The second part of this chapter will be dedicated to North Korea: the 
mechanisms of the food crisis and social changes induced by the famine. Finally, 
it will identify the pros and the cons that define the dilemma of humanitarian aid 
to North Korea. In doing so, it will also examine some of the challenges 
experienced by the international community and South Korean organisations as 
they attempt to operate in a very controlling state.  
2. Defining civil society 
Defining civil society remains a subject of debate among academics, NGOs 
and policy makers. In the NGO world, the term often refers to “the arena of 
voluntary-uncoerced-collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
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values… Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power” 
(Pouligny 2005: 497). According to the UNDP, civil society is the sphere which 
serves as an intersection between the state and the market and which is 
determinant to the healthy functioning of democratic state (Soesatro 1999).  
In a study of civil society in post-socialist countries, David Lane (2006) 
identifies three theoretical approaches to civil society. Firstly, he refers to the 
most generic definition provided by civil society theorists who say that civil 
society is the group of autonomous associations who act as intermediates between 
individuals, primary groups (family) and the political authority (state). However, 
says Lane, sociologists claim that modern society has created different spheres of 
social life, which include culture, education, mass media etc. and that each group 
interacts and influences another, thus creating a strong network of 
interdependence. Finally, Lane gives an historical perspective of civil society 
taking into account the ideas of critical theorists. Critical theorists such as 
Marxists claim that civil society is the product of the bourgeoisie and is therefore 
not autonomous because it is dependent on that particular class. According to 
Gramsci, civil society is the space where ideology can be created and constitutes a 
vital element in the process of reaching consensus and the legitimisation of power. 
Thus, the rise in power of a particular group is based on consensus rather than 
coercion. For critical theorists, political economy prevails over other aspects of 
society, which implies a hierarchical relationship of the different units rather than 
a horizontal one, as it is the case with sociological interpretations (Lane 2006). 
Further embedded in that problematic scenario is the question of the role of 
civil society with regards to the state. Foley and Edwards (1996) distinguish two 
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different approaches: a civil society which works together with the state to 
enhance it and a civil society that opposes the state. The first version of civil 
society is based on Alexis de Toqueville’s “Democracy in America’s” definition 
whereas Whaites (1996) promotes the idea that “civil society (in contrast to 
traditional society) is a defensive counterbalance to the increased capabilities of 
the modern state. It provides the realm in which society interacts constructively 
with the state, not to subvert and destroy it, but to refine the state’s actions and 
improve its efficiency” (Whaites 1996: 241). Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, 
while establishing strategies to counter the communist regime in Poland in the 
1980s, formulated another version of this. Their definition emphasises the 
importance of complete independence of civil society from the state precisely 
because the role of civil society is to oppose resistance to the state (Foley & 
Edwards 1996: 38).  
Other areas of discord are often due to the fact that theorists are unable to 
decide whether civil society should be completely autonomous from the state and 
the market, or whether it should function in cooperation with the other spheres, 
and if so, how and to what extent? Finally, the question is also related to other 
theoretical debates such as when and how to draw the line between what is and is 
not political. Therefore, adherence to a particular theory of international relations 
may also determine perceptions of what civil society should be or is.  
 In a critique of current literature of NGOs and civil society, Claire Mercer 
(2002) claims that a neo-liberal/Anglophone perspective on development 
inadequately reflects the realities of the different cultures of developing countries 
(Mercer 2002: 6). In an East Asian context, the idea of a society that opposes the 
state is especially challenged by the pervasive influence of Confucian traditions 
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whereby family, society and state function in the same way, they are the “smaller 
and larger versions of the same kind of relationships: they are related as 
microcosm and macrocosm, not antagonists” (Weller 2005: 6). Weller says since 
there is no antagonistic view of state versus society therefore, it is possible for a 
so-called civil society to work alongside an authoritarian state without ever 
threatening its existence (Weller 2005: 8). In China, for example, civil society can 
take different forms. Hadi Soesastro (1999) explains that Chinese organisations 
can be typically Chinese in the sense that they can be half official and half un-
official, which indicate that a state-led civil society is predominant in China 
(Soesatro 1999).  
It will be argued below that civil society in the Republic of Korea resisted 
actively the consecutive authoritarian governments. In fact as argued previously, 
Koreans had already fought courageously against the colonisation of their nation 
by Japan.  Samuel Kim (2006) argues that as the movement for independence was 
not unified, it left the country even more fragmented: “except for the negative 
anti-Japanese identity that was shared by all, the nationalist exiles returned home 
with a set of mutually competing foreign sources of legitimacy: the groups were 
in varying degrees, Americanized, Russianized, Sinicized, Communized, or 
Christianized” (Samuel Kim 2006: 8).  However, this also means that Koreans 
were creative in thinking and were ready to advocate for their rights and 
independence.  
3.Civil Society and the South Korean state 
 
The development of civil society 
 
In the case of South Korea, scholars have generally opted for a critical theory 
analysis of civil society development and their argument will be summarised 
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below. However, the ideas of Cumings (2002) and Woong-jae Ryoo (2009) will 
be presented as a theory as other scholars such as Clark (2007) and Duncan (2002) 
have challenged their analysis. First, as mentioned in the first two chapters of this 
dissertation, Christianity and faith-based organisations have been very active in 
the public sphere in the course of the twentieth century. This research has 
highlighted the political nature of Korean evangelicalism. However, as noted by 
Clark (2007), it is also worth mentioning the Church’s “determination to set its 
own moral and social agenda as an institution of civil society” (Clark 2007 
(2002): 178). As such, Clark argues that Protestant Christianity developed 
dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s by developing mainly “non-political 
expressions” and advertising a “variety of messages … so that there was truly 
something for everyone” (Clark 2007 (2002): 183). Thus, together with the 
growth of the Church, came the proliferations of education institutions promoting 
literacy and education as well as publishing houses, newspapers and broadcasting 
organisations (Clark 2007 (2002): 184). These churches and organisations have 
been active civil society organisations without necessarily being political or 
confrontational of the South or North Korean state. 
Second, in an article entitled “The problematic modernity of Confucianism” 
John Duncan (2002) questions the relevance of using Western models and 
Western experiences to understand the emergence of civil society in Korea 
(Duncan 2002). Duncan (2002) also challenges the belief that Confucian 
traditions contributed to the democratisation of Korea. Some scholars have 
explored the idea that the Confucian mechanism of checks and balances offered a 
valid alternative to Western style democracies. For example, Duncan refers to 
Cho Hein (1997) who argues that, in Chosŏn, the court of intellectuals—the 
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literati—sought to control the power of the sovereign and supported the idea of a 
weak ruler. The literati were self-appointed guardians of the people and of moral 
values. According to Cho Hein, the authoritarianism and military rule, which 
characterised the governments of Korea between 1948 and 1987, were in fact 
reminiscent of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). In his analysis, 
Duncan concedes that whereas there are elements of Confucianism that are not 
incompatible with democracy, such as the rejection of military rule, he dismisses 
the idea that democracy in Korea is the product of some sort of “congruence 
between Confucianism and the Enlightenment” (Duncan 2002: 53). Duncan 
argues that “the best way to establish the possibility of some sort of Korean 
equivalent to ‘civil society’ or the ‘public sphere’ is to demonstrate that there was 
in the Chosŏn some process of social differentiation analogous to that which took 
place with the rise of market economy in Western Europe, a process that both 
levelled status differences and provided individuals with independent livelihoods 
that were not dependent on political power and patronage” (Duncan 2002:52). It is 
impossible within the scope of this research to analyse these issues further, 
however, this chapter will support the argument that the Confucian emphasis on 
education has produced generations of intellectual elites who took the lead in 
fighting for human rights and promoting democracy in South Korea and that is 
why it will highlight their role in a critical analysis of the rise of civil society in 
Korea.  
It was the educated—university students and university graduates—who 
initiated movements of dissent and supported workers’ rights in the times of rapid 
industrialisation of the South (Sang-jin Han 1998: 302). Bruce Cumings (2002) 
and Woong-jae Ryoo (2009) concur with that analysis and take further the 
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argument of critical theorists. In separate studies of the South Korean civil 
society, they refer specifically to the writings of Habermas on the emergence of 
capitalism and the consequent developments of a public sphere and a bourgeoisie 
in seventeenth and eighteenth century Western Europe. The bourgeoisie—the 
middle class—has been historically referred to as the rebelling class, independent 
from the state and representative of the civil society.  The dissemination of 
newspapers and increasing means of mass-communications facilitated the growth 
of capitalism and the rise in power of the bourgeoisie (Cumings 2002; Woong-jae 
Ryoo 2009). However, Cumings says that Habermas quickly recognised that this 
kind of civil society was limited in time and space, and civil society eventually 
became what it is today: a space “for competition between plural interests who 
negotiate and compromise among themselves and with government officials, 
while excluding the public from their proceedings” (Cumings 2002: 22). Cumings 
and Ryoo argue that contrary to the Western European bourgeoisie of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the South Korean bourgeoisie has never 
acquired nor desired the ‘hegemonic influence’ of the elite middle-class described 
by Habermas. The South Korean bourgeoisie is in fact a direct product of the rise 
of capitalism under authoritarian regimes and “has historically demonstrated little 
capacity or willingness to look beyond its own narrowly defined class interests 
and envision a capitalism that genuinely embraces and accommodates the working 
class” (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 28). The South Korean bourgeoisie was born as a 
result of the modernisation of the state under Japanese rule, which for the most 
part dismantled the traditional Confucian Korean political system. Thus, the 
bourgeoisie supported authoritarian governments because they favoured economic 
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growth and in spite of a growing political influence, has remained distant from the 
concerns of the average citizen (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 29). 
Therefore, Cumings (2002) argues that the development of modern day civil 
society in South Korea can be found in a “site of conflict”: in the fight for 
independence and the struggle for democracy (Cumings 2002: 25). Cumings 
argued that students actively engaged in the more unstable political periods of the 
twentieth century: in the process of liberation of the 1940s, in the toppling of the 
Rhee regime and the transition to the Second Republic. During the Second 
Republic established after Syngman Rhee, from April 1960 to May 1961, civil 
society flourished with the expansion of the media industry and a remarkable 
number of university students (Cumings 2002: 25). 
 Students and workers also actively engaged in the resistance to the Park and 
Chun dictatorship and used minjung ideology to convey new political and social 
messages within South Korean society (Cumings 2002: 32).  Equally, protesters in 
the 1980s were not from the bourgeoisie but were students, workers, and members 
of a disillusioned middle-class (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 29). 
South Korean civil society was severely repressed under the military 
dictatorships, but rapidly developed after the democratic transition of 1987. 
Modern day South Korean civil society emerged from the civic movements that 
brought about democracy in the eighties and more especially the student and the 
media-related movements (Woong-jae Ryoo 2009: 34). These organisations are 
torchbearers of democracy in South Korea, they are mostly engaged in domestic 
issues such as policy reforms, social justice, civic and labour rights, immigration 
and so on. Some of them are also strongly involved in the promotion of civil 
society and democracy throughout the rest of Asia with the notable exception of 
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North Korea. Other organisations are involved in international affairs: 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea or other developing countries, and human 
rights activism towards North Korea. North Korean defectors often manage the 
latter. 
Contemporary civil society 
 
In his book, The Other Cold War (2010), Heonik Kwon argues that the 
establishment of a Cold War order resulted from the process of decolonisation. 
Thus, the experience of Cold War was different for the postcolonial world where 
societies and families were torn apart violently. According to Kwon, research 
suggests that such historical developments continue to affect “interpersonal 
relations and communal lives” in countries that were torn apart by civil war such 
as Korea (Heonik Kwon 2010: 113). Consequently, in post-war South Korea 
many families were denied the right to mourn the loss of their loved ones who had 
been killed for adhering to socialist ideals. After democratisation, civic rights 
groups reclaimed the right to grieve the dead and in 2005, an investigation was 
launched into the massacre of an estimated two to three hundred thousand 
civilians, allegedly communist sympathisers, that took place in the early stages of 
the war (Heonik Kwon 2010: 105-113).  Kwon argues that since the end of the 
Cold War, “the state can no longer base its legitimacy on its role in safeguarding 
the political community against external threats only. The displacement of the 
state from the dualist geopolitical structure forces it to build an alternative 
legitimacy in an active, constructive engagement with the civil society” (Giddens 
(1994) paraphrased in Heonik Kwon 2010: 116). The section below will 
demonstrate that the South Korean state has not yet been able to fully engage 
constructively with civil society.  
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Since 1988, the number of civil society organisations has been growing and 
consecutive governments have been cooperating more closely with civil society. 
Prominent leaders of civic movements engaged in politics and the formal 
distinction between state and civil society became blurred. Some began to work in 
the local assemblies or the National Assembly, others in political parties or the 
Blue House. Under Kim Young-sam, the government started to cooperate even 
more actively with civil society. The relationship between civil society and the 
state further developed under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) (in Korean ch’amyŏ yŏndae) and 
the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), two major organisations, 
expanded the scope of their activities to issues that had been neglected in the past, 
such as reunification with North Korea (Eui-young Kim 2009: 876).  
In 2000, in the run up to the Presidential elections, the PSPD, together with 
other NGOs, launched a “blacklist campaign” of 86 candidates allegedly unfit for 
the position because of their previous involvement in antidemocratic activities, 
corruption, suspicious financial activities and so on. For the most part, the 
campaign was described as a success and received the support of the Korean 
population. Nevertheless, opponents to the campaign accused the organisations of 
impartiality and of violating electoral laws. For example, most of the blacklisted 
candidates were in fact members of the opposition i.e. the conservative party (Eui-
young Kim 2009: 887). The conservatives therefore requested the resignation of 
pro Kim Dae-jung leaders of the organisations and drew attention to Kim Dae-
jung’s financial assistance to the organisations — 192.5 billion won 
($17.5 million) between 1998 and 2000 (Eui-hang Shin 2003: 705). Many 
criticised the NGOs for failing to fairly criticise the government and for “lacking 
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expertise” (Eui-young Kim 2008: 311). Even though the two NGOs consequently 
refused to receive financial assistance from the government (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 
297), Eui-young Kim (2008) argues that since 2000, the popularity of the PSPD 
and of the CCEJ has been in “steady decline” (Eui-young Kim 2008: 309).  
The government is still wary of organisations’ pursuit of self-interests and has 
the power to dissolve an organisation if it goes against perceived public interests 
(Jun-ki Kim 2003: 196). In order to gain access to certain benefits, such as the 
ability to raise funds, a non-profit organisation (NPO) must register with the 
government but the government has the authority to reject an application for 
registration (Bidet 2002: 135). Article 32 of the Civil Code, which was passed in 
1958, provides for the “incorporation, operation and liquidation” of non-profit 
organisations and states that “an association or foundation engaged in scholarly 
work, religion, charity, social interaction or otherwise nonprofit activities may be 
made a legal person subject to the approval of relevant ministries”. Article 39 
grants the government the right to dissolve an organisation “engaged in acts 
detrimental to public interests”. In 1975, the Act concerning Incorporation and 
Operation of Public Interest Organisation (the PIO Act) was enacted to govern 
further organisations established to “serve public interest in areas of charitable 
activities”  (Jun-ki Kim 2003: 17). Kyoung-ryung Seong (2000) argues that one of 
the weaknesses of Korean civil society is that it suffers from an “excess of self-
interests” and conflict thereof which CSOs are unable to solve by themselves and 
require mediation by the state (Kyoung-ryung Seong 2000: 101). CSOs in fact do 
not have experience in conflict resolution and suffer from the absence of 
mediators that all parties can trust (Cheon-sik Woo, Tae-jong Kim & Won-ho 
Jang 2007: 12). 
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The years of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2008) 
The coming into power of President Kim Dae-jung in 1998 brought about 
significant changes in the relations between the two Koreas. Kim Dae-jung 
pursued a policy of engagement with the North called the Sunshine Policy. 
Through the policy, President Kim sought to establish reconciliation and peace 
through economic cooperation and greater interactions. As argued previously, he 
promoted peaceful coexistence as opposed to reunification. The policy was based 
on three principles: the first principle is that the South would not tolerate any 
military provocation or threat by North Korea. The second principle was based on 
“flexible dualism” establishing new terms of economic engagement: “Easy tasks 
first, and difficult tasks later”; “Economy first, politics later”; “Non- 
governmental organisations first, government later”; “Give first, and take later.” 
The third principle emphasised the importance of a strong military deterrence 
(Chung –in Moon 2000: 7-8).  
In 1999, the government established the “Office of Civic Cooperation in the 
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) to 
support the activities of NGOs” (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 281). The government 
wanted to partner with CSOs in the governance of the country. As a result the 
CSOs requested financial compensation from the government in exchange for 
their expertise and cooperation—because of the small numbers of supporters, 
many NGOs’ financial situation have been and remain a subject of concern. In 
response to the NGOs’ request, the National Assembly adopted in 2000 the Act of 
Assistance for Nonprofit Civil Organisations (AANPCO). Whilst the aim of the 
act was to contribute to the rise of their activities, NPOs must fulfil a certain 
number of criteria before they can gain government support. For instance, an 
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organisation must meet the required minimum number of 100 members before it 
applies for government assistance; the organisation is also prohibited from 
supporting a political party or promoting a religious ideology (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 
286). According to the Asian Institute for Civil Society Movement (1998), 
funding for NGOs comes, from the largest part, from membership fees and 
donations (41.2 %) and the second largest share comes from the government 
(14.8%) (Pan-suk Kim 2002: 293). However, with the successive financial crises 
and decline of public trust in the third sector, NGOs came to rely increasingly on 
government’s financial assistance. The danger, says Kim, is that the government 
could favour certain NGOs activities over others, the latter being those who would 
work against the government’s policy lines. For instance, NGO service providers 
were more likely to benefit from government assistance than advocacy NGOs. 
Equally, the governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun financed and even 
took control of the South Korean NGO aid programme to North Korea through 
the Non-Profit Private Organization Support Act (January 2000) as well as the 
Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund that granted funding to NGOs operating in North 
Korea (Gory 2008: 193). 
In doing so, the successive governments took the lead in creating networks and 
ensuring greater homogeneity in the humanitarian assistance. In the beginning, NGOs 
were working independently of one another but with the implementation of the 
Sunshine Policy and the subsequent development of a North Korea aid programme, 
NGOs were made to cooperate more closely with the government. One of the major 
contributions of state interference in NGOs’ assistance to North Korea was the 
recognition of the need for consistency in the process of alleviating hunger in North 
Korea. Paradoxically, greater cooperation and consistency also engendered greater 
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competition. However, the successive South Korean Presidents also used and 
manipulated organisations providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea to fit 
their own political agenda and strengthen their North Korea policies. As examined in 
the third chapter, under the Kim Young-sam government, NGOs were not permitted 
to provide aid directly to North Korea. Kim Young-sam feared that the channel of aid 
through non-state actors could undermine his policy towards North Korea. NGOs had 
to request permission from the Ministry of Unification before sending aid to the 
North and it could only be channelled through the Red Cross (Gory 2008: 108-109). 
In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung adopted new measures so that NGOs would no 
longer need to go through the Red Cross to provide aid to North Korea and in April 
1998, two leaders from the Korean Sharing Movement were allowed to visit North 
Korea. The Kim administration also facilitated fundraising activities and expanded 
the scope of aid items to include fertiliser and farming machinery (Gory 2008: 119-
120). 
 In October 1999, the Unification Ministry said that NGOs providing 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea were soon to benefit from subsidisation from 
the state and an Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund was established in 2000 (Gory 2008: 
122). The South Korean government took the lead in providing rice and fertiliser to 
North Korea while NGOs were required to provide development assistance (Gory 
2008: 128).  The Korean government monitored closely the activities of civil society 
groups through the creation of strict registration measures to enter the North Korea 
aid programme.  
In his research on the level of independence of South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs, Gory (2008) concludes that President Kim designed strict registration 
criteria to the North Korea aid programme to control and monitor the activities of 
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CSOs in North Korea and ensure that they were in line with his policy of 
engagement. Gory further contends that NGOs played the “role of policy backstop” 
to the government’s policy which means that NGOs would act as an interface 
between the Korean governments when relations were strained. In addition to that 
role, Gory affirms that NGOs helped “institutionalize the engagement policy 
towards North Korea through the conduct of sustained assistance programmes” 
(Gory 2008: 278).  
In the meantime, North Korean human rights organisations sought financial 
assistance in the West (mostly the United States and Europe) and saw the scope of 
their activities and freedom of movement restricted. Presidents such as Kim Dae-
jung and Roo Moo-hyun remained silent on both the question of human rights 
violations in the North as well as the failure of the North Korean state to 
implement democracy. Thus, their governments were very supportive of the NGO 
work in North Korea while restricting the freedoms of North Korean human rights 
activists including defectors. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to comment 
further on South Korean state control over the segment of civil society that deals 
with North Korean human rights organisations however it is worth mentioning 
that between the years 1998 and 2008, the Presidents curtailed the rights of many 
North Korean human rights activists especially North Korean defectors because 
the latter challenged the legitimacy of the Sunshine Policy. North Korean 
defectors have reported incidents of intimidation by the South Korean National 
Police and research into their personal lives; restriction on freedom of movement 
(refrained from sending balloons across the DMZ or prohibition for the, now late, 
high-ranking defector Hwang Jang-yop from leaving the country); restriction on 
freedom of speech to report human rights violations in North Korea; restriction on 
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freedom of the press (including the prohibition of broadcasting human rights 
documentaries); restriction on freedom of assembly in certain buildings 
(impossibility to hold human rights conferences in hotels supportive of the 
government’s policy) and so on. In fact the South Korean liberal governments 
argued that the provision of food aid helped protect the human rights of North 
Koreans. Their policy was the following: 
[W]e should work on a more fundamental remedy, to help North Korea as a 
state, to walk out on its own from the current situation, and on [sic.] the long 
term, to prevent any more displaced occurring. Thus, this again concludes to 
the absolute importance of humanitarian assistance. On that account, we can 
conclude that, when discussing human rights of North Korean displaced 
people, it is compulsory to be willing to give humanitarian aid to North 
Korea, so that there would not be more displaced people. With such needs 
coming to reality, we all will certainly contribute to the settlement of peace 
(rights to peace) on the Korean peninsula (Kyung-seo Park 2005: 25). 
 
The progressive Presidents were severely criticised both at home and 
internationally for refusing to address the question of human rights with the North 
Korean authorities. However, it can be argued that their policies of engagement, 
albeit flawed, achieved greater results in terms of relations with North Korea as 
exemplified by the establishment of the industrial complex, Kaesong.  
 Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) 
 
Soon after he came into power in February 2008, Lee Myung-bak was 
severely criticised for his attempts to interfere with freedom of assembly, freedom 
of the press/media (including the independent film-making industry), freedom of 
speech, freedom of thought and so on (Situation of Freedom of Expression in 
Korea and the use of UN procedures International Workshop 2009). Lee Myung-
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bak also sought to restrict the right to establish trade unions and exerted pressure 
on existing trade unions. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and 
Reporters Without Borders (RWB) condemned him for his excessive interference 
in the appointment of key executives of broadcasting companies. South Korea 
was placed on the list of “countries under surveillance” by RWB for scrutinizing 
on-line news content and the arrest of a young blogger Minerva amongst other 
things (Reporters Without Borders 2010). Amnesty International also condemned 
the South Korean administration for excessive use of the force and arbitrary 
arrests of peaceful protesters who demonstrated against government policies 
between 25 May and 10 July 2008 (Amnesty International 2008). Unlike his 
predecessors, Lee Myung-bak did not attempt to prevent North Korea human 
rights activists to exercise their right to criticise the North Korean government and 
there was an increasing number of North Korea human rights related events taking 
place in the South. However, National Security agents attended these events and 
monitored their activity.  
Lee Myung-bak also challenged the validity of the inter-Korean agreements 
made under the engagement policies of his predecessors and took a tougher stand 
towards North Korea. South Korea’s official position with regards to 
humanitarian assistance was as follows: 
First, provision of humanitarian aid in parallel with the universal standard 
of humanitarianism and fraternity is essential. Second, South Korea will 
directly assist the North instead of using international agencies, while 
strengthening transparency in distribution on behalf of those North Korean 
citizens in need. Along with this, the South Korean Government will 
review whether to respond positively, upon official request of humanitarian 
assistance from the North. Third, national consensus regarding the severity 
of food shortage or natural disaster will be weighed considerably in 
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deciding food aid delivery. Fourth, in response to receiving South Korea's 
humanitarian assistance, the North should be willing to resolve South 
Korea's humanitarian concern for separated families reunion and returning 
of abductees and prisoners from the Korean War (Hyeong- jung Park 2009: 
153). 
 Whereas President Lee Myung-bak did not make any changes to the laws 
regulating the North Korea aid programme, he nonetheless instructed the Ministry 
of Unification to suspend partially the projects in place. The government also 
withdrew the government’s financial support. In 2009, out of the 54 organisations 
registered with the North Korea aid programme, only six organisations benefited 
from state funding. The administration wanted to provide aid in compensation for 
North Korea’s efforts in the process of denuclearisation. Jong-moo Lee from the 
Korean Sharing Movement said in 2009: “The current situation is reminiscent of 
the times of the YS [Kim Young-sam] administration. Not only has the 
administration reduced the support to NGO activities with matching funds from 
the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, but also it has made civil aid activities wither 
by allowing NGO visits and sending aid materials to the North on a selective basis” 
(Jong-moo Lee 2009: 123). In February 2013, the new South Korea President 
took office. Park Geun-hye, daughter of Park Chung-hee, has vouched to re-
establish a relation of trust with North Korea, trustpolitik. She has also said that 
she would no longer link humanitarian aid to politics and therefore has allowed a 
limited number of aid shipments to North Korea. However, 2013 has been marked 
by high tensions between the two nations. Furthermore, the question of whether to 
provide food aid to North Korea has always been a contentious issue as the North 
Korean government is recognised as being responsible for the famine of the 1990s 
and now for issues of food security in the country. 
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4. North Korea and the food crisis 
 
Food security and the famine 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, in the 1990s, North Korea went through a 
famine which forced the country to call the international community for aid and to 
open its doors to foreign agencies. Even though the famine is believed to have 
been most acute between the years 1990 and 2001, Schwekendiek (2011) argues 
that surveys conducted in 1987 already indicated severe rates of malnutrition in 
children: “the nutritional stress was already quite considerable before the collapse 
of the Eastern Bloc, and also contradicts the government’s explanation that the 
natural disasters of the 1990s caused the famine” (Schwekendiek 2011: 59). 
Actually the north of the peninsula is rich in natural resources whereas the south 
has traditionally been the bastion of agricultural production. Thus, after the 
division of the country, Schwekendiek (2011) argues that the north struggled to 
feed its population because only 16% of the land is arable: “[b]ecause of its 
mountainous terrain, it has only 16 percent arable land being a natural and 
insuperable obstacle to produce sufficient food even under excellent weather 
conditions and massive utilization of fertilizers” (Schwekendiek 2011: 117). But 
geographical conditions alone cannot explain why North Koreans have been 
suffering from famine, malnutrition and food shortages. Food is indeed an 
important component of the North Korean propaganda. Kim Il-sung himself 
promised in October 1962 at the third session of the Third Supreme People’s 
Assembly that every household would be enabled to eat a hot bowl of rice and 
beef soup at every meal after the completion of the seven-year development plan 
(French 2007: 27). As the North Korean leaders and his government took 
responsibility for the well being of their citizens, North Koreans should have been 
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granted access to food unconditionally and unlimitedly. The reality however is 
very different. There is no food security in North Korea. According to a definition 
given by the 1996 World Food Summit, “food security exists when all people, at 
all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (Ireson 2013: 101). This means that even when there is food available, all 
citizens should have the financial means to purchase it and the food should also be 
physically accessible to everyone. The role of the government in ensuring 
availability and accessibility is therefore crucial in order to guarantee food 
security. However because of the undemocratic structures of the North Korean 
system and society, people go hungry.  
In modern times, famines do not occur in democracies as argued by Amartya 
Sen (1999): 
Authoritarian rulers, who are themselves rarely affected by famines (or 
other such economic calamities), tend to lack the incentive to take timely 
preventive measures. Democratic governments, in contrast, have to win 
elections and face public criticism, and have strong incentives to undertake 
measures to avert such famines and other such catastrophes—be it 
economically rich (as in contemporary Western Europe or North America) 
or relatively poor (as in post independence India, or Botswana, or 
Zimbabwe) (Sen 1999: 16). 
Furthermore, to ensure food security, the government would have to undertake 
reforms and open the country to trade and investment which they refuse to do as 
they are worried that reforms and opening of the country would lead to its 
collapse. Instead, in accordance with its ideological system, North Korea strives 
to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. Schwekendiek (2011) argues that even 
during the Cold War, North Korea could have compensated for its lack of arable 
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land by selling its natural resources which include tungsten, magnesite, gold, 
copper and coal to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
which was the cooperation system established by the Communist states during the 
Cold War. Kim Il-sung however refused to engage in such trade probably because 
Japan had exploited such resources in colonial times and used them during the 
war against the United States. Schwekendiek believes that Kim Il-sung wanted to 
use the resources for the development of North Korea itself (Schwekendiek 2011: 
117-118).  
Exactly how many people died during the years of famine is not known. 
According to Andrei Lankov (2013), there have been two major studies conducted 
thus far that have attempted to estimate the number of deaths accurately: research 
conducted by Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West in 2001 estimated that between 
600,000 and one million people died between 1995 and 2000. In 2011, the 
scholars (together with Peter Johnson) revised their numbers downward to 
490,000. In 2010, Pak Keong-suk estimated that 880,000 people died between 
1993 and 2008 (Lankov 2013: 79). 
Agricultural development: issues and obstacles 
 
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the North Korean government emphasised 
industrial development and agricultural production. According to Ireson (2013), 
scientists in North Korea developed rice and maize varieties that “were high 
yielding18 and responsive to fertilizer input” (Ireson 2013: 105). In spite of the 
rhetoric, North Korea always relied on the import of fuel and fertiliser from the 
Soviet Bloc. In 1987, Russia began to reduce its aid and price support. In 1990, as 
                                                
18 Crop yield is the yield of a crop per unit area of land cultivation and the seed generation of the 
plant itself. 
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Moscow was in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, 
it began to ask North Korea to pay for its imports at world market price. China 
briefly compensated for the loss but in the mid-1990s, also began to demand cash 
payment. As a result, North Korea could no longer purchase the energy and other 
essential elements to maintain agricultural production (Manyin 2013: 135). As 
Ireson (2013) points out, the problem is not that North Korea farming is energy 
intensive (all modern farming is) but that North Korea was and is no longer able 
to pay the price for the energy it needs (Ireson 2013: 106).  
The weather furthermore exacerbated the crisis because of terrace fields. 
Reportedly an idea of Kim Il-sung, terrace fields have increased soil erosion and 
have rendered plains more vulnerable to heavy rains (Lankov 2013: 78). The 
North Korean government blamed natural catastrophes (floods in 1995 and 1996 
followed by a drought in 1997) for the food crisis but it is arguably the 
government’s inability and refusal to import fuel and fertiliser that triggered the 
crisis.  
Dysfunctional Public Distribution System 
 
Since the quasi-collapse of its economy in the early 1990s, the PDS has been 
dysfunctional for various reasons. Furthermore, the system has never secured the 
distribution of food equally as the quotas for rations are dependent on a person’s 
ranking or class in the North Korean society.  In chapter two, we saw that the 
establishment of a class system in North Korea, determined the allocation of food 
rations. Thus with the crisis, whatever food available was distributed to people in 
accordance with their political importance (Natsios paraphrased in Ireson 2013: 
108). 
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According to the original system, farmers were made to provide a portion of 
their production to the government and reallocate the surplus to urban areas but 
since the famine of the 1990s, in addition to the obstacles mentioned above, they 
have shown increasing reluctance to send their production to the PDS and have 
been reselling part of their production illegally on farmer markets (chang 
madang). Their increasing reluctance to work on cooperative farms and to supply 
goods for the national distribution also contributed to the dysfunction of the PDS 
(Natsios 2001: 91). One way to motivate farmers to sell their production to the 
state again and to allow them to make a profit which they could reinvest in future 
production would be for the state to buy production at market price, however the 
North Korean government persists in freezing their prices at a much lower rate as 
Ireson explains: 
A farm that at some point produces a grain surplus is now either forced to 
sell that surplus to the state at a small fraction of its market value, or, if it 
evades the regulation, it is still unable to use a market-based profit to 
purchase seed, spare parts, or fertilizer that could be used to further increase 
production the following year. The same situation holds for industrial 
enterprises producing farm supplies if they cannot sell them at a cost 
commensurate with the production costs and secure raw materials in the 
same manner. Until these obstacles are removed, any aid, development 
loans, or investment in either the DPRK agriculture or industrial sectors will 
be unsustainable (Ireson 2013: 123). 
 Because of their heavy dependence on the PDS and its lack of reliability, 
people in the urban regions are usually said to have suffered more from food 
shortages and the famine but according to recent studies by Hazel Smith, access to 
food has recently become a problem for farmers and their families as well: the 
regions of South Hwanghae and North Hwanghae, for instance, have become the 
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worst provinces “in terms of the relationship of nutritious status to agricultural 
self-sufficiency in the early 2000s”. In contrast, the population in North 
Hamgyong are now doing better because of the increasing number of interactions 
and market transactions with China (Smith 2009: 85).   
The World Food Programme used to channel food aid through the PDS, which 
has been greatly criticised because of the unfair nature of the PDS. Others argue 
that the PDS has altogether disappeared in spite of the government’s efforts to 
maintain it (Ireson 2013: 111). Today, Hazel Smith believes that the best way to 
ensure transparency of food aid distribution would be through the use of schools 
as distribution points (Smith  2011a).  
Rise of a dual economy 
 
In order to cope with the quasi-collapse of the PDS, the North Korean 
population has been increasingly relying on farmer markets, which have been 
burgeoning in the country. In 2000, the Bank of Korea reported that the 
underground economy amounted to 27 percent of North Korea’s Gross National 
Income (Eberstadt 2007: 209)  
Farmer markets have become more diversified and supply a range of different 
products. According to Frank (2005), in the North Korean approach to the 
economy, “markets play a supplementary role in increasing the efficiency of 
state-directed production and distribution, and are not intended to replace self-
direction of the economy” (Frank 2005: 292). An appreciation that was also the 
more recent analysis of a representative of the North Korea’s national bank, the 
Central Bank: 
In the past, the utilization of the market was partially allowed because the 
state was unable to satisfactorily secure the supplies needed for the 
production activities of enterprises as planned. The market was utilized as a 
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supplementary means based on the principle of socialist economic 
management. We believe that, as the capability of the state has 
strengthened, the role of the market—which has performed its function as a 
supplementary means—will gradually dwindle (Chosun Sinbo interview 
with Central Bank representative Cho Song-hyo’n quoted in Snyder 2010: 
2). 
 
Noland and Haggard refute this, arguing that “North Korea is certainly not a 
case of a dual economic and political transition. Rather, North Korean reforms 
should be interpreted as ratification under duress of a bottom-up process of 
marketization that the regime has subsequently struggled to control” (Haggard & 
Noland 2007: 165).  
The rise of the markets furthermore means that North Korean citizens need the 
financial means to purchase goods on the markets: “food produced does not equal 
food distributed” and a “full marketization of food would leave the newly created 
poor unable to purchase an adequate diet” (Ireson 2013: 113). The examples of 
South Hwanghae and North Hwanghae provinces mentioned above are such 
examples of provinces which produce rice in abundance but where local citizens 
are unable to purchase the production.  
At the end of 2009, the authorities proceeded to a revaluation of their currency. 
On 30 November 2009, the North Korean authorities gave its citizens a week to 
exchange its old currency for a new currency at the rate of 100:1. The reforms 
failed for two reasons: because of a lack of goods available, the government was 
unable to compensate for the loss of the markets through the PDS; because of a 
sudden lack of currency, traders were unable to buy supplies in China to resell on 
the markets (Snyder 2010: 1). Nonetheless, at the end of December 2009, the 
North Korean regime took further steps to implement the reforms by banning the 
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import and use of foreign currency and closing down some of the largest markets 
in the country (Snyder 2010: 2).  The negative impact of price reforms and the 
inflation it caused was worsened by the fact that no supply-side measure had been 
provided to boost output. Practically, this means that owners of won, the original 
Korean currency, lost over 95% of their savings as a result of this devaluation.  
Many people are believed to have died from starvation as a result of the 2009 
currency reforms as they were no longer able to purchase food on the markets. 
The minister of economy was reportedly executed (Snyder 2010: 4).  To this date, 
the country continues to suffer from severe food shortages and the population, 
especially children, is gravely affected by malnutrition. According to a report 
published in May 2012 by the United Nations, two-thirds of the 24 million 
population face chronic food shortages: “Nearly a third of children under five 
show signs of stunting, particularly in rural areas where food is scarce, and 
chronic diarrhoea due to a lack of clean water, sanitation and electricity has 
become the leading cause of death among children” (United Nations 2012). 
Social changes in North Korea as a result of the famine 
 
On the one hand, scholars who advocate for the provision of food aid to North 
Korea tend to agree that political reforms in North Korea will not take place until 
the population has been fed. For example, Hazel Smith argues that “all the 
revolutions made in history and those in the Middle East are not made by starving 
people. Revolutions are made by people who have enough to eat and want more 
freedom, usually educated, usually lower middle class” (Smith 2011). The case of 
China, however, shows that for the most part, the educated middle-class benefits 
from the political status quo and is therefore not interested in challenging it.  
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Human rights activists and opponents of food aid, argue, on the other hand, 
that the provision of humanitarian assistance prolongs the existence of the state 
and thus, the suffering of the people: stop the provision of food assistance and the 
regime will collapse. The organisation Free North Korea Radio (Chayu pukhan 
pangsong), especially, have been opposing the provision of food aid to North 
Korea arguing that it only benefits the elite (Free North Korea Radio NGO 2009) 
Either way, access to food will play an important role in the future of North 
Korean society. As explained above, North Koreans have found creative ways to 
try to cope with the food crisis outside of the control of the state. At best, the 
North Korean regime has been able to contain these efforts but it is too late to stop 
them.  
In spite of this tight control by the regime over its population, it is possible to 
identify three factors which have emerged in spite of the state and which might, in 
the long term, contribute to the rise of a form of political resistance in North 
Korea. As a result of the famine, North Korea has been undergoing significant 
changes, among which are: a certain degree of decentralisation of power, 
movements of people and the rise of private markets.  
Unable to cope with the crisis of the 1990s, the central government deferred 
more responsibilities to local leaders. Andrew S. Natsios (2001) and Sue Lautze 
(1997), in their respective studies of the North Korean famine, acknowledge the 
decentralisation of power to provincial and county authorities and their positive 
contributions in addressing the humanitarian crisis. As further argued by Hazel 
Smith, “as a class they seem to have been less driven by ideology and more by 
genuine duty to the people they were responsible for feeding. They showed some 
independence from the politics of the central government and negotiated around 
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the bureaucratic obstacles that the central authorities had placed in their way. Of 
course, some performed better than others”. Hazel Smith also describes local 
leadership “as the motor of socioeconomic change” and explains how county and 
provincial authorities—who also suffered from the famine—tolerated population 
movement within North Korea and also illegal border crossing to China because 
they could not feed their populations (Smith 2005:94-95).   
Movements of the population inside the country and the possible existence of a 
certain number of ‘displaced persons’ have yet been thoroughly documented but 
might serve North Korea well and foster changes. Freedom of movement is, in 
theory, strictly limited in North Korea. However, increasing movements of 
population within North Korea and also in and out of the country, have resulted in 
an increasing number of interactions and encounters among people emerging from 
different social and economic backgrounds. According to Andrei Lankov, the 
North Korean government has nearly lost all authority over domestic travel 
(Lankov 2013: 89). In a study led by Alan Whaites from World Vision UK, 
displacement and conflict may bring about the necessary societal changes leading 
to the growth of civil society such as the transformation of original identities and 
detachment from previous preconceptions (Whaites 1996: 242).  
Trips in and out of China also mean that over the last two decades, North 
Koreans have had greater access to outside information and the media. In their 
report entitled “A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media 
Environment”, Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim (2012) reveal that the number of 
North Koreans who have not been exposed to foreign media is decreasing and that 
there is an increasing amount of material being smuggled across the border into 
North Korea such as televisions, radios, DVDs and USB sticks. This increase of 
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access to foreign information has been accompanied, the authors argue, by an 
“increasing willingness among North Koreans to share information with those 
they trust ... bribes often allow one to avoid punishment and far fewer North 
Koreans appear to be reporting on each other than before” (Kretchun & Jane Kim 
2012: 1). Finally, private markets, which for many have become the only source 
of food supply, have also established the foundations of capitalism in North Korea 
where individuals, not only farmers, can trade. More importantly, they have 
opened a new space, outside of the control of the state, where people (especially 
women) can come, meet and exchange information. In 2008, a group of women 
demonstrated against threats by the government to regulate or even close some of 
these markets (Good Friends NGO May 2008).   
5. The new ethics of humanitarianism and the dilemma of food aid to 
North Korea 
 
With regards to North Korea, David Hawk (2010) argues that 
engagement/peace oriented policies have always lacked a human rights 
component. He identifies three policies that have so far been implemented: a 
concern for human rights but a confrontational approach (US policy 2002-2005); 
full engagement with no regards for human rights (South Korean policy 1998-
2008); engagement with no human rights component (US policy 1993-2000). For 
the most part, South Korean evangelical groups have either been providing food 
assistance and promoted engagement or have adopted a confrontational approach 
and have been fighting to improve human rights in North Korea.   
 The challenge, argues David Hawk, would be to engage with the North—
promote peace—whilst including strategies to promote human rights (Hawk 2010: 
17-30). In other words, it is possible to implement an inclusive approach towards 
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North Korea: work for the establishment of a peace agreement, provide food 
assistance and promote human rights. Such a holistic approach would require that 
non-state actors and states agreed to work together. Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, 
former UN rapporteur for human rights in the DPRK, used to plea for a “people 
first policy” in reference the military first policy implemented in North Korea. 
In fact, the debate over food aid to North Korea falls within a broader debate 
with regards to new ethics of humanitarianism and an ideological shift within the 
field of human rights. Since the establishment of the International Red Cross, 
humanitarianism has relied on principles of neutrality according to which 
assistance should be provided to both sides of a conflict, regardless of the human 
rights atrocities committed by one side against the other. The core principles of 
humanitarianism as laid out by the ICRC are: humanity, neutrality, impartiality 
and independence: 
Humanity commands attention to all people. Impartiality requires that 
assistance be based on need and not on the basis of nationality, race, 
religion, gender, or political opinion. Neutrality demands that humanitarian 
organisations refrain from taking part in hostilities or from taking any action 
that either benefits or disadvantages the parties to the conflict. Independence 
demands that assistance should not be connected to any of the parties 
directly involved in armed conflicts or who have a stake in the outcome; 
accordingly, there is a general rule that agencies should either refuse or limit 
their reliance on government funding, especially if the donors have a stake in 
the outcome (Barnett & Weiss: 2008: 3)    
Meanwhile human rights activity was considered political since it was an 
ideological response to the conservative dictatorships of the Cold War era. 
Towards the end of the Cold War, activists began to reconsider their ideology. 
Thus, human rights activism borrowed the concept of “impartiality” from 
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humanitarianism and began to recognise that the state was not necessarily always 
the perpetrator of crimes (Leebaw 2007: 227). For example, in Peru, the Truth 
Commission acknowledged that during the 1980s, crimes were committed both 
by the state and by the Maoist group, the Shining Path. Likewise scholars and aid 
practitioners began to recognise that humanitarian assistance actually played a 
role in politics. For example, the ICRC was accused of complicity for refusing to 
speak out against the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany (Barnett & Weiss 
2008: 37). As aid became an instrument of foreign policy, it became politicised. 
As a result, since the early 1990s, in addition to the more traditional concerns 
for issues of development, the mandate of NGOs has been broadened to include 
promotion of “civil society, democracy, good governance, and social capital” 
(Mercer 2002: 5). This “New Policy Agenda” (Edwards & Hulme 1996) or “new 
humanitarianism” (Fox 2001) is founded on the beliefs of neoliberal economics 
and liberal theory, which also promote the idea that market and private initiatives 
are the most efficient means to achieve economic growth (Edwards & Hulme 
1996: 2). This “new policy agenda” or “new humanitarianism” implies therefore 
that NGOs are no longer considered neutral but are recognised as political actors. 
The idea that human rights and peace building should be incorporated to the NGO 
humanitarian activities puts an end to the differentiation between humanitarian 
and development interventions and to the principle of neutrality (Fox 2001). 
Western states have been examining new “ethical” foreign policies to respond to 
the new challenges posed by a post-cold War world (Chandler 2003). The 
promotion of human rights, which was once marginalised, has now superseded 
the politics of aid and economic integration, which are even considered by some 
as a hindrance to democracy and human rights. The use of sanctions and 
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international isolation are considered more “ethical” (Chandler 2003: 304). The 
defence of human rights and democracy through humanitarian intervention was 
institutionalised in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) and is commonly referred to as the “responsibility to 
protect” (Chandler 2004: 60). In reality, human rights advocates and 
humanitarian practitioners have engaged in an “impossible comparison between 
the apples of human life and the pears of human freedom” (Slim 1997: 249). At a 
humanitarian conference held in Seoul in November 2009, Hazel Smith said that 
all UN agencies “failed to resolve the assistance/protection dilemma” in North 
Korea.  Hazel Smith claims that this goal cannot be achieved and she argues that 
in general: 
[T]he role of humanitarian agencies is to support international human rights 
law as well as to deliver assistance. In the DPRK, this meant that humanitarian 
agencies, as in every country in the world, were supposed to try to counter 
human rights abuse as well as to provide assistance to those who needed it. As 
everywhere else in the world, humanitarian agencies working with a 
government that most of the world found to be a congenital abuser of human 
rights, could not find ways to both carry out their assistance role and to carry 
out the protection mandate (Smith 2009: 88).  
However, the fact that the current food shortages are attributed to the 
government and their failure to undertake reforms is not the only reason why 
many are against the provision of food aid to North Korea. There are other 
arguments used to oppose the provision of food aid as described below. 
Lack of reliable data 
 
Nicholas Eberstadt (2007), an economist, argues that it is virtually impossible 
to carry out an exhaustive appraisal of the state of the North Korean economy 
because of the unreliability of the documents provided by the North Korean 
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authorities, the scarcity of accurate statistics as well as North Korea’s refusal to 
allow the international community including the WFP to conduct thorough 
research around the country (Eberstadt 2007). North Korea has also been accused 
of exaggerating and/or distorting data when calling for assistance. However 
Schwekendiek  (2011) says that there are good reasons to believe that the North 
Korean government would not falsify data: “This is because it is too difficult to 
falsify just one figure alone ... Supposing a regime manipulates one number, then 
it would have to falsify all others as well: if it artificially increases its industrial 
output this year, it would have to falsify next year’s figure too to report politically 
impressive growth rates, hence it would have to keep on falsifying and 
exaggerating in its figures for all periods thereafter” (Schwekendiek 2011: 18). 
Instead Schwekendiek believes that North Koreans being surveyed tend to give 
what they believe to be politically correct answers in order to protect their 
families (Schwekendiek 2011: 21). 
Political considerations: bellicose behaviour, human rights violations 
and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
 
North Korea is criticised by some for not spending its hard currency on the 
import of food. Since 1999, it is estimated that 90% of North Korea’s food 
provision comes from food aid as opposed to commercial imports. Hazel Smith 
claims that non-food imports occurred in the areas of energy, agriculture and 
industry, which might contribute to the development of the country in the future 
(Smith 2009: 84). In contrast, most academics criticise North Korea’s failure to 
import food and argue that food aid has prevented North Korea from undertaking 
the necessary economic reforms that would improve the living conditions of its 
citizens and that it allows it to spend its foreign currency in the purchase of other 
items (Taylor & Manyin 2011: 30). North Korea is accused of investing its money 
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in military expenditures and the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) including nuclear weapons instead of spending money on the welfare of 
its population. Equally, there has been a growing discontent in the international 
community with regards to North Korea’s behaviour. Two nuclear tests, missile 
tests, the sinking of a South Korean military vessel and the shelling of 
Yeonpyeong, a disputed island in the Yellow Sea, have angered North Korea’s 
largest food donors: South Korea and the United-States. Furthermore, it is argued 
that aid can only be beneficial and contribute to the country’s development when 
the country has pre-emptively adopted policies that are favourable to economic 
growth, which is not the case of North Korea (Coyne & Ryan 2009: 38).  
Food diversion, monitoring and access 
 
In addition, human rights campaigners and North Korean refugees have been 
questioning the provision of aid to North Korea arguing that is does not reach the 
most vulnerable segments of the population and that in fact much of the food aid 
received is being diverted to the army. The North Korean authorities restricted the 
WFP and NGOs staff from conducting unanticipated verifications (Taylor & 
Manyin 2011:13). The authorities denied random access to foreigners, claiming 
they could challenge the nation’s stability by undermining the “control of 
information and the control of individual movement” (Taylor & Manyin 2011:16). 
In the 1990s, NGOs and UN agencies faced a number of restrictions on their 
activities in North Korea. The North Korean government was involved in every 
aspect of relief efforts, banned organisations from using Korean-speaking staff 
and enforced a week’s advance notice to be given to conduct food monitoring 
(Snyder 2013: 216). The question of whether food is effectively diverted to the 
army constitutes another subject of controversy. The military-first strategy, 
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sŏngun, has been a dominant characteristic of Korean propaganda since 1995 and 
“expresses the emphasis on the military throughout society˝ (Young-sun Lee & 
Deok-ryong Yoon 2004: 52). Lee and Yoon say that that the military-first policy 
naturally proceeds from the economic crisis provoked by the 1995 flood and the 
1996 drought. As thousands of people died and a considerable number of people 
abandoned their jobs to go and seek food, the military then took over people’s 
jobs ensuring, political, economic and social stability.  
According to various reports, food being sold on markets at a government-
controlled price serves as evidence that officials are stealing and reselling food. 
Refugees have also reported that food aid was being distributed to the army 
(Taylor & Manyin 2011: 9). But it can also be argued that there exists no 
verifiable evidence to corroborate those claims since they mostly rely on the 
testimonies of refugees, or that some food has been diverted but not a substantial 
amount. According to the WFP, diversion is unlikely for the following reasons:  
§ The North Korean army and party elite have preferential access to national 
agricultural production (which is mainly rice and more desirable than the 
WFP’s wheat donations), 
§ China and other countries provide food aid that can be used by the North 
Korean military and elite, 
§ The Army has its own agricultural production, 
§ There is a culture of respect for state authority, and 
§ Intense regimentation of all sectors of society precludes thefts (Quinones 
2002: 17). 
 
Another reason why the diversion of food might be unlikely these days is 
because food aid is targeted and over the years, the WFP has been able to 
negotiate a certain level of freedom with the North Korean authorities that allows 
them to conduct their activity in greater transparency. In an email, Katharina 
Zellweger (2012) said that the WFP had the best monitoring system:  
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The most vulnerable are children, pregnant and nursing women and the 
elderly. WFP food aid is targeted and goes mainly to children, mostly 
children below the age of six, that is at present to about 1 million children in 
nurseries and kindergartens. Food provided is mostly in the form of fortified 
blended food. WFP has unhindered access to ports, warehouses, factories, 
institutions and households. In 2011, WFP staff travelled more than 350,000 
miles throughout the country. Over 2000 beneficiary visits were conducted. 
Data collection and supervision has been strengthened as the DPRK 
government by now facilitates taking measurements of children, surveys and 
assessments. Moreover, WFP has now access to markets and also Korean 
speakers among its monitoring team (Katharina Zellweger  2012). 
With regard to access and monitoring, South Korean NGOs faced even greater 
challenges not least because their staff are all Korean speakers. The North 
Koreans restricted their access to the region of Pyongyang but some organisations 
managed to negotiate access to the south and the north of the province. World 
Vision Korea and Good Neighbors were also able to negotiate access to specific 
institutions such as children’s homes or schools (Reed 2009:210). The KSM also 
implemented a housing programme in the south of Pyongyang (North Hwanghae 
province) whereby the NGO would provide materials and local people would 
provide the labour. This operation required a certain level of interaction between 
the NGO’s staff and local people who knew that their counterparts were from 
South Korea (Reed 2009: 212). With the implementation of such projects, NGOs 
were able to facilitate the visit of a large number of donors from South Korea: 
between the years 1996 and 2005, the Ministry of Unification of South Korea has 
reported that 13,822 South Koreans visited the North to visit projects (Reed 2009: 
212). 
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But South Korean organisations are also very realistic and admit that there 
continues to be problems with food monitoring and access: “I recognise there is 
clear tension between human right organisations and humanitarian aid 
organisations. Both organisations have different scope of work but work hard for 
the DPRK children and people. Corruption is prevalent in underdeveloped 
countries, especially bad government [sic] including the DPRK, Somalia and 
Zimbabwe. As a humanitarian aid worker, I do believe that the fact that people 
receive only 20% of the food we sent, we have to send humanitarian goods for 
some people” (SK6). And as Schwekendiek (2011) argues “international food aid 
has indeed helped the people” (Schwekendiek 2011: 61). 
The ongoing debate with regards to food aid is in fact reminiscent of the 
debate that took place in the earlier years of the North Korean famine when the 
international community de-humanised the North Korean population by putting 
emphasis on the political nature of the famine under the mismanagement of an 
authoritarian state. Generally Western media tend to focus on the leadership of 
North Korea. The Kims are well known figures in the media. The media however 
rarely reports on the daily struggle of the population of 24 million. With regards 
to the debate that took place in the 1990s, Aaltola argues: 
On the one hand, because of the existing humanitarian emphasis 
‘instinctively’ connected with images of famine, the ‘natural’ sequence of 
events in the North Korean case seemed to point to the following chain: 
natural disaster--> famine--> suffering--> immediate aid. This stereotypic 
sequence emphasises the moral point of view, which is immune to political 
influences: one has a moral responsibility to help the needy and suffering 
immediately. On the other hand, the North Korean famine was placed in a 
larger, politically charged context instead of highlighting the face-value and 
iconic implications of the situation: Communist mismanagement--> chronic 
	   266 
food scarcity--> minimum food aid ... the fact that the delayed or minimum 
food aid to North Korea caused enormous suffering in the country was 
effectively de-emphasized by associating the famine with the natural collapse 
of an ‘evil’ and ‘flawed’ Communist regime instead of with a humanitarian 
catastrophe” (Aaltola 1999: 374-375). 
 
As explained earlier human rights activists are amongst the strongest 
opponents to food aid for North Korea because they claim that it sustains the 
regime. Humanitarian workers, especially South Korean representatives, are often 
of the view that the human rights movement is driven by political considerations 
whereas they claim to be addressing the problem at its roots by promoting peace 
and feeding the people inside the country thus addressing directly the problems of 
defection and China’s forced repatriation of refugees. Many NGOs who provide 
aid to North Korea believe that North Koreans have the right to food and that 
refusing to deliver it amounts to a violation of their dignity and right to life (SK1). 
However, as pointed out by Seong-ho Jhe, former human rights ambassador at 
large for South Korea, the UN resolutions with regards to human rights in North 
Korea never prioritised civil and political rights over the right to food but 
emphasised the need to improve all aspects of the lives of North Koreans. Seong-
ho Jhe rightly argues that civil society and policy makers in South Korea should 
stop regarding human rights and food aid as conflicting concepts and start to 
adopt a constructive and balanced attitude. He also calls for an end to the Cold 
War discourse ongoing in the South: 
It is not appropriate to dichotomize those who stress humanitarian aid to 
North Korea and those who debate the North’s human rights situation, 
labeling the former as liberal, nationalistic and pro-unification and the latter 
as conservative, Cold War-orientated, confrontational and anti-unification ... 
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the South Korean government should implement mature and balanced North 
Korea policies that provide humanitarian aid on the one hand and 
continuously raise the human rights issues in the North on the other so as to 
address inter-Korean relations in a comprehensive and integrated manner 
(Seong-ho Jhe  2011: 79). 
In fact, the provision of assistance to North Korea has served different 
purposes. In addition to relief efforts, humanitarian workers and promoters of 
politics of engagement believe that working in North Korea with North Koreans is 
important for a number of reasons as listed below. 
Building trust 
 
Many NGOs and institutions have concentrated their efforts on building 
relationships with North Koreans and re-establishing trust between North Korea 
and the rest of the world. According to Hazel Smith, “an unanticipated effort of 
humanitarian operations was to contribute substantially to the potential for active 
peace on the peninsula. In some ways, these operations provided a motor and 
model for peacebuilding initiatives” (Smith 2005: 6).  
The main difficulty for NGOs working to promote peace, empowerment or 
democracy lies in the procedures of evaluation or assessment: “[a]ssessing NGO 
performance is a difficult and messy business.” Edwards and Hulme (1996) argue 
that one can only “judge” and “interpret” NGO performance. Not only is there no 
“bottom line” to measure progress against but also the outcome of NGO activity 
largely depends on the influence of external variables which are out of the control 
of NGOs. Therefore, some argue that the connection between NGOs and the 
processes of empowerment and democratisation are in reality purely “speculative 
and rhetorical” (Fisher 1997: 449). However, in an analysis of the work of rights-
based NGOs in Latin America, the authors argue that “just because income 
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generation is measurable quantitatively, it does not prove that economic gain is a 
more valid goal that the less measurable goals of empowerment, increased self-
esteem or creativity” (Lazar & Molyneux 2003: 229). Edwards and Hulme further 
assert that these achievements, which belong to the “realm of the invisible” 
(Kaplan 2000: 520), are the essence of sustainable development and that their 
importance should not be downplayed (Edwards & Hulme 1996: 34). 
Non-state activities have taken different shapes and range from capacity 
building to academic and cultural exchanges. NGOs are involved in what is called 
Track II diplomatic exchanges—“that is, sponsoring informal communications 
between North Korean scientists, academics, military officers and private citizens, 
and their counterparts in the United States or overseas” (Taylor & Manyin 
2011:10). South Korean NGOs, in particular, are often determined to strengthen 
their relationships with their North Korean counterparts. They also frequently 
believe that aid to North Korea could be more consistent if the government lifted 
the ban on travel to North Korea (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 131). They want to reduce 
the problems of social integration that may happen after reunification (Jong-moo 
Lee 2009: 129). As argued by Samuel S. Kim, reunification without reconciliation 
could be disastrous and reconciliation could actually be a goal in itself (Samuel S. 
Kim 2006: 343).  
Capacity building; teaching by example 
 
Erich Weingartner says that aid workers should demonstrate to their North 
Korean partners “through example, how a civil society functions” (Weingartner 
2001: 34). Another reason why NGOs and the international community want to 
work inside North Korea is because they want to train and empower the North 
Koreans: “Capacity building is an ongoing process of helping people, 
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organisations and societies improve and adapt to changes around them. 
Performance and improvements are taken in the light of the mission, objectives, 
context, resources and sustainability” (James 2001: 3). Many South Korean NGOs 
argue that “they are willing to heighten the consciousness of North Koreans 
regarding development assistance projects through the successful demonstration 
of pilot development assistance projects, and to stimulate North Koreans to 
change institutions and policies into ones which fit more into development 
purposes” (Jong-moo Lee 2009: 130). 
 The European Union places great emphasis on capacity building in North 
Korea. Since the beginning of its operations in the country in 1995, the European 
Union (EU) has been very supportive of “reform inducement”: “ECHO’s projects 
are peanuts, but our objective is to open their mind” (Schloms 2004: 13). NGO 
workers say they are not oblivious to the fact that the North Korean government 
itself must take constructive measures to implement concrete positive changes: 
“while NGOs can make a contribution towards improving the situation of the 
DPRK people and are perhaps sowing seeds of change, humanitarian aid agencies 
cannot solve the problem; this needs the commitment of the DPRK government to 
bring about change and it needs an international environment which is less hostile, 
in which mutual interests and mutual responsibilities are shared” (Zellweger 
2005: 27).  
Critics have said that the work of NGOs has had very limited impact on North 
Korea’s behaviour but supporters of aid say that “trust-building efforts, though 
not immediately measurable, might be an important investment in the possibility 
of future reconciliation” (Thomas T. Park, Seliger & Hyung-suk Kim 2007: 145).  
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In fact, literature on civil society in former communist states and NGOs’ 
involvement with such regimes challenges preconceived ideas about civil society 
and international NGO work. Scholars have increasingly acknowledged the 
existence of a state-led civil society in former communist states or in present day 
China and recognised that Western civil society, for instance Western NGOs, 
should accept to work in collaboration which such bodies. For instance, the 
leaders of Vietnamese NGOs are in reality former high-ranking officials (Lux & 
Straussman 2004: 178). The case of Vietnam also illustrates the fact that the 
intentions of the NGOs are not necessarily the same as that of donors in terms of 
expected outputs or working style (Lux, & Straussman 2003: 176). Development 
NGO work in Vietnam began two years after the beginning of the transition, ‘Doi 
Moi’, and was initiated by a Thai NGO, Population and Development 
International (PDI). In the early days of its work, the NGO focused on training 
and educational projects for governmental officials. The organisation also worked 
with state led actors such as the Ministry of Health, the Vietnam Women’s Union 
and the Vietnam Youth Union (Lux & Straussman 2003: 176).  Lux and 
Straussman argue that this type of engagement which was not a “state-to-state 
encounter” or “state-to-United Nations” relationship; provided the foundations for 
modern day civil society’s development in Vietnam (Lux & Straussman 2003: 
177).  
6. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter examined the background to NGO activity in both North and 
South Korea. It identified the relationship between the state and civil society in a 
Korean context. It was argued that civil society very much depends on the 
political configurations of the state rather than on cultural predilections. It was 
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argued that although South Korean Christian organisations have a degree of 
agency, they are limited in their endeavours because of wider structural factors 
such as the South Korean state control over NGOs, an over politicised and 
polarised civil society as well as other socio-cultural factors that prevent the 
strengthening of civil society. In the second part, this chapter identified the factors 
that determined NGO activity in North Korea. In doing so, it explained the 
mechanisms of the ongoing food crisis in North Korea and further speculated 
about the potential emergence of civil society in North Korea. Finally, it 
summarised the arguments in favour and against food aid as the international and 
domestic debate affects greatly the way NGO activity is perceived in North 
Korea. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
1. Summary of argument 
 
This research examined the way South Korean evangelicals responded to the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea because I wanted to identify how evangelicals 
design their mission strategy to North Korea. In the process of doing so, the aim 
was to help understand the role of South Korean evangelicalism/ conservative 
Christianity in relation to North Korea. South Korean Christian evangelical 
organisations have been at the forefront of humanitarian activity in North Korea 
and this research argued therefore that the current civil society response to the 
crisis in North Korea could not be fully understood without assessing its religious 
component.  
I used contextualisation as a criterion to assess mission to North Korea. The 
concept of contextualisation and my underpinning philosophy of critical realism, 
mean that the experience of Koreans must be taken into account to understand 
Korean evangelicalism. I argued that evangelicals have been shaped by and 
engaged with their context. In addition to the spiritual and cultural background, 
historical and socio-political factors have affected the way by which evangelicals 
have received, integrated and sought to spread the gospel. More specifically, as 
the purpose of my study was to show how evangelicals are engaging with issues 
of poverty, division of the peninsula and human rights, I referred to the holistic 
model of contextualisation. 
 My dissertation sought to give answers to the following questions: how do 
South Korean evangelical organisations construct their mission strategies to North 
Korea?  How do they respond to the perceived humanitarian concerns? How do 
they view North Korea? Does active involvement in the North mean that they 
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have given up on their anti-communist stance? What is their context? What are 
the factors and conditions that limit and determine their related activities in the 
South and in the North? 
First, my research sought to build a bridge between the ‘secular’ and the 
‘sacred’ and argued that in spite of the twentieth century’s politics of 
secularisation, religion has not disappeared from the public sphere and is in fact 
growing. Equally, it was argued that the North Korean government never 
managed to resolve the question of religion and that in spite of its politics of 
religious persecution, especially toward Christians; North Koreans are still 
interested in faith and spirituality. It was also said that current research on the 
relationship between North Korea and NGOs does not fully integrate the level of 
influence exerted by Christians, especially evangelicals, on policy toward North 
Korea.  
My research concluded that while providing humanitarian assistance to North 
Korea, South Korean evangelical organisations (faith-based organisations) have 
demonstrated their willingness to work within the North Korean context. They 
have responded to the perceived needs of the field while respecting the 
limitations imposed on their activities. They have accepted to work with the 
North Korean authorities, which means that they had no choice but to integrate 
their activities within the broader domestic system. In other words, their activity 
cannot be perceived as being imposed from the outside but instead as being the 
result of collaboration between South and North Koreans. However, this does not 
mean that they have not challenged South Korean policies when they deemed it 
necessary, as exemplified by their advocacy activities at the height of the famine. 
It was further argued that because of the restrictions imposed on their activities by 
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North Koreans, evangelicals were compelled to develop more creative ways to 
approach North Koreans than straightforward evangelism.  
My research also argued that the aim for evangelicals is not only to address 
humanitarian concerns but also to restore God’s glory in Pyongyang and achieve 
the reunification of the two countries. Therefore, their activities are not devoid of 
a political agenda and continue to carry an anti-communist/anti-North Korea 
overtone that characterised the era of the Cold War. A strong sense of Christian 
nationalism continues to explain the reason why South Korean evangelicals 
become involved with mission to North Korea. 
Thus, it was argued that their revival theology is intrinsically linked to their 
political theology as they are aiming to reconstruct a reunified, democratised and 
christianised peninsula. They continue to believe that Christianity can liberate 
North Koreans from Kim Il-sungism and believe that Korea, as a nation, has a 
special role to play in the evangelisation of the world.  They believe that the 
coming of the kingdom of God will include the reunification of the two Koreas as 
they compare the current situation to that of biblical Israel.  
My dissertation also exposed differences of opinion within the conservative 
tradition: evangelicals have split between those who oppose food aid—the human 
rights movement—and those who advocate food aid—the humanitarian 
movement.  Most Christian human rights activists oppose food aid not only 
because they believe that it sustains the regime, but also because they believe that 
it amounts to aiding evil. Humanitarian activists, on the other hand, believe that 
they can help North Korean society develop by expressing God’s love through the 
provision of food aid and development assistance. This shows that it would be 
inaccurate to lump together all evangelicals. As it was also explained, the division 
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is reflective of the wider domestic context whereby those with conservative 
political leanings are believed to be against the North Korean regime whereas 
those with democratic political leanings are believed to be in favour of 
engagement with North Korea.  
The chapter dedicated to Juche and mission to North Korea argued that North 
Koreans have developed a form of civil religion as formulated by philosopher 
Rousseau. It was argued that some evangelicals are slowly moving from a 
position of antagonism toward the North Korean system to a position of greater 
humility. So far, most South Korean evangelicals have placed themselves in a 
position of moral superiority in light of the perceived failure of the North Korean 
system to provide for its people, however, many are increasingly recognising the 
importance of understanding the worldview of North Koreans and of restoring 
broken relationships. 
In the last chapter, I examined the evolving relationship between civil society 
and the state in South Korea. It was argued that successive South Korean 
governments have not allowed civil society groups to operate fully independently 
and that, often, governments use civil society to implement or strengthen their 
policy. The absence of a peace treaty especially, continues to affect regional 
politics and the scope of civil society activity. This chapter also looked at the 
mechanisms of the food crisis in North Korea and identified the restrictions 
imposed on civil society activity.  
In conclusion, this research argued that in spite of the rhetoric, South Korean 
evangelicals were never apolitical and were always engaged to a certain extent in 
social action. It was argued that South Korean evangelicals have been shaped by 
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their context and have also engaged with it. Their dedication to relieving hunger 
and poverty in North Korea shows that they take the socio-political context of 
North Korea seriously. Furthermore, in spite of the spirit of division between 
humanitarian and human rights groups, ultimately it means that evangelicals, as a 
group, have sought not only to address the symptoms but also the roots of the 
problems by challenging the North Korean political structures. In that respect, it 
could be argued that their activities as a whole have embraced the North Korean 
problem holistically.  
As some South Korean evangelicals continue to re-evaluate and identify new 
strategies to approach North Korea, they seek to understand the North Korean 
worldview through the study of Juche and it is suggested that, in fact, they are 
looking to apply cross-cultural missiological principles. They also believe that 
mission to North Korea should be more integrated and include the restoration of 
relationships or shalom. 
2. Further areas of research 
 
In his concluding remarks on the future of Korean theology, Adams argues that 
Koreans are no longer developing new theologies. He claims that “many of the 
creative theologians in Korea have had a personal experience of suffering which 
has caused them to question old assumptions and to think deeply about life” 
(Adams 2012:269). Adams says that many experienced suffering under Japanese 
occupation, during the Korean War and the establishment of the DPRK. Liberal 
Christians also suffered when they challenged South Korean conservative 
government but now, says Adams, Korea is enjoying a period of prosperity and 
“the personal experience of suffering is no long the norm, but rather the 
exception, for theologians” (Adams 2012 270). Furthermore, in their respective 
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studies, both Jin-hwan Kim (2012) and Byung-ro Kim [(2005) deplore a lack of 
research on a theology of reunification.  
However, with a growing number of North Korean refugees converting to 
Christianity—there are currently approximately 24,000 North Koreans in South 
Korea and many also live in Europe and the United States—new theologies might 
not come from South Korea, as it is generally expected, but rather be the 
prerogative of North Koreans who have experienced tremendous suffering in their 
home country and escaped to face the challenges of living in capitalistic and 
competitive societies.  Further studies of mission to North Korea and theologies of 
reunification therefore should not only include the voices of the North Koreans 
themselves but in fact be their own work. In other words, North Koreans should 
no longer be the objects but the subjects of mission studies and theologies of 
reunification. 
This research focused on the involvement of South Korean evangelicals in 
relation to North Korea. Further research should be dedicated to the study of the 
role of liberal churches in addressing humanitarian concerns in North Korea. 
Unlike evangelical groups, liberal churches have a less antagonistic attitude 
toward North Korea and, as seen in the second chapter, have engaged into 
dialogue with the North Korean official churches. However they have also been 
actively engaged in humanitarian relief campaigns in North Korea. On the other 
hand, liberal churches have been less critical of human rights violations 
committed and it would be interesting to explore why this is the case. 
3. Conclusion 
 
While this research focused on mission to North Korea, South Korean 
Christian humanitarian organisations and missionaries are currently spread in 
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different regions of the world, this research provided an insight into their values 
and motivations. It lays the grounds for further research on the role of South 
Korean evangelical missionaries as they seek to engage with the contexts of other 
areas of the world.  
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Appendix 1 Semi-structured interview questions  
 
 
1. 이 일에 참여하기로 결정한 이유는 무엇이며 목표는 무엇입니까?  
   
2. 북한과의 대화창구는 어떻게 됩니까?  
   
3. 당신은 인권단체와 어떤 관계를 맺고 있습니까?  
인도주의적 식량지원의 문제점 (대북 식량 전용) “allegations of food 
diversion”에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까? 풍선을 띄우는 등과 같은 대북 
선전 행위/인권단체의 활동이 당신의 활동에 영향을 미칩니까?  
   
4. 남한 정권의 변화는 대북활동에 영향을 주었습니까?  
만일 그렇다면, 어떤 방식으로 영향을 미칩니까? 남북관계의 변화가 
어떻게 영향을 줍니까? 예) 북한 방문의 제한?  
   
5. 대한민국 내에서 보수와 진보 사이에의 분리/갈등이 (division) 당신의 
활동에 영향을 줍니까?  
   
6. 개인적으로 생각할 때 전반적으로 대한민국 국민들은  대북지원에 
찬성/반대 한다고 생각하십니까? 만일 그렇다면, 설명해 주십시오.  
   
7. 당신은, 왜 한국의 기독교 단체들이 일반 단체들 보다 더 북한 문제에 
관심을 갖는다고 생각합니까?  
예) 이것은 한반도의 기독교 역사 때문입니까? 선교적인 이유입니까? 
하나님의 사랑을 보여 주기 위해서입니까?  
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Appendix 2  Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North 
Korea: Member Organisations 
 
 
??? ? 
Green One Korea 
greenonekorea.or.kr 
Welfare & Environment 
 
????????? 
Gyung-Nam Unification Agricultural Collaboration Cooperation  
gntongil.org 
Agriculture/ Medical aid/ Welfare & Environment/ Humanitarian Aid 
 
??????? 
The Salvation Army Korea T erritory 
salvationarmy.or.kr 
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment / Emergency Aid 
 
???? 
Korea Food for the Hungry 
kfhi.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????? 
International Corn Foundation 
icf.or.kr 
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment 
 
????? 
Good Neighbors 
goodneighbors.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
 
??? 
Good People 
goodpeople.or.kr 
Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
 
?? ????? 
Nanum International 
inanum.org 
Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
????????? 
Inter-Korean Kangwon Association Council*  
No website 
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????????? 
Inter-Korea Cooperation & Development Council  
No website 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
?????? 
South-North Sharing Campaign 
sharing.net 
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid 
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?????? 
Korea Peace Foundation 
snpeace.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Culture / Emergency Aid 
 
???????? 
Korean Living Together Movement 
kltm.org 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
 
???????????? 
Jeju Center for Inter-Korea Exchange & Cooperation  
jejunk-coop.or.kr 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
 
?????? 
The Korean National Tuberculosis Association 
knta.or.kr 
Medical Aid 
 
???????? 
The General Assembly of Presbyterian Church of Korea 
pck.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
 
?????? 
Korean Medical Association 
kma.org 
Medical Aid 
 
?????? 
The Korean Association of People Sharing Love  
No website 
Agriculture / Welfare & Environment / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
 
????? 
SAM Care International 
samcare.org ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid 
 
??????? 
Okedongmu Children in Korea 
okfriend.org ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????????? 
Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture  
neafound.org 
 
????? 
Lighthouse Foundation 
lighthousekorea.org ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
???????? 
National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement  
saemaul.net ( Eng ) 
Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
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?????????? 
Zero TB World 
zerotb.net 
Medical Aid 
 
???? ????? 
Green Umbrella Child Fund Korea 
childfund.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
 
??? ??? ??? ??????  
Coal Sharing Movement* 
lovecoal.org 
Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????? 
New Millennium Life Movement  
new2000.org 
Welfare & Environment 
 
??????? 
Save the Children Korea 
sc.or.kr 
Welfare & Environment / Medical Aid 
 
???? 
Movement For One Korea 
krhana.org 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid Welfare & Environment 
Education 
 
???????? 
New World Nice People 
nwnp.kr 
Agriculture / Medical Aid Welfare & Environment / 
Emergency Aid 
 
?????? 
Service For Peace Korea Foundation  
sfp.or.kr 
Humanitarian Aid 
 
?????????? 
Medical Aid for Children 
healthchild.org 
Emergency Aid / Medical Aid 
 
?????????? 
Korean Sharing Movement 
ksm.or.kr 
Emergency Aid / Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????????? 
Won-Buddhists Movement for Sowing Grace 
won.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
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???? 
World Vision 
worldvision.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
????? 
Eugene Bell Foundation 
eugenebell.org ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid 
 
??????????? 
Jeollanamdo Residents Interchange Association 
 unijn.or.kr 
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid 
 
?????????? 
One Korea Buddhist Movement 
bubta.org 
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid 
 
?????? 
Paper Culture Foundation 
paperculture.or.kr 
 
?????? 
Good Hands 
goodhands.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Humanitarian Aid / Agriculture / Emergency Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
???????? ??????? 
Nation Reconciliation Committee 
caminjok.or.kr 
Humanitarian Aid 
 
??????? ???????  
Committee for the reconciliation of the Korean People 
 hwahai.cbck.or.kr 
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
 
???????? 
Korea Unification Network 
kuninet.or.kr 
Medical Aid / Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??3000  
The Corea Peace3000 
peace3000.net 
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??? ? 
Forest For Peace 
peaceforest.or.kr 
Welfare & Environment 
 
???? 
GreenTree Charity Foundation 
greentreekorea.org 
Medical Aid / Humanitarian Aid 
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??????????? 
Evergreen One Korea 
cafe.daum.net/hana3000 
Humanitarian Aid / Medical Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
????????? 
Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and culture  
koreahana.net 
Humanitarian Aid / Agriculture 
 
??YMCA????  
National Council of YMCAs of KOREA  
ymcakorea.org 
Humanitarian Aid 
Welfare & Environment 
 
???????? 
Korea Association of Health Promotion  
kahp.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Medical Aid 
 
???????? 
Dairy Goat Project 
goat4north.net 
Agriculture / Humanitarian Aid 
 
??????? 
Join Together Society 
jts.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Agriculture / Medical Aid Humanitarian Aid / Emergency Aid 
 
?????? 
Caritas Corea 
caritas.or.kr ( Eng ) 
Education / Agriculture / Welfare & Environment / Medical Aid 
 
??????? 
Korean Foundation for World Aid 
 hankorea.or.kr 
Agriculture / Medical Aid Humanitarian Aid / Welfare & Environment 
 
??????? 
Sharing Together Society 
sharingtogether.or.kr 
Welfare & Environment / Humanitarian Aid 
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